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Foreword

their efforts to provide timely data for this Report.
We were also grateful for the World Risk Poll data
provided by the Lloyd’s Register Foundation as
part of their risk supplement to the Gallup World
Poll in 2019. We also greatly appreciate the life
satisfaction data collected during 2020 as part
of the Covid Data Hub run in 2020 by Imperial
College London and the YouGov team. These data
partnerships are all much appreciated.

This is the ninth World Happiness Report. We use
this Foreword to offer our thanks to all those who
have made the Report possible over the past nine
years and to thank our team of editors and partners
as we prepare for our decennial report in 2022.
The first eight reports were produced by the
founding trio of co-editors assembled in Thimphu
in July 2011 pursuant to the Bhutanese Resolution
passed by the General Assembly in June 2011
that invited national governments to “give
more importance to happiness and well-being in
determining how to achieve and measure social
and economic development.” The Thimphu
meeting, chaired by Prime Minister Jigme Y.
Thinley and Jeffrey D. Sachs, was called to
plan for a United Nations High-Level Meeting
on ‘Well-Being and Happiness: Defining a
New Economic Paradigm’ held at the UN on
April 2, 2012. The first World Happiness Report
was prepared in support of that meeting and
reviewing evidence from the emerging science
of happiness.

Although the World Happiness Reports are based
on a wide variety of data, the most important
source has always been the Gallup World Poll,
which is unique in the range and comparability of
its global series of annual surveys.
The life evaluations from the Gallup World Poll
provide the basis for the annual happiness rankings
that have always sparked widespread interest.
Readers may be drawn in by wanting to know
how their nation is faring but soon become
curious about the secrets of life in the happiest
countries. The Gallup team has always been
extraordinarily helpful and efficient in getting
each year’s data available in time for our annual
launches on International Day of Happiness,
March 20th. Right from the outset, we received
very favourable terms from Gallup and the very
best of treatment. Gallup researchers have also
contributed to the content of several World
Happiness Reports. The value of this partnership
was recognized by two Betterment of the Human
Conditions Awards from the International Society
for Quality of Life Studies. The first was in 2014
for the World Happiness Report, and the second,
in 2017, went to the Gallup Organization for the
Gallup World Poll.

The preparation of the first World Happiness
Report was based in the Earth Institute at
Columbia University, with the Centre for Economic
Performance’s research support at the LSE and
the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research,
through their grants supporting research at the
Vancouver School of Economics at UBC. The
central base for the reports has since 2013 been
the Sustainable Development Solutions
Network (SDSN) and The Center for Sustainable
Development at Columbia University, directed by
Jeffrey D. Sachs. Although the editors and authors
are volunteers, there are administrative, and
research support costs covered most recently
through a series of grants from The Ernesto Illy
Foundation, illycaffè, Davines Group, The Blue
Chip Foundation, The William, Jeff, and Jennifer
Gross Family Foundation, The Happier Way
Foundation, Indeed, and Unilever’s largest ice
cream brand Wall’s.

Since last year, Gallup has been a full data partner
in recognition of the Gallup World Poll’s importance
to the contents and reach of the World Happiness
Report. We are proud to embody in this more
formal way a history of co-operation stretching
back beyond the first World Happiness Report to
the start of the Gallup World Poll itself. COVID-19
has posed unique problems for data collection,
and the team at Gallup has been extremely
helpful in building the largest possible sample of
data in time for inclusion in this report. They have
gone the extra mile, and we thank them for it.

As noted within the report, this year has been one
like no other. The Gallup World Poll team has faced
significant challenges in collecting responses this
year due to COVID-19, and we much appreciate
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The team at the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University, Sybil Fares, Juliana
Bartels, Meredith Harris, and Savannah Pearson, and
Jesse Thorson, have provided an essential addition
to our editorial and proof-reading capacities. All
have worked on very tight timetables with great
care and friendly courtesy.

We have had a remarkable range of expert
contributing authors over the years and are
deeply grateful for their willingness to share their
knowledge with our readers. Their expertise
assures the quality of the reports, and their
generosity is what makes it possible. Thank you.
Our editorial team has evolved over the years. In
2017, we added Jan-Emmanuel De Neve, Haifang
Huang, and Shun Wang as Associate Editors, joined
in 2019 by Lara Aknin. In 2020, Jan-Emmanuel
De Neve became a co-editor, and the Oxford
Wellbeing Research Centre thereby became a
fourth research pole for the Report. In 2021,
Haifang Huang stepped down as an Associate
Editor, following four years of much-appreciated
service. He has kindly agreed to continue as
co-author of Chapter 2, where his contributions
have been crucial since 2015.

Our data partner is Gallup, and institutional
sponsors include the Sustainable Development
Solutions Network (SDSN), the Center for
Sustainable Development at Columbia University,
the Centre for Economic Performance at the LSE,
the Vancouver School of Economics at UBC, and
the Wellbeing Research Centre at Oxford.
Whether in terms of research, data, or grants,
we are enormously grateful for all of these
contributions.

Sharon Paculor has continued her excellent work
as the Production Editor. For many years, Kyu Lee
of the Earth Institute handled media management
with great skill, and we are very grateful for all he
does to make the reports widely accessible. Ryan
Swaney has been our web designer since 2013,
and Stislow Design has done our graphic design
work over the same period.

John Helliwell, Richard Layard, Jeffrey D. Sachs,
Jan-Emmanuel De Neve, Lara Aknin, Shun Wang;
and Sharon Paculor, Production Editor
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• Trust and the ability to count on others are
major supports to life evaluations, especially
in the face of crises. To feel that your lost
wallet would be returned if found by a
police officer, by a neighbour, or a stranger,
is estimated to be more important for
happiness than income, unemployment,
and major health risks (see Figure 2.4 in
chapter 2).

2020 has been a year like no other. This whole
report focuses on the effects of COVID-19
and how people all over the world have fared.
Our aim was two-fold, first to focus on the
effects of COVID-19 on the structure and quality
of people’s lives, and second to describe and
evaluate how governments all over the world have
dealt with the pandemic. In particular, we try to
explain why some countries have done so much
better than others.

• Trust is even more important in explaining
the very large international differences in
COVID-19 death rates, which were substantially higher in the Americas and Europe
than in East Asia, Australasia, and Africa,
as shown here (see Figure 2.5 of chapter
2). These differences were almost half due
to differences in the age structure of
populations (COVID-19 much more deadly
for the old), whether the country is an
island, and how exposed each country was,
early in the pandemic, to large numbers of
infections in nearby countries. Whatever
the initial circumstances, the most effective
strategy for controlling COVID-19 was to
drive community transmission to zero and
to keep it there. Countries adopting this
strategy had death rates close to zero, and
were able to avoid deadly second waves,
and ended the year with less loss of income
and lower death rates.

•T
 he pandemic’s worst effect has been the
2 million deaths from COVID-19 in 2020.
A rise of nearly 4% in the annual number
of deaths worldwide represents a serious
social welfare loss.
•F
 or the living there has been greater
economic insecurity, anxiety, disruption
of every aspect of life, and, for many
people, stress and challenges to mental
and physical health.

Happiness, trust and deaths under
COVID-19 (Chapter 2)
There has been surprising resilience in how
people rate their lives overall. The Gallup World
Poll data are confirmed for Europe by the
separate Eurobarometer surveys and several
national surveys.

• Factors supporting successful COVID-19
strategies include

• The change from 2017-2019 to 2020 varied
considerably among countries, but not
enough to change rankings in any significant
fashion materially. The same countries
remain at the top.

- confidence in public institutions. Trusted
public institutions were more likely to
choose the right strategy and have their
populations support the required actions.
For example, Brazil’s death rate was
93 per 100,000, higher than in Singapore,
and of this difference, over a third
could be explained by the difference in
public trust.

•E
 motions changed more than did life
satisfaction during the first year of
COVID-19, worsening more during lockdown and recovering faster, as illustrated
by large samples of UK data. For the world
as a whole, based on the annual data from
the Gallup World Poll, there was no overall
change in positive affect, but there was
a roughly 10% increase in the number of
people who said they were worried or
sad the previous day.

- income inequality, acting partly as a
proxy for social trust, explains 20% of
the difference in death rates between
Denmark and Mexico. A second measure
of social trust, whether there was a high
expected return of lost wallets found by
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• In early 2020, East Asian countries were
better prepared to act because of their
previous pandemics experience. However,
by mid-2020, the international evidence
was clear – you have to suppress the virus.
But in the summer, the West opened up
and had a second wave of infections that
as bad as the first.

neighbours or strangers, was associated
with far fewer deaths.
- whether the country had, or learned
from, the lessons from SARS and other
earlier pandemics.
- whether the head of the government
was a woman.

COVID-19 prevalence and well-being:
lessons from East Asia (Chapter 3)

Reasons for Asia-Pacific success in
suppressing COVID-19 (Chapter 4)

East Asia, Australia, and New Zealand’s success
are explained in detail as a case study in Chapter 3.
The chapter describes country by country, the
workings of test and trace and isolate, and travel
bans to ensure that the virus never got out of
control. It also analyses citizens’ responses,
stressing that policy can be effective when
citizens are compliant (as in East Asia) and
more freedom-oriented (as in Australia and New
Zealand). In East Asia, as elsewhere, the evidence
shows that people’s morale improves when the
government acts.

• The Asia-Pacific region has achieved
notable success compared to the
North Atlantic region in controlling the
pandemic, with far lower mortality rates
and greater successful implementation of
Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs)
to stop the spread of the disease, such as
border controls; face-mask use; physical
distancing; and widespread testing,
contact tracing, and quarantining (or home
isolation) of infected individuals.
•T
 he successes of NPI implementation in the
Asia-Pacific region resulted from measures
that were both top-down, with governments
setting strong control policies, and bottomup, with the general public supporting
governments and complying with government-directed public health measures.

• The success of the Asia/Pacific countries in
controlling deaths has not been at the cost
of greater economic losses. In fact, countries
with the highest deaths also had the
greatest falls in GDP per head (r = 0.34).
Thus, in 2020, there was no choice between
health and a successful economy. The route
to success on both scores came from rapid,
decisive intervention wherever cases
appeared (test and trace, and quarantining
of those at risk) as well as personal hygiene
(including masks) and quarantining of
international travellers.

•T
 he more individualistic culture of the
North Atlantic countries compared to
countries in the Asia-Pacific region and the
relative looseness of social norms may also
have contributed to lower public support
for NPIs. Assertions of “personal liberty”
and demands for privacy in the North
Atlantic contributed to the reluctance of
individuals in the North Atlantic countries
to comply with public health measures
such as contact tracing.

•T
 he rise in the daily number of new
confirmed cases was found to be associated
with a lower level of the public expressed
happiness in mainland China, and a higher
level of negative affect in the other four
East Asian regions. However, having stricter
mobility control and physical distancing
policies considerably offset the decrease in
happiness caused by the rise in the daily
new confirmed cases.

•A
 lack of sufficient scientific knowledge
among the populations of the North Atlantic
countries has also contributed to the failure of
effective pandemic control due to the public’s
lack of understanding of the epidemiology
of the pandemic and susceptibility to false
information and fake news.
8
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Mental health in the COVID-19
pandemic (Chapter 5)

• People whose feeling of connectedness fell
had decreased happiness, as did people
whose sense of loneliness increased and
whose social support was reduced.

Mental health has been one of the casualties both
of the pandemic and the resulting lockdowns.
As the pandemic struck, there was a large and
immediate decline in mental health in many
countries worldwide. Estimates vary depending
on the measure used and the country in question,
but the findings are remarkably similar. In the UK,
in May 2020, a general measure of mental health
was 7.7% lower than predicted in the absence of
the pandemic, and the number of mental health
problems reported was 47% higher.

• Many positive features of a person’s life
helped to protect their sense of connectedness. These included gratitude, grit, prior
connections, volunteering, taking exercise,
and having a pet. It also helped to have
activities that provided ‘flow.’
• Likewise, there were negative features
that weakened a person’s protection.
These included prior mental illness, a
sense of uncertainty, and a lack of proper
digital connections. Clearly, digital
connection is vital, and many people
have been helped by digital programmes
promoting mental health.

• The early decline in mental health was
higher in groups that already had more
mental health problems – women, young
people, and poorer people. It thus increased
the existing inequalities in mental well-being.
• However, after the sharp initial decline in
mental health, there was a considerable
improvement in average mental health,
though not back to where it started. But
a significant proportion of people (22%
in the UK) had mental health that was
persistently and significantly lower than
before COVID-19.

Work and well-being during
COVID-19: impact, inequalities,
resilience, and the future of work
(Chapter 7)
• Global GDP is estimated to have shrunk
by roughly 5% in 2020, representing the
largest economic crisis in a generation. In
many countries, job vacancies remained
approximately 20% below normal levels by
the end of 2020. Young people, low-income,
and low-skill workers have also been more
likely to lose working hours or lose their
jobs entirely.

•At the same time, as mental healthcare
needs have increased, mental health
services have been disrupted in many
countries. This is serious when we consider
that the pandemic is likely to leave a lasting
impact on the younger generation.
 n the positive side, the pandemic has
•O
shone a light on mental health as never
before. This increased public awareness
bodes well for future research and better
services that are so urgently needed.

•N
 ot being able to work has had a negative
impact on well-being. Unemployment
during the pandemic is associated with a
12% decline in life satisfaction and a 9%
increase in negative affect. For labour
market inactivity, these figures are 6.3%
and 5%, respectively. While young people
report lower levels of well-being than other
age groups, the effect of not being able to
work is less severe than older cohorts,
suggesting that they may be more optimistic
about future labour market opportunities
post-COVID-19. Countries that have introduced more substantial labour market

Social connections and well-being
during COVID-19 (Chapter 6)
•O
 ne major element in COVID-19 policy has
been physical distancing or self-isolation,
posing a significant challenge for people’s
social connections, vital for their happiness.
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Living long and living well:
the WELLBY approach (Chapter 8)

protections for workers have generally seen
less severe declines in well-being.
• For those who have remained at work,
the impact is mixed. In the United States,
workplace happiness declined just before
the federal emergency declaration in
March, followed by a quick recovery.
Suggesting that (a) happier workers may
have been more likely to retain their
jobs, (b) workers’ reference groups may
have changed, or (c) workers remaining
employed may have been more able to
work from home in the first place, and
therefore have been less negatively affected.
Supportive management and job flexibility
have become even more important drivers of
workplace well-being during the pandemic.
Purpose, achievement, and learning at work
have become less important. However,
other drivers’ importance (trust, support,
inclusivity, belonging, etc.) have remained
unchanged, suggesting that what makes
workplaces supportive of well-being in
normal times also makes them more
resilient in hard times.

To evaluate social progress and to make effective
policy, we have to take into account both:
o the quality of life, and
o the length of life.
Health economists use the concept of QualityAdjusted Life Years to do this, but they only count
the individual patient’s health-related quality of
life. In the well-being approach, we consider total
well-being, whoever experiences it, and for
whatever reason: All policy-makers should aim
to maximise the Well-Being-Adjusted Life-Years
(or WELLBYs) of all who are born. And include
the life-experiences of future generations (subject
to a small discount rate).
• The well-being approach puts a lower value
than is customary upon money relative to
life. According to many studies in rich
countries, an extra $1 raises WELLBYs by
around 1/100,000 points. But an extra year
of life increases WELLBYs by around 7.5
WELLBYs. So, the community should value
a year of life equally to $750,000 of GDP.

•S
 ocial support can protect against the
negative impact of not being able to work.
In the United Kingdom, the negative effect
of not working on life satisfaction was 40%
more severe for lonely workers to begin
with. Furloughing helps but may not fully
compensate for the negative impact of not
working. Furloughed workers, even those
without any income loss, still experienced
a significant decline in life satisfaction
relative to those who continued working.

• The WELLBY approach also provides a
more complete way of measuring human
progress and comparing the performance
of different countries. It does this by
multiplying average well-being by life
expectancy. On this basis, the number of
WELLBYs per person rose by 1.3% between
2006-08 and 2017-19, due to higher lifeexpectancy, especially in the less healthy
countries. This was a significant reduction
in fundamental inequality across the world,
and inequality remains lower in 2020
despite COVID-19.

 he impacts of the pandemic on the world
•T
of work are likely to endure. Evidence from
past recessions and early research from the
COVID-19 pandemic suggests that young
people who come of age in worse macroeconomic conditions are more likely to be
driven by financial security in adulthood.
The shift to remote working is likely to last
long after the crisis has subsided. Providing
future workers with more flexibility and
control over their working lives, but at the
risk of undermining social capital at work.
11
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Introduction

neighbours, strangers, or the police. All are found
to be strong supports for well-being, and for
effective COVID-19 strategies.

This ninth World Happiness Report is unlike any
that have come before. COVID-19 has shaken,
taken, and reshaped lives everywhere. In this
chapter, our central purpose remains just what it
has always been – to measure and use subjective
well-being to track and explain the quality of lives
all over the globe. Our capacity to do this has
been shaken at the same time as the lives we are
struggling to assess. While still relying on the
Gallup World Poll as our primary source for our
measures of the quality of life, this year, we tap a
broader variety of data to trace the size and
distribution of the happiness impacts of COVID-19.
We also devote equal efforts to unravelling how
geography, demography, and the spread of the
virus have interacted with each country’s scientific
knowledge and social and political underpinnings,
especially their institutional and social trust levels,
to explain international differences in death rates
from COVID-19.

Fourth, we turn to examine how different features
of national demographic, social and political
structures have combined with the consequences
of policy strategies and disease exposure to help
explain international differences in 2020 death
rates from COVID-19. A central feature of our
evidence is the extent to which the quality of the
social context, and especially the extent to which
people trust their governments, and have trust
in the benevolence of others, supports not only
their ability to maintain their happiness before
and during the pandemic but also reduces the
COVID-19 death toll by facilitating more effective
strategies for limiting the spread of the pandemic
while maintaining and building a sense of
common purpose.
Our results are summarized in a short concluding
section.

First, we shall present the overall life evaluations
and measures of positive and negative emotions
(affect) for those countries for which 2020
surveys are available. The resulting rankings
exclude the many countries without 2020 surveys,
and the smaller sample sizes, compared to the
three-year averages usually used, increase
their imprecision. We then place these rankings
beside those based on data for 2017-2019, before
COVID-19 struck, and also present our usual
ranking figure based on the three-year average
of life evaluations 2018-2020.

Photo by Kaylee Eden on Unsplash

Second, we use responses at the individual level
to investigate how COVID-19 has affected the
happiness of different population subgroups, thus
attempting to assess possible inequalities in the
distribution of the well-being consequences of
COVID-19.
Third, we review and extend the evidence on the
links between trust and well-being. We find
evidence that trust and benevolence are strong
supports for well-being, and also for successful
strategies to control COVID-19. We present new
evidence on the power of expected benevolence,
as measured by the extent to which people think
their lost wallets would be returned if found by
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Technical Box 1: Measuring subjective well-being

response for each person, with values
ranging from 0 and 1. When needed, we use
weighted averages across all individuals
surveyed within a country to give national
averages for positive affect.

Our measurement of subjective well-being
relies on three main indicators: life evaluations,
positive emotions, and negative emotions
(described in the report as positive and
negative affect). Our happiness rankings are
based on life evaluations, as the more stable
measure of the quality of people’s lives. In
World Happiness Report 2021, we pay more
attention than usual to specific daily emotions
(the components of positive and negative
affect) to better track how COVID-19 has
altered different aspects of life.

Negative emotions. Negative affect is
measured by asking respondents whether
they experienced specific negative emotions
during a lot of the day yesterday. Negative
affect, for each person, is given by the
average of their yes or no answers about
three emotions: worry, sadness, and anger.
National averages are created in the same
way as for positive affect.

Life evaluations. The Gallup World Poll,
which remains the principal source of data
in this report, asks respondents to evaluate
their current life as a whole using the image
of a ladder, with the best possible life for
them as a 10 and worst possible as a 0. Each
respondent provides a numerical response
on this scale, referred to as the Cantril
ladder. Typically, around 1,000 responses are
gathered annually for each country. Weighted
averages are used to construct populationrepresentative national averages for each
year in each country. We base our usual
happiness rankings on a three-year average
to increase the sample size to give more
precise estimates. This year, in order to focus
on the effects of COVID-19, we consider
how life evaluations and emotions in 2020
compare to their averages for 2017-2019.

Comparing life evaluations and emotions:
• Life evaluations provide the most
informative measure for international
comparisons because they capture
quality of life in a more complete and
stable way than emotional reports
based on daily experiences.
•L
 ife evaluations differ more between
countries than emotions and are
better explained by the widely differing
life experiences in different countries.
Emotions yesterday are well explained
by events of the day being asked
about, while life evaluations more
closely reflect the circumstances
of life as a whole. But we find and
will show later in the chapter that
emotions are significant supports for
life evaluations.

Positive emotions. Respondents to the
Gallup World Poll are asked whether they
smiled or laughed a lot yesterday and whether
they experienced enjoyment during a lot of
yesterday. For each of these two questions,
if a person says no, their response is coded
as 0. If a person says yes, their response is
coded as a 1. We calculate the average

 ositive emotions are almost three
•P
times more frequent (global average
of 0.71) than negative emotions
(global average of 0.27).
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How have life evaluations and
emotions evolved in 2020?

Regular readers of this report will remember that
our rankings are based on the average of surveys
from the three previous years, so the number of
countries covered by our usual procedures is
somewhat less affected. Most countries not
surveyed in 2020 continue to be represented by
their 2018 and 2019 survey results. This year’s
version, along with the estimated contributions
from our six supporting factors, appears here
as Figure 2.1. Given our emphasis on life under
COVID-19, we also pay special attention to
the 2020 surveys and compare them with
2017-2019 data.

The Gallup World Poll, which has been our
principal source of data for assessing lives around
the globe, has not been able to conduct the
face-to-face interviews that were previously used
for more than three-quarters of the countries
surveyed. Conversion from computer-assisted
personal interviews (CAPI) to computer-assisted
telephone interviews (CATI) has been difficult and
time-consuming. The number of 2020 surveys
available in time for our analysis is about twothirds as large as usual. The change of mode does
not affect the industrial countries, most of which
were already being surveyed by telephone in
previous years. Earlier research on the effect of
survey mode has shown that answers to some
questions differ between telephone and in-person
surveys, while answers to well-being questions
were subject to very small mode effects. Recent
UK large-sample evidence found life satisfaction
to be only 0.04 points higher by telephone than
in-person interviewing.1 However, the shift from
personal interviews to phone surveys may in some
countries have changed the pool of respondents
in various ways, only some of which can be
adjusted for by weighting techniques. This leads
us to be somewhat cautious when interpreting the
results reported for 2020. But the overall rankings
for 2020, especially among the top countries,
are unlikely to have been altered by pure mode
effects, since most of the top countries were
already being reached by telephone surveys prior
to 2020, while the countries that shifted to
telephone mode in 2020 (marked by an asterisk
beside their country names in Table 2.1) are
grouped further down in the rankings.

First a look at the primary data for 2020. The first
column of Table 2.1 shows ranked orderings of
average national life evaluations based on the
2020 surveys, accompanied in the second column
by a ranked list of the same countries based on
the 2017-2019 surveys used for the national
rankings in World Happiness Report 2020. From
the 95% confidence regions shown for both series,
it is easy to see that the bands are much wider
for 2020, primarily because the sample sizes
are generally 1,000 compared to 3,000 for the
combined sample covering 2017-2019.
Figure 2.1 combines the 2020 data with that from
2018 and 2019, just as done in a normal year. The
figure covers 149 countries, because countries are
included as long as they have had one or more
surveys in the 2018-2020 averaging period.
Country positions in all three rankings are quite
similar. Comparing the first two rankings, where
the number of countries is the same, the pairwise
rank correlation is 0.92. Comparing the 2017-2019
rankings with those based on the 2018-2020 data,
for the 95 countries with data for 2020, the rank
correlation is 0.99. This shows that COVID-19 has
led to only modest changes in the overall rankings,
reflecting both the global nature of the pandemic
and a widely shared resilience in the face of it.

Global life evaluations have
shown remarkable resilience
in the face of COVID-19.
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Table 2.1. Ranking of happiness (average life evaluations) based on the 2020
surveys compared to those in 2017-2019
Rank by
2020 score

Score, 2020
(95pct conf. interval)

Finland

1

Iceland

2

Denmark
Switzerland

Country name

Rank by
2017-19 score

Score, 2017-19
(95pct conf. interval)

7.889 (7.784-7.995)

1

7.809 (7.748-7.870)

7.575 (7.405-7.746)

4

7.504 (7.388-7.621)

3

7.515 (7.388-7.642)

2

7.646 (7.580-7.711)

4

7.508 (7.379-7.638)

3

7.560 (7.491-7.629)

Netherlands

5

7.504 (7.412-7.597)

6

7.449 (7.394-7.503)

Sweden

6

7.314 (7.182-7.447)

7

7.354 (7.283-7.425)

Germany

7

7.312 (7.163-7.460)

15

7.076 (7.006-7.146)

Norway

8

7.290 (7.160-7.421)

5

7.488 (7.420-7.556)

New Zealand

9

7.257 (7.124-7.391)

8

7.300 (7.222-7.377)

Austria

10

7.213 (7.080-7.347)

9

7.294 (7.229-7.360)
7.200 (7.136-7.265)

Israel*

11

7.195 (7.072-7.318)

12

Australia

12

7.137 (6.984-7.291)

11

7.223 (7.141-7.305)

Ireland

13

7.035 (6.903-7.166)

14

7.094 (7.016-7.172)

United States

14

7.028 (6.859-7.197)

16

6.940 (6.847-7.032)

Canada

15

7.025 (6.884-7.166)

10

7.232 (7.153-7.311)

Czech Republic*

16

6.897 (6.743-7.051)

17

6.911 (6.827-6.995)

Belgium

17

6.839 (6.727-6.950)

18

6.864 (6.796-6.931)

United Kingdom

18

6.798 (6.671-6.925)

13

7.165 (7.092-7.237)

Taiwan Province of China

19

6.751 (6.619-6.883)

24

6.455 (6.379-6.532)

France

20

6.714 (6.601-6.827)

21

6.664 (6.590-6.737)

Saudi Arabia

21

6.560 (6.370-6.749)

26

6.406 (6.296-6.517)

Slovakia*

22

6.519 (6.360-6.678)

33

6.281 (6.204-6.357)

Croatia*

23

6.508 (6.304-6.712)

61

5.505 (5.431-5.579)

Spain

24

6.502 (6.357-6.647)

27

6.401 (6.318-6.484)

Italy

25

6.488 (6.319-6.658)

28

6.387 (6.303-6.472)

Slovenia

26

6.462 (6.309-6.615)

30

6.363 (6.277-6.449)

United Arab Emirates

27

6.458 (6.341-6.576)

19

6.791 (6.711-6.871)

Estonia*

28

6.453 (6.306-6.599)

41

6.022 (5.951-6.092)

Lithuania*

29

6.391 (6.223-6.560)

35

6.215 (6.129-6.302)

Uruguay*

30

6.310 (6.143-6.476)

25

6.440 (6.351-6.529)

Kosovo*

31

6.294 (6.059-6.529)

32

6.325 (6.223-6.428)

Cyprus

32

6.260 (6.088-6.431)

38

6.159 (6.060-6.258)

Kyrgyzstan*

33

6.250 (6.087-6.412)

58

5.542 (5.456-5.627)

Latvia*

34

6.229 (6.085-6.373)

46

5.950 (5.882-6.018)

Bahrain

35

6.173 (5.977-6.369)

22

6.657 (6.537-6.777)

Kazakhstan*

36

6.168 (6.000-6.337)

40

6.058 (5.973-6.143)

Malta

37

6.157 (5.998-6.315)

20

6.773 (6.689-6.857)
6.228 (6.139-6.318)

Chile*

38

6.151 (5.984-6.317)

34

Poland*

39

6.139 (5.974-6.305)

36

6.186 (6.117-6.256)

Japan

40

6.118 (5.985-6.251)

50

5.871 (5.790-5.952)
6.376 (6.296-6.456)

Brazil*

41

6.110 (5.888-6.332)

29

Serbia*

42

6.042 (5.834-6.249)

51

5.778 (5.679-5.878)

Hungary*

43

6.038 (5.833-6.243)

43

6.000 (5.923-6.078)

Mauritius

44

6.015 (5.819-6.211)

39

6.101 (5.989-6.213)

Mongolia*

45

6.011 (5.852-6.171)

63

5.456 (5.377-5.535)

Mexico*

46

5.964 (5.765-6.163)

23

6.465 (6.371-6.559)

Argentina*

47

5.901 (5.688-6.113)

45

5.975 (5.870-6.079)

Thailand*

48

5.885 (5.657-6.112)

44

5.999 (5.915-6.082)

Moldova*

49

5.812 (5.643-5.980)

55

5.607 (5.525-5.690)
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Table 2.1: Ranking of happiness (average life evaluations) based on the 2020
surveys compared to those in 2017-2019 continued
Country name

Rank by
2020 score

Score, 2020
(95pct conf. interval)

Rank by
2017-19 score

Score, 2017-19
(95pct conf. interval)

South Korea

50

5.793 (5.653-5.932)

49

5.872 (5.786-5.959)

Greece*

51

5.788 (5.620-5.955)

59

5.515 (5.423-5.607)

China*

52

5.771 (5.649-5.893)

69

5.124 (5.073-5.175)

Portugal

53

5.768 (5.579-5.957)

48

5.911 (5.807-6.015)

Montenegro*

54

5.722 (5.503-5.941)

57

5.546 (5.450-5.642)

Colombia*

55

5.709 (5.488-5.930)

37

6.163 (6.053-6.274)

Bulgaria*

56

5.598 (5.364-5.832)

70

5.102 (5.015-5.188)

Bolivia*

57

5.559 (5.365-5.753)

52

5.747 (5.648-5.847)

Bosnia and Herzegovina*

58

5.516 (5.314-5.717)

54

5.674 (5.583-5.765)

Nigeria*

59

5.503 (5.282-5.723)

80

4.724 (4.622-4.826)

Russia*

60

5.495 (5.366-5.625)

62

5.501 (5.440-5.561)

El Salvador*

61

5.462 (5.227-5.697)

31

6.348 (6.234-6.462)

Tajikistan*

62

5.373 (5.183-5.563)

56

5.556 (5.492-5.619)

Albania*

63

5.365 (5.139-5.591)

75

4.883 (4.773-4.993)

Ecuador*

64

5.354 (5.142-5.567)

47

5.925 (5.822-6.029)

Ghana*

65

5.319 (5.043-5.596)

67

5.148 (5.033-5.263)

Hong Kong S.A.R. of China

66

5.295 (5.154-5.437)

60

5.510 (5.420-5.601)
4.889 (4.810-4.968)

Laos*

67

5.284 (5.043-5.525)

74

Bangladesh*

68

5.280 (5.014-5.546)

77

4.833 (4.754-4.911)

Ukraine*

69

5.270 (5.072-5.467)

86

4.561 (4.463-4.658)

Ivory Coast*

70

5.257 (4.996-5.517)

64

5.233 (5.090-5.377)

Cameroon*

71

5.241 (4.953-5.530)

72

5.085 (4.953-5.217)

Dominican Republic*

72

5.168 (4.931-5.406)

53

5.689 (5.552-5.826)

Georgia*

73

5.123 (4.891-5.356)

81

4.673 (4.588-4.758)

Philippines*

74

5.080 (4.869-5.290)

42

6.006 (5.908-6.104)

North Macedonia*

75

5.054 (4.851-5.256)

66

5.160 (5.068-5.251)

South Africa*

76

4.947 (4.766-5.128)

78

4.814 (4.696-4.932)
4.672 (4.563-4.782)

Iran

77

4.865 (4.677-5.052)

82

Turkey*

78

4.862 (4.638-5.085)

68

5.132 (5.054-5.210)

Zambia*

79

4.838 (4.577-5.099)

92

3.759 (3.641-3.878)

Morocco*

80

4.803 (4.592-5.013)

71

5.095 (4.986-5.204)

Iraq*

81

4.785 (4.550-5.021)

79

4.752 (4.634-4.869)

Tunisia*

82

4.731 (4.502-4.960)

88

4.392 (4.295-4.490)

Uganda*

83

4.641 (4.381-4.901)

87

4.432 (4.298-4.566)

Venezuela*

84

4.574 (4.345-4.802)

73

5.053 (4.927-5.179)

Ethiopia*

85

4.549 (4.249-4.850)

90

4.186 (4.110-4.263)

Kenya*

86

4.547 (4.307-4.786)

84

4.583 (4.450-4.716)

Egypt*

87

4.472 (4.200-4.745)

91

4.151 (4.081-4.222)

Namibia*

88

4.451 (4.207-4.695)

85

4.571 (4.452-4.691)
4.308 (4.224-4.392)

Myanmar*

89

4.431 (4.223-4.639)

89

Benin*

90

4.408 (4.212-4.603)

65

5.216 (5.064-5.368)

Cambodia*

91

4.377 (4.140-4.614)

76

4.848 (4.735-4.962)

India**

92

4.225 (4.151-4.299)

93

3.573 (3.519-3.628)

Jordan*

93

4.094 (3.882-4.306)

83

4.633 (4.518-4.749)

Tanzania*

94

3.786 (3.504-4.067)

94

3.476 (3.352-3.600)

Zimbabwe*

95

3.160 (2.954-3.365)

95

3.299 (3.184-3.414)

Note: A small number of countries/territories have 2017-19 averages different from those reported in WHR 2020 due
to their 2019 survey data arriving too late for inclusion in WHR 2020. An asterisk beside a country name marks a
switch from face-to-face interviews to phone interviews in 2020; India added a portion of phone interviews in 2020,
amounting to 0.16 of the weighted sample.
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83. Congo (Brazzaville) (5.342)*
84. China (5.339)
85. Ivory Coast (5.306)
86. Armenia (5.283)*
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87. Nepal (5.269)*
88. Bulgaria (5.266)
89. Maldives (5.1 98)*
90. Azerbaijan (5.1 71 )*
91 . Cameroon (5.1 42)
92. Senegal (5.1 32)*
93. Albania (5.1 1 7)
94. North Macedonia (5.1 01 )

Figure 2.1:
Ranking of happiness 2018-2020 (Part 1)
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(6.1 (4.073)
89)
37.Estonia
Zambia
41. Panama41
. Panama
(6.1
80)* (3.849)*
1 (6.180)*
38.
Sierra
Leone
42. Uzbekistan
(6.179)*
42.
(6.19)
79)*
1 39.Uzbekistan
India (3.81
43. Chile (6.172)
43.
(6.1 72)(3.775)*
1 40.ChileBurundi
44. Poland (6.166)
44.
(6.1 (3.658)*
66)
1 41 .Poland
Yemen
(6.152)
45. Kazakhstan
45.
52)
1 42.Kazakhstan
Tanzania(6.1
(3.623)*
46. Romania46.
(6.140)*
Romania
1 43.
Haiti (6.1
(3.6140)*
5)*
47. Kuwait (6.106)*
47.
(6.1 06)*
1 44.Kuwait
Malawi
(3.600)*
48. Serbia (6.078)
48.
(6.078)
1 45.Serbia
Lesotho
(3.51 2)*
49. El Salvador
(6.061)
49.
Salvador
(6.061
)
1 46.El
Botswana
(3.467)*
(6.049)
50. Mauritius
50.
Mauritius
(6.049)
1 47.
Rwanda
(3.41 5)*
51.

Latvia (6.032)
51
. Latvia
(6.032) (3.1 45)
1 48.
Zimbabwe

52. Colombia
(6.012)
52.
Colombia
(6.01 2)(2.523*
1 49.
Afghanistan
53. Hungary (5.992)
54. Thailand (5.985)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Note: Those with a * do not have survey

Explained by: GDP per capita

Explained by: generosity

information in 2020. Their averages are

Explained by: social support

Explained by: perceptions of corruption

56. Japan
(5.940)
based on the 2018-2019
surveys.

Explained by: healthy life expectancy

Dystopia (2.43) + residual

Explained by: freedom to make life choices

95% confidence interval

55. Nicaragua (5.972)*

57. Argentina (5.929)
58. Portugal (5.929)
59. Honduras (5.91 9)*
60. Croatia (5.882)

83. Congo (Brazzaville) (5.342)*
39.
(6.223)
84. Cyprus
China (5.339)
40.
(6.1 (5.306)
89)
85. Estonia
Ivory Coast
41
80)*
86.. Panama
Armenia(6.1
(5.283)*

World Happiness Report 2021

42.
(6.1 79)*
87. Uzbekistan
Nepal (5.269)*
43.
(6.1 (5.266)
72)
88. Chile
Bulgaria
44.
(6.1
66)
89. Poland
Maldives
(5.1
98)*
45.
(6.171
52)
)*
90. Kazakhstan
Azerbaijan (5.1
46.. Cameroon
Romania (6.1
91
(5.140)*
42)
47. Senegal
Kuwait (6.1
92.
(5.106)*
32)*
48. Albania
Serbia (6.078)
93.
(5.1 1 7)
49. North
El Salvador
(6.061(5.1
) 01 )
94.
Macedonia

Figure 2.1:
Ranking
of happiness 2018-2020 (Part 2)
50. Ghana
Mauritius
(6.049)
95.
(5.088)
51 . Niger
Latvia(5.074)*
(6.032)
96.
52. Turkmenistan
Colombia (6.01(5.066)*
2)
97.

53. Hungary98.
(5.992)
53.
Hungary(5.051
(5.992)
Gambia
)*
54. Thailand99.
(5.985)
54.
Thailand
(5.985)
Benin
(5.045)
55. Nicaragua
(5.972)*
Nicaragua
(5.972)*
155.
00.
Laos (5.030)
56. Japan (5.940)
56.
(5.940) (5.025)
1 01 .Japan
Bangladesh
57.

Argentina
(5.929)
57.
Argentina
1 02.
Guinea(5.929)
(4.984)*

58. Portugal58.
(5.929)
Portugal
1 03.
South(5.929)
Africa (4.956)
59. Honduras
(5.919)*
59.
Honduras
9)*
1 04.
Turkey(5.91
(4.948)
60. Croatia (5.882)
60.
(5.882)
1 05.Croatia
Pakistan
(4.934)*
61.

Philippines
61
. (5.880)
Philippines
(5.880)
1 06.
Morocco
(4.91 8)

62. South Korea
(5.845)
62.
(Korea (5.845)
Venezuela
(4.892)
1 07.South
63. Peru (5.840)*
(5.840)*(4.891 )
163.
08.PeruGeorgia
64. Bosnia and
Herzegovina
(5.813) (5.81 3)
64.
and Herzegovina
1 09.Bosnia
Algeria
(4.887)*
65. Moldova65.
(5.766)
1 1(5.766)
0.Moldova
Ukraine
(4.875)
66. Ecuador66.
(5.764)
1 (5.764)
1 1 .Ecuador
Iraq (4.854)
67. Kyrgyzstan
(5.744)
67.
(5.744)
1 1 2.Kyrgyzstan
Gabon (4.852)*
68. Greece (5.723)
68.
(5.723)
1 1 3.Greece
Burkina
(Faso (4.834)*
69. Bolivia (5.716)
69.
(5.71 6)(4.830)
1 1 4.Bolivia
Cambodia
70. Mongolia
70.
(5.677) (4.794)*
1 1 (5.677)
5.Mongolia
Mozambique
71.

Paraguay
71
.6.Paraguay
(5.653)*
1 1 (5.653)*
Nigeria
(4.759)

72. Montenegro
(5.581)
72.
(5.581 )
1 1 7.Montenegro
Mali (4.723)*
(5.545)
73. Dominican
(5.545)
73.
Dominican
Republic
1 1 8.Republic
Iran (4.721
)
74. North Cyprus
(5.536)*
74.
Cyprus(4.636)
(5.536)*
1 1 9.North
Uganda
75. Belarus 75.
(5.534)*
1(5.534)*
20.Belarus
Liberia
(4.625)*
76. Russia (5.477)
76.
(5.477)
1 21 .Russia
Kenya
(4.607)
77.

Hong Kong
S.A.R.
of China
(5.477)
77.
Kong
S.A.R.
of
China (5.477)
Tunisia
(4.596)
1 22.Hong

(5.466)
78. Tajikistan
Tajikistan
(5.466)
Lebanon
(4.584)*
178.
23.
(5.411)*
79. Vietnam179.
(5.41(4.574)
1 )*
24.Vietnam
Namibia
80. Libya (5.410)*
80.
(5.41 0)* Territories (4.51 7)*
1 25.Libya
Palestinian
81.

Malaysia81
(5.384)*
. Malaysia
(5.384)*
1 26.
Myanmar
(4.426)

82. Indonesia
(5.345)*
82.
Indonesia
1 27.
Jordan(5.345)*
(4.395)
83. Congo (Brazzaville)
(5.342)* (5.342)*
83.
(Brazzaville)
1 28.Congo
Chad
(4.355)*
84. China (5.339)
84.
1 29.China
Sri(5.339)
Lanka (4.325)*
(5.306)
85. Ivory Coast
85.
Coast (5.306)
1 30.Ivory
Swaziland
(4.308)*
86. Armenia86.
(5.283)*
(5.283)*
1 31
.Armenia
Comoros
(4.289)*
87. Nepal (5.269)*
87.
(5.269)*
1 32.Nepal
Egypt
(4.283)
88. Bulgaria88.
(5.266)
1 (5.266)
33.Bulgaria
Ethiopia
(4.275)
89. Maldives89.
(5.198)*
Maldives
(5.1 98)*
1 34.
Mauritania
(4.227)*
90. Azerbaijan
)*
90.
Azerbaijan
(5.1 71(4.208)*
1 35.(5.171)*
Madagascar
91.

Cameroon
91
. (5.142)
Cameroon
(5.107)*
42)
1 36.
Togo (4.1

92. Senegal92.
(5.1(4.073)
32)*
1(5.132)*
37.Senegal
Zambia
93. Albania 93.
(5.1Leone
1 7) (3.849)*
1(5.117)
38.Albania
Sierra
94. North Macedonia
(5.101)
94.
Macedonia
1 39.North
India
(3.81 9) (5.1 01 )
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97.
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Haiti(5.051
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99. Benin (5.045)
99.
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100. Laos (5.030)
1 00.
45.
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1 01
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(5.025)
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1 03.
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To get a more precise impression of the direction
and size of the national level changes during
2020, Table 2.2 shows the size and significance
of changes from 2017-2019 average to 2020 for
each country’s life evaluations, positive affect,
and negative affect. The countries in each column
are listed in the order of the estimated size of
the changes, with the most improved conditions
shown at the top of each list. The first column
shows the average changes in life evaluations,
on the scale of 0 to 10. The second column
shows increases in the average frequency for two
measures of positive affect (laughter and enjoyment), where the scale is zero where none of the
emotions was felt a lot on the previous day, and
1.0 if all respondents frequently felt all measures
on the previous day. The third column shows the
average for three measures of negative affect
(worry, sadness and anger), but in the reverse
ordering, with the countries at the top being
those in which the frequency of negative affect
has fallen. In all cases, asterisks show the level
of statistical significance of the changes.

Photo by Forest Simon on Unsplash

We remind readers that the rankings in Figure 2.1
depend only on the average life evaluations
reported by respondents in the Gallup surveys,
and not on our model to explain the international
differences. The first six sub-bars for each country/
territory reflect our efforts to attribute the reported
life evaluation score in that country to its average
income, life expectancy and four social factors.
The final bar includes two elements. The first is
the residual error, the part of the national average
that our model does not explain. The second is
the estimated life evaluation in a mythical country
called dystopia, since its score is the model’s
predicted life evaluation (2.43) for an imaginary
country having the world’s lowest observed
values for each of the six variables. With dystopia
and the residual included, the sum of all the
sub-bars adds up to the actual average life
evaluations on which the rankings are based. For
more details, please refer to previous annual
reports, including WHR 2020, and the Statistical
Appendix 1.
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The pandemic’s toll
on negative emotions
is clear.

For all our measures of subjective well-being and
their main determinants, there are some countries
with significant improvements and others where
life has gotten worse. For life evaluations, there
are 26 countries with significant increases, and 20
with decreases marked by two (p<0.05) or three
(p<0.01) asterisks. The pandemic’s toll on negative
emotions is clear, with 42 countries showing
significantly higher frequency of negative emotions,
compared to 9 where they were significantly less
frequent. Positive emotions lie in the middle
ground, with 22 countries on the upside and 25
heading down, in all cases relative to the average
values in 2017-2019. Given how all lives have been
so importantly disrupted, it is remarkable that
the averages are so stable.

Using the data from all 95 countries, life evaluations
showed an insignificant increase from 2017-2019
to 2020 (+0.036, p=0.354) in a regression analysis
of individual-level data for changes in reported
means.2 Negative affect showed a significant
increase (+0.023, p<0.001) while positive affect was
unchanged (-0.000, p=0.991). When comparing
changes in life evaluations and emotions, it is
important to remember that life evaluations are
on a 0 to 10 scale, while emotions are on a 0 to 1
scale. Within negative affect, worry (+0.032,
p<0.001) and sadness (+0.029, p<0.001) have
both shown statistically significant increases for
the global sample of countries, while anger has
not changed. Within positive affect, both laughter
and enjoyment yesterday were mostly unchanged
between 2017-2019 and 2020. Among other
COVID-interesting variables in the Gallup World
Poll, the reported frequency of stress shows an
increase in 2020 (+0.021, p=0.002). There was
an increase in the number of people who did
something interesting yesterday (+0.031,
p<0.001), and in the share of respondents who
felt well-rested (+0.014, p=0.007). There was also
a significant drop in the reported frequency of
health problems (-0.029, p<0.001), which we shall
show later was concentrated among those over
60 years of age.

Many countries with large increases in life
evaluations also shifted from in-person to telephone
mode in 2020. This led us to investigate more
broadly if there was a more general upward
movement of life evaluations in countries that
shifted from in-person to telephone samples.
For the 61 switching countries other than China,
there was an average increase of 0.055 points. For
the 32 countries that used telephone interview
throughout the sample period, there was an
average drop of 0.049 points. In neither case was
the change statistically significant. Although
changes in the composition of surveyed populations
may underlie some of the very large life evaluation
increases in China and perhaps other countries,
the data suggest that the effects of the method
change are unlikely to have been large enough for
the world as a whole to mask any large drops. As
already noted, a careful study of mode effects in
the United Kingdom estimated pure mode effects
to be 0.04 points, not large enough to materially
affect country rankings. Almost all of the
top-ranking countries used telephone surveys
before 2020, so that for them there has been no
shift in mode. There have been both in-person and
telephone samples for India, with the in-person
responses being lower than telephone responses,
while significantly higher than in-person responses
in 2019. Hence the reversal in 2020 of the longerterm slide in Indian life evaluations was not
attributable to mode effects.

The results in Table 2.2 reveal a considerable
variety of national changes in life evaluations
and emotions, with the overall stability of the
global and regional trends comprising differing
national experiences.
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Table 2.2: Change in well-being from 2017-2019 to 2020
Ladder

Positive affect

Negative affect

Global average
Mean country

0.036

Mean country

-0.000

Mean country

0.023***

By region
East Asia

0.584***

South Asia

South Asia

0.535***

Central & Eastern Europe

0.052***

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.291***

Middle East/North Africa
Southeast Asia

Commonwealth
of Indep States
Central & Eastern Europe

0.156

Western Europe

-0.007

South Asia

0.004

0.009

Commonwealth
of Indep States

0.015

0.009

Southeast Asia

0.017

Sub-Saharan Africa

-0.002

Sub-Saharan Africa

North America +
Australia/NZ

0.048

Western Europe

-0.006

North America +
Australia/NZ

Middle East/North Africa

0.043

Commonwealth of Indep
States

-0.014

Middle East/North Africa

Western Europe

0.019

North America + Australia/
NZ

Latin America & Caribbean

0.151

0.084*

0.042

Latin America & Caribbean

0.050***

Lat America & Car

-0.044***

East Asia

0.054***

-0.392

East Asia

-0.058***

Central & Eastern Europe

0.082***

Zambia

1.079***

Croatia

0.148***

Benin

-0.151***

Croatia

1.003***

Moldova

0.128***

Morocco

-0.126***

Nigeria

0.779***

Latvia

0.120***

Hong Kong

-0.068***

Ukraine

0.709***

Czech Republic

0.105***

Ivory Coast

-0.050***

Kyrgyzstan

0.708***

Lithuania

0.095***

Albania

-0.043***

India

0.652***

India

0.094***

Italy

-0.040**

China

0.647***

Egypt

0.083***

Ethiopia

-0.034

Mongolia

0.555***

Serbia

0.078***

Zambia

-0.033*

Bulgaria

0.496***

Ukraine

0.074***

Bolivia

-0.032*

Albania

0.482***

Iraq

0.071***

Israel

-0.032**
-0.027**

Southeast Asia

-0.327***

-0.03***

0.025
0.028***

By country

Georgia

0.451***

Tunisia

0.068***

France

Bangladesh

0.447***

Bulgaria

0.067***

Philippines

-0.027

Estonia

0.431***

Tajikistan

0.064***

Saudi Arabia

-0.026*

Laos

0.396***

Bolivia

0.059***

India

Ethiopia

0.363**

Cambodia

0.054***

Lithuania

-0.022

Tunisia

0.339***

North Macedonia

0.048***

Mauritius

-0.020

-0.022***

Egypt

0.321**

Poland

0.044**

Taiwan

-0.017*

Tanzania

0.309**

Myanmar

0.043***

Germany

-0.016

Taiwan

0.296***

Kyrgyzstan

0.042***

Cambodia

-0.015

Latvia

0.279***

Greece

0.039**

Cyprus

-0.013

Greece

0.273***

Bangladesh

0.038*

Namibia

-0.010

Serbia

0.263**

Spain

0.037**

Latvia

-0.010

Japan

0.247***

Ethiopia

0.037

Russia

-0.009

Slovakia

0.238***

Montenegro

0.036*

Spain

-0.008

Germany

0.236***

Philippines

0.028*

Bahrain

-0.007

Georgia

0.024

Kazakhstan

-0.007

Italy

0.023

Croatia

-0.006

Uganda

0.209

Moldova

0.204**

Iran

0.192*

New Zealand

0.023

Bangladesh

-0.005

Montenegro

0.176

South Africa

0.021

United Kingdom

-0.005

Lithuania

0.176*

Bosnia & Herz

0.020

Ghana

-0.003

Ghana

0.172

Hungary

0.016

Australia

0.000
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Table 2.2: Difference between 2020 happiness and 2017-2019 averages
continued
Ladder

Positive affect

Negative affect

Cameroon

0.156

Japan

0.014

Myanmar

Saudi Arabia

0.153

Austria

0.011

Japan

0.001

South Africa

0.133

Nigeria

0.009

Austria

0.003

Myanmar

0.123

Ivory Coast

0.008

Moldova

0.004

Kazakhstan

0.110

Estonia

0.005

Uruguay

0.007

Spain

0.101

Uganda

0.005

Switzerland

0.007

Italy

0.101

Germany

0.004

Iceland

0.009

Cyprus

0.001

0.101

Ghana

0.002

Iran

0.010

Slovenia

0.099

Bahrain

0.002

Norway

0.013

United States

0.089

Slovakia

0.000

Finland

0.013

Finland

0.081

Australia

-0.001

Iraq

0.015

Iceland

0.071

Iceland

-0.003

Belgium

0.018

Netherlands

0.056

Saudi Arabia

-0.003

South Korea

0.018

France

0.050

Taiwan

-0.003

South Africa

0.021

Hungary

0.038

Cameroon

-0.005

United States

0.028*

Iraq

0.033

Cyprus

-0.007

Estonia

0.028**

Ivory Coast

0.023

Morocco

-0.007

Bulgaria

0.029*

Israel

-0.005

Albania

-0.009

Denmark

0.030**

Russia

-0.005

Norway

-0.010

Laos

Czech Republic

-0.014

Mauritius

-0.010

Ireland

Belgium

-0.025

Hong Kong

-0.011

Tanzania

Kosovo

-0.031

Chile

-0.012

New Zealand

0.031**

Kenya

-0.036

United Kingdom

-0.014

Argentina

0.032**

Sweden

-0.039

South Korea

-0.017

Uganda

0.033*

New Zealand

-0.042

Denmark

-0.018

Colombia

0.033**

0.030
0.030**
0.031

Poland

-0.047

Zambia

-0.019

Cameroon

0.033*

Switzerland

-0.051

Switzerland

-0.019

Venezuela

0.034**

Ireland

-0.059

Ireland

-0.020

Chile

0.034**

Argentina

-0.074

El Salvador

-0.021

Slovakia

0.035**

Chile

-0.078

France

-0.023

United Arab Emirates

0.036***

South Korea

-0.080

Dominican Republic

-0.023

Kosovo

0.037***

Austria

-0.081

Venezuela

-0.027

Dominican Republic

0.038**

Australia

-0.085

Kosovo

-0.029*

Netherlands

0.040***

-0.030**

Sweden

0.042***

-0.031

Tunisia

0.047***

-0.032**

Greece

0.048***

Mauritius

-0.086

Finland

North Macedonia

-0.106

Iran

Thailand

-0.114

United States

Namibia

-0.120

Benin

-0.032

Slovenia

0.051***

Uruguay

-0.130

Portugal

-0.032*

Canada

0.052***

Denmark

-0.131*

Kenya

-0.033*

Hungary

0.053***

Zimbabwe

-0.139

Colombia

-0.033**

Montenegro

0.054***

Portugal

-0.143

Israel

-0.035**

Brazil

0.055***

Bosnia & Herz

-0.158

Slovenia

-0.036*

Kenya

0.058***
0.060***

Tajikistan

-0.182*

United Arab Emirates

-0.040***

El Salvador

Bolivia

-0.188*

Canada

-0.040**

Mexico

0.060***

Norway

-0.198***

Zimbabwe

-0.041**

China

0.060***

Canada

-0.207**

Laos

-0.041**

Georgia

0.062***

Hong Kong

-0.215**

Mongolia

-0.043**

Bosnia & Herz

0.064***

Brazil

-0.266**

Russia

-0.046***

North Macedonia

0.065***

Turkey

-0.270**

Turkey

-0.048***

Ukraine

0.066***
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Table 2.2: Difference between 2020 happiness and 2017-2019 averages
continued
Ladder

Positive affect

Negative affect

Morocco

-0.292**

Tanzania

-0.049**

Kyrgyzstan

0.067***

United Arab Emirates

-0.332***

Ecuador

-0.049***

Mongolia

0.070***
0.070***

United Kingdom

-0.366***

Mexico

-0.053***

Nigeria

Colombia

-0.454***

Thailand

-0.053***

Serbia

0.071***

Cambodia

-0.471***

Sweden

-0.055***

Ecuador

0.077***

Venezuela

-0.479***

Argentina

-0.055***

Portugal

0.079***

Bahrain

-0.484***

Brazil

-0.058***

Czech Republic

0.088***

Mexico

-0.501***

Uruguay

-0.060***

Turkey

0.090***

Dominican Republic

-0.521***

Kazakhstan

-0.063***

Malta

0.093***

Jordan

-0.539***

Namibia

-0.063***

Egypt

0.111***

Ecuador

-0.571***

China

-0.065***

Thailand

0.115***

Malta

-0.616***

Netherlands

-0.067***

Zimbabwe

0.122***

Benin

-0.808***

Belgium

-0.110***

Tajikistan

0.122***

El Salvador

-0.886***

Malta

-0.115***

Poland

0.147***

Philippines

-0.926***

Notes: Each change is calculated by regressing the dependent variable on an indicator for the year 2020, using all
individual responses in the GWP in the given sample in the years 2017 through 2020. Significance calculated with robust
standard errors, clustered by country when more than one is present. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Comparing the Gallup World Poll
data with other sources

The Gallup surveys were all taken after the start
of the pandemic, with fewer than 2% of interviews
taking place before March 15th.

How do these Gallup World Poll results compare
with those from other international surveys and
data from national sources? Other chapters in
this report review many of the scores of studies
documenting how different aspects of well-being
have been affected by COVID-19. We concentrate
on surveys with large nationally representative
samples, mostly obtained by repeated surveys
of different representatives from the same
underlying population.

Our broadest comparison is for a group of European
countries for which the Eurobarometer annually
collects life satisfaction responses for about 1,000
respondents in each of 34 countries. For the whole
sample of roughly 34,000 respondents, life satisfaction measured on a four-point response scale,
converted to a 0 to 10 scale, averaged 6.66 in 2019
and 6.64 in 2020. The Eurobarometer and the
Gallup World Poll provide consistent information
about international differences in life evaluations.
For the 30 countries with data available for 2019
and 2020 in both surveys, the two surveys provide
quite consistent cross-country rankings. The
rankings from the two surveys are well correlated,
both for 2019 (r=0.84) and for 2020 (r=0.80).
Given the generally small size of the year-to-year
changes in both surveys, the changes from 2019
to 2020 are not correlated across the two surveys,
sometimes moving in the same direction, and
sometimes not. Here are several examples, in some
cases supported by national polls:

Comparing the Gallup World Poll data with other
surveys where survey modes have not changed
helps to show the extent to which the change in
survey mode for many Gallup World Poll countries
is affecting the overall pattern of changes. We
also provide data from two UK surveys with
several observations during 2020 to help expose
how evaluations were changing during the course
of the year. The relative stability within the year
confirms our finding that the date of survey did
not have systematic effects on the 2020 evaluations.
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the Gallup World Poll and 0.38 for the Eurobarometer. All three surveys provide a fairly consistent
picture of moderate, but statistically significant,
reductions in life evaluations using different
surveys and question wording. The ONS estimates
provide additional value from their large sample
size, exposing quarterly patterns that match the
pandemic stages and revealing larger but more
quickly recovering changes for the emotions than
for life evaluations. Between the two emotions,
anxiety was affected almost twice as much as
happiness yesterday.

For the United Kingdom, average Gallup World
Poll life evaluation fell from 7.16 in 2019 to 6.80 in
2020, while the Eurobarometer life satisfaction
measure fell from 7.74 to 7.36, with both changes
being of statistical significance. The UK Office for
National Statistics (ONS) has recently published3
life satisfaction, anxiety, happiness yesterday, and
the extent to which people think that the things
they do in their lives are worthwhile, all asked on
the same 0 to 10 response scale, based on large
samples drawn from the Labour Force Survey.
These are probably the largest samples from any
country enabling comparisons between each of the
first three quarters of 2020 with the corresponding
quarters of the 2019. Given the second wave of
COVID-19 infections and deaths that started at
the end of the summer, it is expected that all
three measures will be worse in Q4. But the
average results for the first three quarters are the
data most comparable with the other surveys, all
of which were undertaken in the first three quarters
of the year. The ONS data, based on much larger
samples, show a life satisfaction drop of 0.13
points on the 0 to 10 scale compared to 0.36 for

To get some idea of the possible size of Q4 drops
in life evaluations, Figure 2.2 brings together the
ONS quarterly estimates of life satisfaction with
the monthly Cantril ladder estimates drawn from
the ICL/YouGov survey. The monthly data confirm
the expectation that Q4 life satisfaction fell as
infections, deaths, and lockdowns were all rising.
It also shows an increase in December, when
optimism was growing about the possibilities for
vaccine efficacy and delivery. The 95% confidence
intervals for the estimates are shown by vertical

Figure 2.2: Quarterly and monthly estimates for UK life evaluations in 2020
2020 life satisfaction dynamics in the UK
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evaluations rise slightly in the Gallup World Poll,
while falling in the Eurobarometer. For Italy,
both surveys show life evaluations essentially
unchanged from 2019 to 2020. As shown in
Table 2.2 above, the 2020 Italian ladder score is
higher than its average for 2017-2019, though the
difference is not statistically significant.

bars. The confidence regions for the ONS estimates
are much tighter because their samples included
more than 25,000 respondents in each quarter.
The ONS has also split their large samples by
age and gender, providing some large sample
counterpart to discussions in chapters 5 and 6
based generally on smaller samples of earlier
data. Panel A of Figure 2.3 shows the dynamics
for the four well-being measures collected by the
ONS, reported separately for male and female
respondents. For both genders, there is a ranking
of effects, with life worthwhile being least affected,
followed by life satisfaction, happiness, and
anxiety. For both emotions- happiness yesterday
and anxiety yesterday - the effects were largest
during the lockdown Q2, and largely returned to
baseline in Q3, when cases and fatalities seemed
to be in check and restrictions were being lifted.
The drops in life satisfaction and happiness, and
the increases in anxiety, in Q2 were significantly
greater for women than men, with the gender gap
disappearing in Q3. Panel B shows the same four
well-being measures for the population divided
into three age groups. All four well-being measures
were less changed for the young, who showed
little decline from Q1 to Q2 and no improvements
from Q2 to Q3.” `The Q2 worsening and Q3
recovery were felt almost equally for both of the
older age groups. Before and during the pandemic,
life satisfaction was highest for those over 60, and
lowest for those between 30 and 59. Although
the advantage of the young relative to the middleaged grew in Q1 and Q2, it shrank thereafter, and
even crossed over for the emotional measures in
Q3. How things evolved during the second and
deadlier wave in Q4 is hinted at by the monthly
data in Figure 2.2 but must await the larger ONS
samples for a more complete story to be told.

As already indicated for the Gallup World Poll
data, most countries did not significantly change
in either survey. It is reassuring that the two
surveys tell generally consistent stories about life
evaluations in 2020, despite using different
questions and response scales, and being fielded
at different times.

How have the well-being effects of
COVID-19 varied among population
subgroups?
There have been numerous studies, ably surveyed
in subsequent chapters, of how the effects of
COVID-19, whether in terms of illness and death,
or living conditions for the uninfected, have
differed among population sub-groups. The fact
that the virus is more easily transmitted in close
living and working arrangements, where physical
distancing can be challenging to maintain, partly
explains the higher incidence of disease among
those in elder care, prisons, hospitals, housing for
migrant and temporary workers, and other forms
of group living. Similarly, risks are higher for those
employed in essential services, especially for
front-line health care workers and others who
deal with many members of the public or work
in crowded conditions. Age has been the main
factor separating those with differing risks of
serious or fatal consequences, although the
relation is complicated by the preponderance of
fatalities in elder-care settings where lower
immune responses of the elderly are compounded
by co-morbidities that partly explain why these
individuals are in institutional care in the first
place. Those with lower incomes are also thought
to be more at risk, being perhaps more likely to be
in high-risk workplaces, with fewer opportunities
to work from home, and fewer resources to
support the isolation required for those infected.

For Germany, the Eurobarometer data show
slightly increased life evaluations from 2019 to
2020, while the Gallup World Poll shows a larger
increase. For France, the Gallup World Poll and the
Eurobarometer both show increases in average
life evaluations from 2019 to 2020, significantly
so in the latter case. Two national surveys for
France match these increases.4 For Finland, the
two surveys tell slightly different stories, as life
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Figure 2.3: Quarterly estimates of four UK well-being measures, 2019–2020
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In this section we shall first confirm these general
findings using all individual-level data from the
years 2017 through 2020, testing to see which
if any of these effects have become larger or
smaller in 2020. We use the 2020 effects as a
proxy for the effects of COVID-19 and all related
changes to economic and social circumstances,
a simplification not easily avoided.

The Gallup World Poll data are not sufficiently
fine-grained to separate respondents by their living
or working arrangements, but they do provide
several ways of testing for different patterns of
consequences. In particular, we can separate
respondents by age, gender, immigration status,
income, unemployment, and general health status.
Previous well-being research by ourselves and
many others has shown subjective life evaluations
to be lower for those who are unemployed, in poor
health, and in the lowest income categories. In
World Happiness Report 2015 we examined the
distribution of life evaluations and emotions by age
and gender, finding a widespread but not universal
U-shape in age for life evaluations, with those
under 30 and over 60 happier than those in
between. Female life evaluations, and frequency
of negative affect, were generally slightly higher
than for males. For immigrants, we found in World
Happiness Report 2018 that life evaluations of
international migrants tend to move fairly quickly
toward the levels of respondents born in the
destination country.

Table 2.3 shows the results of individual-level
estimation of a version of the model that we
regularly use to explain differences at the national
level. We use the same column structure as in
our usual Table 2.1, while adding more rows to
introduce variables that help to explain differences
among individuals but which average out at the
national level. The first three columns show
separate equations for life evaluations, positive
affect and negative affect. The fourth column is a
repeat of the life evaluation equation with positive
and negative emotions as additional independent
variables, reflecting their power to influence how
people rate the lives they are leading.
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Table 2.3: Individual-level well-being equations, 2017–2020

Log HH income

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Ladder

Pos. affect

Neg. affect

Ladder

0.130***

0.009***

-0.010***

0.116***

(0.009)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.008)

-0.562***

-0.081***

0.131***

-0.402***

(0.032)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.028)

Count on friends

0.884***

0.118***

-0.095***

0.722***

(0.030)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.027)

Freedom

0.573***

0.113***

-0.099***

0.411***

(0.024)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.021)

Donation

0.259***

0.050***

0.009***

0.228***

(0.018)

(0.003)

(0.002)

(0.016)

Perceptions of corruption

-0.227***

-0.000

0.043***

-0.190***

(0.023)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.022)

Age < 30

0.297***

0.050***

-0.016***

0.245***
(0.025)

Health problem

(0.027)

(0.004)

(0.004)

0.059

-0.023***

-0.041***

0.044

(0.040)

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.036)

0.182***

0.011***

0.032***

0.193***

(0.025)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.022)

0.003

-0.007*

0.015***

0.020

(0.026)

(0.004)

(0.003)

(0.024)

-0.241***

-0.048***

0.053***

-0.169***

(0.031)

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.031)

College

0.402***

0.018***

-0.012***

0.378***

(0.023)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.022)

Unemployed

-0.497***

-0.052***

0.084***

-0.384***
(0.025)

Age 60+

Female

Married/common-law

Sep div wid

Foreign-born

Institutional trust

COVID

(0.027)

(0.004)

(0.004)

-0.076*

-0.018***

0.027***

-0.054

(0.042)

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.039)

0.260***

0.048***

-0.039***

0.196***

(0.019)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.017)

0.013

-0.007

0.026***

0.042

(0.036)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.036)

Pos. affect

0.652***

Neg. affect

-0.815***

(0.024)

(0.036)
Constant

Country fixed effects
Adj. R2
Number of countries
Number of obs.

3.309***

0.432***

0.446***

3.430***

(0.095)

(0.012)

(0.010)

(0.087)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.254

0.124

0.139

0.278

95

95

95

95

358,013

344,045

355,636

346,780

Notes: 1) The equations include all complete observations 2017-2020 for countries with 2020 surveys, including country-years with particular missing
questions with appropriate controls. The variable COVID is a dummy variable taking the value 1.0 in 2020. Standard errors clustered at the country
level are reported in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Institutional trust: The first principal component of the following five measures: confidence
in the national government, confidence in the judicial system and courts, confidence in the honesty of elections, confidence in the local police force,
and perceived corruption in business. This principal component is then used to create a binary measure of high institutional trust using the 75th
percentile in the global distribution as the cutoff point. This measure is not available for all countries since not all surveys in all countries ask all of the
questions that are used to derive the principal component. When an entire country is missing this institutional-trust measure, we use a missing-value
indicator to maintain overall sample size.
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those reporting negative emotions looms larger
when measured, as is often done, in relation to
the previous number of people reporting negative
feelings. Thus, we find that while the percentage
of the population feeling sad during a lot of the
previous day grew by 2.9%, from 23.2% to 26.1%
of the population, this represented a 12% increase
in the number of people feeling sad during a lot
of the previous day.

By adding a specific measure of institutional trust
to our usual six variables explaining well-being,
the effect of institutions is now split between
the new variable and the usual perceptions of
corruption in business and government. We leave
both in the equation to show that the index for
confidence in government represents more than just
an absence of corruption. Indeed, we shall show
later that it is the most important institutional
variable explaining how nations have succeeded
or failed in their attempts to control COVID-19.

How do we square this substantial resiliency at
the population level with evidence everywhere
of lives and livelihoods torn asunder? First, it is
important to note that some population subgroups
hardest hit by the pandemic are not included in
most surveys. For example, surveys usually
exclude those living in elder care, hospitals,
prisons, and most of those living on the streets
and in refugee camps. These are populations that
were already worse off and have been most
affected by COVID-19.

The equations are estimated using about 1,000
respondents in each year from 2017 through
2020. The results show the continued importance
of all the six variables we regularly use to explain
differences among nations, as well as a number
of additional individual-level variables. These
additional variables include age, gender, marital
status, education, unemployment and whether
the respondent was born in another country.
Income is represented by the logarithm of household income and health status by whether the
respondent reports having health problems. The
effects of COVID-19 are estimated by adding a
variable (called COVID) equal to 1.0 for each 2020
survey respondent. These estimates for 2020
effects differ from those we have previously seen
in the raw data because here we are estimating
the 2020 effects beyond those that are due to
changes in the main driving variables, some of
which have themselves been affected by COVID-19.

Second, the shift from face-to-face interviews
to cell phone surveys has tended to alter the
characteristics of the surveyed population in ways
that are hard to adjust for by usual weighting
methods. For example, the average incomes of
2020 respondents in China were much larger than
those of 2019 respondents, explicable in part
because cell-phone sampling procedures would
cover people living inside high income gated
communities otherwise inaccessible by face-toface methods.

Just as we found with the analysis of the basic
data reported in previous tables and figures, and
in most comparable population-representative
surveys in other countries, the equations in
Table 2.3 show that subjective well-being has
been strikingly resilient in the face of COVID-19.
As shown by the very small estimated coefficient
on ‘COVID’, there have been no significant changes
in average life evaluations, while the frequency of
positive emotions has fallen, and of negative
emotions has risen, with the increase in negative
emotions much higher than the reduction in
positive emotions, in terms of shares of the
population surveyed. Since the frequency of
positive emotions in previous surveys is more
than twice as large as for negative emotions
(71% vs 27%), the increase in the numbers of

Third, is it possible that the relative stability of
subjective well-being in the face of the pandemic
does not reflect resilience in the face of hardships,
but instead suggests that life evaluations are
inadequate measures of well-being? If the chosen
measures do not move a lot under COVID-19,
perhaps they will not change whatever happens.
In response to this quite natural scepticism, it is
important to remind ourselves that subjective life
evaluations do change, and by very large amounts,
when many key life circumstances change. For
example, unemployment, discrimination, and
several types of ill-health have large and sustained
influences on measured life evaluations. Perhaps
even more convincing is the evidence that the
happiness of immigrants tends to move quickly
towards the levels and distributions of life
34

World Happiness Report 2021

evaluations. Confidence in public institutions also
plays an important role.

evaluations of those born in their new countries
of residence, and even in the sub-national regions
to which they move.5

These large samples of individual responses can
be used to show how average life evaluations, and
the factors that support them, have varied among
different sub-groups of the population. What do
the results show? We start by reporting how the
2020 changes in life evaluations and emotions
differ by population subgroups, and then consider
two possible reasons for these differences.
We first consider how the basic supports for
well-being have changed for different subgroups,
and then see whether the well-being effects of
these conditions have become greater or less
under COVID-19.

The monitoring of emotions has been especially
important under COVID-19, since negative emotions
have been the most affected of all the well-being
measures. In a typical country, the number of
people reporting being sad or worried in the
previous day in 2020, compared to 2017-2019,
was more than 10% greater for sadness (from
23.2% of the population to 26.1%) and 8% greater
for worry (from 38.4% of the population to 41.5%).
The equations in Table 2.3 replicate the same
general pattern as we normally show for the
national-level data (analysis using national
average data including 2020, shown in Statistical
Appendix 1). Income, health, having someone to
count on, having a sense of freedom to make key
life decisions, generosity, and the absence of
corruption all play strong roles in supporting life

For the world sample, as shown in Table 2.4, and
in most countries, there have been significant
changes from 2017-2019 to 2020 in some of the
key influences on life evaluations. There has been
a significant increase in unemployment and

Table 2.4: Changes in sample characteristics from 2017-2019 to 2020
(1)

(2)

(3)

2017-2019

2020

Change in mean from 2017-2019 to 2020

Log HH income

9.415

9.250

Health problem

0.231

0.202

Count on friends

0.845

0.844

● Decrease

Freedom

0.806

0.812

● Insignificant

Donation

0.317

0.324

Perceptions of corruption

0.715

0.700

Age < 30

0.317

0.323

Age 60+

0.183

0.170

Female

0.495

0.493

Married/common-law

0.569

0.534

Sep div wid

0.110

0.113

College

0.169

0.193

Unemployed

0.064

0.083

Foreign-born

0.066

0.072

Institutional trust

0.286

0.284

Number of countries
Number of obs

95

95

265,377

92,636

-0.029***

● Increase

-0.015**
+0.006*
-0.013***
-0.034***
+0.024***
+0.019***

Note: Columns 1 and 2 report the mean values for each variable in 2017-2019 and 2020, respectively, from the set of
all complete observations in countries with 2020 surveys. Column 3 reports the changes in means from 2017-2019 to
2020 that have a p-value of 0.1 or less in a two-sample t-test with standard errors clustered at the country level.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table 2.5: How have life evaluations changed in 2020 for different people?

Log HH income
Health problem

(1)

(2)

(3)

2017-2019

2020

Change in coefficient from 2017-2019 to 2020

0.152***

0.109***

(0.009)

(0.012)

-0.553***

-0.572***

(0.032)

(0.041)

Count on friends

0.867***

0.889***

(0.0315)

(0.050)

Freedom

0.570***

0.587***

(0.023)

(0.035)

Donation

0.238***

0.290***

(0.019)

(0.024)

-0.240***

-0.215***

Perceptions of corruption
Age < 30
Age 60+
Female
Married/common-law
Sep., div., wid.

(0.023)

(0.042)

0.278***

0.342***

(0.027)

(0.044)

0.006

0.216***

(0.042)

(0.049)

0.177***

0.199***

(0.025)

(0.035)

-0.011

0.046

(0.027)

(0.036)

-0.235***

-0.247***

(0.033)

(0.050)

College

0.393***

0.402***

(0.023)

(0.033)

Unemployed

-0.471***

-0.553***

Foreign-born
Institutional trust
Country FEs
Adj. R2
Number of countries
N of obs.

(0.030)

(0.049)

-0.060

-0.108**

(0.045)

(0.050)

0.278***

0.228***

(0.020)

(0.032)

Yes

Yes

0.263

0.246

95

95

265,377

92,636

-0.043***
● Larger effect
● Smaller effect
● Insignificant

+0.052**

+0.210***

+0.057*

Note: Regressions in columns 1 and 2 include a constant, country fixed effects, and controls for country-years with
missing questions. Column 3 reports significant changes in the absolute value of the coefficients from 2017-2019 to
2020. See appendix note on calculation of standard errors in column 3. Standard errors are clustered by country.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

well-being are concentrated among those over
the age of 60, where the frequency of reported
health problems fell from 46% to 36% for men and
from 51% to 42% for women. Among the survey
respondents, the increases in unemployment were

negative emotions, offset by a reduction in the
reported frequency of health problems. The
frequency of the reporting of health problems fell
from 23% to 20% for the population as a whole.6
These changes, and the related improvements in
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that has taken place in its impact, as shown in
Table 2.5. For unemployment, there has been a
significant increase in the number of unemployed
plus a slightly greater average happiness loss
from being unemployed.

concentrated among those under 30, where it
was up from 9.2% to 10.2% (p=.006) for men and
up from 10.5% to 14.6% for women (p<.001), and
those between 30 and 60, up from 5.1% to 6.3%
(p<.001) for men and from 5.8% to 8.0% (p<.001)
for women. Unemployment increases were much
larger for those in the bottom quarter of their
country’s income distribution (up from 8.3% to
11.8%, p<.001).

As for institutional trust, Table 2.5 shows that it
remains a highly important determinant of life
evaluations. We shall explore below how it also
enables societies to deal effectively with crises,
especially in limiting deaths from COVID-19.

In Table 2.5 we repeat the basic equation for life
evaluations in Table 2.3, but now fit separate
equations for 2017-2019 and for 2020. This permits
us to see to what extent the happiness impacts
of COVID-19 have varied among population
sub-groups.

The importance of trust
and benevolence
Many studies of the effects of COVID-19, including
those surveyed in other chapters, have emphasized
the importance of public trust as a support for
successful pandemic responses.7 We have studied
similar linkages in earlier reports dealing with
other national and personal crisis situations, so it
is appropriate here to review and augment our
earlier analysis before we do our assessment of
how trust has affected the success of national
strategies to limit COVID-19 death rates. In World
Happiness Report 2020 we found that individuals
with high social and institutional trust levels were
happier than those living in less trusting and
trustworthy environments. The benefits of high
trust were especially great for those in conditions
of adversity, including ill-health, unemployment,
low income, discrimination and unsafe streets.8 In
World Happiness Report 2013, we found that the
happiness consequences of the financial crisis of
2007-2008 were smaller in those countries with
greater levels of mutual trust. These findings are
consistent with a broad range of studies showing
that communities with high levels of trust are
generally much more resilient in the face of a
wide range of crises, including tsunamis,9 earthquakes,10 accidents, storms, and floods. Trust and
cooperative social norms not only facilitate rapid
and cooperative responses, which themselves
improve the happiness of citizens, but also
demonstrate to people the extent to which others
are prepared to do benevolent acts for them, and
for the community in general. Since this sometimes
comes as a surprise, there is a happiness bonus
when people get a chance to see the goodness of

For those variables that do not change due to
COVID-19, such as age, then the difference between
column 1 and 2 shows the effects of COVID-19 on
people in that category. The bars on the right-hand
side of Table 2.5 show the size and significance
of these changes. For other variables, such as
unemployment, then the total effects of COVID-19
depend on how much unemployment has
changed and whether the happiness effect of
being unemployed is larger or smaller in 2020.
These results suggest that COVID-19 has reduced
the effect of income on life satisfaction, increased
the benefits of living as a couple relative to being
single, separated, divorced or widowed, increased
the happiness effects of generosity, and sharply
increased the life satisfaction of those 60 years
and older. In some groups of countries, including
East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East and
North Africa, there was a significant drop in the
life satisfaction of the foreign-born. For countries
with large foreign-born shares, this effect was
enough to affect the overall rankings. For example,
the United Arab Emirates, where only 12% of the
population was born in the country, has average
life evaluations, and corresponding country
rankings, that fell substantially in 2020 even
though life evaluations of the locally-born
increased from 2019 to 2020.
To find the total effect of variables that have
changed under COVID-19, we need to take
account both of how much the variable has
changed, as shown in Table 2.4 and any change
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supports the selection and success of policies that
save lives. Here we set the stage by presenting some
new evidence on the power and plausibility of the
links between trust and well-being, and especially
trust that others will not only be honest, but will
go out of their way to do a good turn for others.

others in action, and to be of service themselves.
Seeing trust in action has been found to lead to
post-disaster increases in trust,11 especially where
government responses are considered to be
sufficiently timely and effective.12
COVID-19, as the biggest health crisis in more
than a century, with unmatched global reach and
duration, provides a correspondingly important
test of the power of trust and prosocial behaviour
to provide resilience and save lives and livelihoods.
Since COVID-19 is such a silently infectious virus,
there is a risk that communities with more frequent
face-to-face meetings have the potential for faster
transmission, unless social closeness can be
quickly recreated at greater physical distance. A
pandemic may also engender a fear of others that
can make it more difficult to create and have a
sense of common purpose, and to adopt social
norms aimed at saving lives. We found in the
previous section that trust is still an important
support for well-being in 2020. In the next section,
we will consider the extent to which higher trust

This new evidence comes from the World Risk
Poll sponsored by Lloyd’s Register Foundation
and administered during the 2019 round of the
Gallup World Poll. Lloyd’s Register Foundation
agreed to include, among their more usual risk
measures relating to the prevalence and perceived
likelihood of bad events, a measure of positive
risk. The measure chosen is usually called the
‘wallet question’ because its original form asked
respondents to assess the likelihood of their
hypothetically lost wallet containing $200 being
returned if found, alternatively, by a neighbour, a
police officer, or a stranger.13 With the likelihood
of wallet return being assessed on the same basis
as a range of negative risks faced by survey
respondents all over the world, it is now possible
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involving large numbers of wallets being dropped
in 40 countries, some containing money and
some not.16 For the 39 of those countries that
were also included in the World Risk Poll, the data
show a strong positive relation (r=0.64) between
expected and actual wallet return. More importantly,
the expected rate of return17 for a wallet found by
a stranger averaged 25%, while the actual average
in the same countries was almost 50%, suggesting
that people are generally too pessimistic about the
kindness of others. The pandemic has provided
many chances to see the kindness of others. If
seeing these kindnesses has been a pleasant
surprise, then the resulting increase in perceived
benevolence will help to offset the more widely
recognized costs of uncertain income and
employment, health risks, and disrupted social lives.

for us to test the well-being importance of
expected benevolence relative to that posed by
mental illness, violent crime, and other risks of
negative outcomes.
The answers to the wallet question are used to
measure the climate of trust in several dimensions,
as measured by the expected return of wallets
found by neighbours, police officers and
strangers. They are more than a conventional
measure of trust. To return a wallet requires a
level of benevolence extending far beyond basic
trustworthiness, since the finder has to go out of
their way, often at considerable effort, to do a
good turn for someone else. It is no surprise that
people are happier if they live in a community
where others stand ready to help. Knowing that
others are acting in such a way has been shown in
experimental studies to encourage others to do
good turns, making them even happier.14

How big is the happiness benefit of expected
benevolence? We find it useful to consider wallet
return by police and by the general community
separately. Someone who thinks it very likely their
wallet will be returned if found by the police has a
life evaluation higher by 0.49 points in the 2019
World Risk Poll data after controlling for basic
demographics. For community benevolence, we
take the average expected return of wallets found
by strangers and neighbours. If they think it is
very likely to be returned if found by either a
neighbour or a stranger, their life evaluation is
higher by another 0.58 points, for a total of more
than a full point on the 0 to 10 scale.18 This is more
than twice the estimated negative effect of being
unemployed and more than having an income
several times higher. Another way of calibrating
the well-being effects of expected benevolence is
to compare them with the effects of negative
events. The combined positive well-being effect
of expected wallet return is again over a full point,
twice or more as large as the negative effects of
expected personal harm from violent crime,
mental illness and any or all of five other risks
measured on the same scale.19 Figure 2.4 shows
the effects of expected wallet return in comparison
with actual unemployment, and violent crime and
mental health, the two most damaging of the seven
risks identified in this part of the World Risk Poll.

Sceptics of the power of trust have emphasized
that unwarranted trust can place your life, or that
of your child, at needless risk. A distinction can be
made between warranted and unwarranted trust,
and between trust and trustworthiness. If one’s
trust exceed the trustworthiness of their society,
they may be led to take unwarranted risks. On the
other hand, if one is too pessimistic about the
trustworthiness of others, then they may be less
willing to make social connections with others,
reducing potential happiness for themselves and
others. Thus, it is very important to know the
actual level of trust and whether it represents a
reliable guide for prudent behaviour. The wallet
question was originally designed with an eye to
verify the reality of trust perceptions. There had
already been wallets experimentally dropped in
the 1990s, and international differences in wallet
return rates were later found to be correlated with
answers to general questions about whether
other people could be trusted.15 To ask a question
more specific to wallet return provides a stronger
test, since it is possible to discover whether
communities with different rates of wallet return
have different levels of trust. It can also show
whether people are on average too optimistic,
too pessimistic, or are well-balanced in their
assessments of the kindness of others. By good
luck, there has recently been an experiment

Thus we find that a variety of trust and generosity
measures remain extremely important supports

39

World Happiness Report 2021

Figure 2.4: Benevolence matters for happiness

Currently unemployed

-0.430

Harm from mental health issues
seen as very likely

-0.382

-0.226
Doubling of income

Harm from violent crime seen
as very likely

0.202

Wallet return by police seen
as very likely

0.459

Wallet return by neighbour or
stranger seen as very likely

-.5

0.619
0
.5
Average effect on life satisfaction

1

Note: Bar lengths indicate the estimated change in life satisfaction associated with each variable in a multivariate
regression with controls for age, age squared, and gender. Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals, based on
standard errors clustered at the country level. Data from the 2019 Lloyd’s Register Foundation World Risk Poll.

How have countries done in
the fight against COVID-19?

for well-being. They may provide an important
element in understanding why life evaluations
have been as resilient in 2020 as previous sections
have shown. In the next section, we ask whether
these primary supports for happiness have also
helped countries in their efforts to find and
implement strategies to control COVID-19. We will
carry forward our data on expected wallet return
by neighbours and strangers as a measure of
social capital that could, and does, supplement
institutional trust (which includes trust in police
as a component) in predicting a successful
COVID-19 strategy.

At the core of our interest in investigating
international differences in death rates from
COVID-19 is to see what links there may be
between the variables that support high life
evaluations and those that are related to success
in keeping death rates low. We find that social and
institutional trust are the only main determinants
of subjective well-being that show a strong
carry-forward into success in fighting COVID-19.20
This section seeks to explain international
differences in national average COVID-19 deaths
per 100,000 population in 2020. In 31 countries
COVID-19 deaths were fewer than 1 per 100,000
population. These include countries as large as
China and as small as New Zealand and Bhutan.
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for the length of life in the measurement of
national well-being. Doing so in the way suggested
would increase the trend growth of national
well-being where life expectancy has been
improving, reflecting that in countries with greater
life expectancy people have longer to enjoy
being alive. It also strengthens the links between
COVID-19 death rates and national well-being
beyond their impact on the life evaluations of
those still living.

This group with extremely low COVID-19 death
rates contains 20 African countries and several
Asian countries and regions that, like China,
Bhutan and New Zealand, adopted policy strategies
to drive community transmission to zero and keep
it there, including Singapore, Taiwan, Cambodia,
and Thailand.
At the other extreme, there were 11 countries with
over 100 COVID-19 deaths per 100,000 population.
These included the United States, the United
Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Czech Republic,
Peru and five smaller European countries. The full
list covering 163 countries is in the statistical
appendix. Figure 2.5 shows the national death
rates in 2020 on a global map revealing stark
regional divides, with very low death rates in Asia,
Africa, and Australasia, and the highest death
rates in some European countries, the United
States and parts of Latin America.

In this section we try to estimate the extent to
which the quality of the social context, which
we have found so important to explaining life
evaluations within and across societies, might
help or hinder progress in fighting COVID-19.
Several studies within nations have found that
regions with high social capital have been more
successful in reducing rates of infection and
deaths.21 Others have argued that different elements
of the social context might have opposite effects
in the fight against COVID-19.22 In particular, it has
been suggested that the close personal relations
within families and communities that are sparked
and fed by frequent in-person meetings, might

If we take a broad view of subjective well-being,
we should consider, as is done in Chapter 8,
extending our measure of national well-being
to adjust for international differences in life
expectancy. Chapter 8 proposes direct adjustment

Figure 2.5: COVID-19 2020 death rates per 100,000 population
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The best strategy was to
drive community transmission
to zero, and to keep it there,
thus saving lives and achieving
more open societies and
economies by late 2020.This
is likely to make for happier
societies in 2021 and beyond.

The first set of three variables comprises:
a)	the median age of the population. This
variable captures the fact that COVID-19
fatality rates are very high for the elderly
and very low for the young. The median age
captures both aspects of this differential
fatality better than do measures of the
share of the population above a certain
age,24 and almost as well as a more
sophisticated adjustment based on
age-standardized mortality rates for
COVID-19.25 There are big regional differences in the averages of national median
ages, being highest in Europe at 42 years
and less than 20 in Sub-Saharan Africa.

provide a good transmission climate for the virus.
On the other hand, those aspects of social capital
relating to pro-social behaviour, trust in others,
and especially trust in institutions might be
expected to foster behaviours that would help a
society to follow physical distancing and other
rules designed to stop the spread of the virus.
We capture these vital trust linkages in two ways.
We have a direct measure of trust in public
institutions, to be described below. We do not
have a measure of general trust in others for
our large sample of countries, so we make use
instead of a measure of the inequality of income
distribution, which has often been found to be a
robust predictor of the level of social trust.23

b)	whether the country is an island. The
island variable covers 21 island nations,
augmented to 22 by treating Australia as
an island rather than a continent. All 22
share the characteristic that access must
be by air or sea, simplifying the application
of measures to monitor and block virus
movements.
c)	an exposure index measuring how close a
country was, in the early stages of the
pandemic (March 31), to infections in other
countries. It embodies the propinquity
principle implicit in the law of gravity, and
embodied in a variety of gravity-based
models of trade,26 migration,27 and
infections.28 Distance matters, as does the
size of the objects of interest, in this case
the number of infections. In our application
of the gravity principle, we treat early
infections elsewhere to be a risk factor for
future infections here, with transmission
being less likely when physical distance is
greater. We use geographic distance as a
proxy for a range of additional factors cultural, linguistic, climatic, and migrationbased - that jointly determine the frequency
of population movements, which in turn
facilitate the spread of a virus. The
variable used is the sum across partner
countries of total early infections in
each country divided by the distance29
separating them. Our measure of the
infection mass in each possible source

Our attempts to explain international differences
in COVID-19 death rates divide the explanatory
variables into two sets, both of which refer to
circumstances that are likely to have affected a
country’s success in battling COVID-19. The first
set of variables cover demographic, geographic
and disease exposure circumstances at the
beginning of the pandemic. The second set of
variables covers several aspects of economic
and social structure, also measured before the
pandemic, that help to explain the differential
success rates of national COVID-19 strategies.
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c)	the level of institutional trust. We use
the national average for 2017-2019 of
institutional trust (on a scale from 0 to 1)
as defined in Table 2.4 of World Happiness
Report 2020. Confidence in public institutions supports the choice and successful
application of a virus-suppression strategy
because those living in societies with high
institutional trust levels are more likely to
accept the necessity of fast and sometimes
painful policy measures. They may be
more likely to follow official advice, and
also to reach out to help others in their
communities.

country is based on infections early in
the first wave of the pandemic (March 31),
and distances are those between the
capital cities of the exposed country and
each of the possible source countries. For
example, the observation for India is the
sum across all other countries of their
cumulative national infections by March
31 divided by the distance between that
country and India. The exposure index
ranges from a low of 0.4 to a high of
almost 8, with an average value of 5.1.
Australia and New Zealand are the only
countries with exposure below 0.5,
reflecting their great distance from
countries with high infection rates at
March 31. All of the eight countries with
an exposure index above 5.0 are in
Western Europe.

d)	the Gini coefficient measuring the country’s
degree of income inequality, on a scale
from 0 to 100, with 0 representing
complete equality. In our global sample of
163 countries, the lowest value is 23 and
the highest 65, with an average of 38.

The second set of variables comprises:

These variables together explain two-thirds of the
international differences in COVID-19 death rates
in our global sample of 163 countries, as shown in
the second column of Table 2.6. The first column
of the Table shows that the three geographic and
demographic variables alone can explain almost
one-half (48%) of the international differences in
COVID-19 death rates in 2020.

a)	a pair of measures of the extent to which
a country was able to remember and
apply the epidemic control strategies
learned during the SARS epidemic of
2003. Countries in the WHO Western
Pacific Region have been building on
SARS experiences to develop fast and
maintained virus suppression strategies.30
Hence membership in that region
(WHOWPR) defines one of our SARS
variables. Being geographically close to
countries with SARS experience may have
accelerated the transmission of information
about alternative COVID-19 suppression
strategies. Our second SARS-related
variable is the average distance between
each country and each of the six countries
or regions most heavily affected by SARS
(China, Hong Kong, Canada, Vietnam,
Singapore and Taiwan).

Although the more complete model of equation
(2) still has a simple structure, we have tested,
and report in Table A1 of Statistical Appendix 2,
what happens if we augment our basic structure by
adding other variables that have epidemiological
or other grounds for inclusion. Of the 18 additional
variables considered separately, six contribute
significant explanatory power. More hospital beds
were associated with a reduction of 3.3 deaths
per 100,000 population for each additional bed
per thousand population. We did not include the
variable in our basic model because it did not
affect the other results but materially reduced the
number of countries covered. Three different trust
variables made contributions, including social
trust and expected return of a lost wallet if found
by community members, whether strangers or
neighbours. These all contributed explanatory
power beyond that provided by our institutional
trust measure and income inequality. Although

b)	whether the country has a female head of
government. Female heads of government
(there are 23 in our sample) have tended
to favour making policy with overall
well-being as the objective, and this makes
suppressing community transmission an
even more obvious choice for them.
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Table 2.6: COVID-19 deaths in 2020 per 100,000 population
Median age

(1)

(2)

Beta

1.265***

1.840***

0.450

(0.332)

(0.308)

Island dummy

-18.459***

-15.602***

(5.333)

(4.867)

Exposure to infections in other countries
(on Mar 31)

12.606***

12.912***

(3.003)

(2.728)

Ln average distance to SARS countries

16.069**

-0.140
0.441
0.158

(6.953)
WHOWPR

-8.720

-0.064

(7.913)
Female heads of government

-18.493***

-0.169

(4.926)
Index for institutional trust

-47.672***

-0.216

(9.878)
Gini

0.777***

0.168

(0.241)
Constant

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

-26.731***

-201.870***

(5.592)

(63.101)

163

163

0.469

0.653

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Column 3 shows the standardized beta coefficients for the equation in
column 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

slightly tighter fitting equation than does the
median age variable. Since it reduces the sample
size and does not materially influence any of the
other main coefficients of the model, we treat
this result as a robustness check on our use
of median age in the base model. These tests
together give us confidence that a range of other
possible variables do not alter the main results
we discuss below.

these variables do not figure in our base model
because of the smaller country coverage, their
explanatory power strengthens our confidence in
the importance of institutional and social trust in
reducing COVID-19 fatalities. A variable covering
the six countries in the East Asian region was
associated with further reductions in fatalities
in that region beyond those provided by the
SARS-related variables in Table 2.6. As already
noted, we leave the East Asia variable out of our
base model to identify likely channels of influence.
The reasons why these countries did even better
than countries with similar SARS experience are
considered in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4,
with the tightness of their social norms being a
suggested reason.31 Finally, we found, and show
as equation (18) in Table A1 of Appendix 2, that a
more accurate adjustment for the interaction of
age-specific mortality risks of COVID-19 with each
country’s population age distribution produces a

First consider the three variables that set the
context facing nations at the start of the pandemic,
all of which affect their likely COVID-19 death
rates. These relate to demography, geography
and exposure. The first equation of Table 2.6,
where three variables are the only ones used to
explain death rates, increasing median age by one
year is associated with 1.26 more deaths per
100,000 people. Therefore, moving from subSaharan median age to the European average is

44

World Happiness Report 2021

leadership, and the final two to the underlying
social and economic contexts.

associated with 29 more COVID-19 deaths per
hundred thousand population in 2020, thereby
accounting for almost half of the actual death rate
difference of 65 between the two regions. Using
the more precise adjustment described in Statistical
Appendix 2, the difference between the European
and African age structures, when combined with
the age structure of COVID-19 fatality rates, would
predict at difference of 39 deaths per hundred
thousand, two-thirds of the total difference.32
Being an island nation, which makes population
movements easier to control, is associated with
18 fewer deaths per 100,000 population. Finally,
each 1 unit increase in the March 31 infection
exposure index is associated with an additional
12.6 deaths per 100,000 people. Comparing a
low-exposure country with an index of 1 to a high
exposure country with an index of 5 would be
associated with a death rate that is higher by
50 per 100,000 population. Actual death rates
averaged 65 per 100,000 in Western Europe
versus about 1 in East Asia. The difference
predicted using the first equation in Table 2.6
would be 36.33

Starting with the science, there is considerable
evidence that countries in the front lines of the
SARS epidemic in 2003 learned important lessons
about the need for fast and effective response to
novel viral threats. Our two SARS-related measures
attempt to measure the likely flow of ideas and
experience that helped some countries find and
choose a successful virus suppression strategy.
First, there is evidence that ideas,34 like trade
flows and viruses, transmit more readily when
distances (geographic, cultural, linguistic, or
political) are less. Our SARS distance variable
finds that doubling a country’s geographic distance
from the six countries with the greatest SARS
experience is associated with a 2020 death rate
higher by 16 per 100,000. However, there is some
potential for SARS experience to have contributed
to costly delays in recognizing the importance of
transmission via aerosols and asymptomatic
carriers, since neither of these crucial aspects was
present in SARS. The key SARS lesson was not to
expect another SARS, but to be prepared to act
fast to halt virus transmission even while its
characteristics were unknown.

Next, we add a group of scientific, political and
social variables to help explain the likelihood of a
country finding and implementing a successful
COVID-19 suppression strategy. The most successful
overall strategy for minimizing death rates has
been to drive community transmission to zero and
keep it there. Instead, some governments chose
to start reopening their economies before they
had reduced community transmission to zero and
established sufficient testing, tracing and isolation
strategies to avoid subsequent surges in infection
rates. These governments were assuming that
they had found a reasonable trade-off between
saving lives and saving the economy. However, the
evidence is becoming clearer that there is no such
trade-off when it comes to the basic strategy. As
will be illustrated below and in Chapters 3 and 4,
countries that chose to achieve and defend zero
community transmission levels have generally
done better on all fronts.

Second, the World Health Organization’s Western
Pacific Region has provided for many years a
forum and a focal point for the development of
pandemic strategies. The average COVID-19
death rate in 2020 was 1.52 per 100,000 population
for the 14 WHOWPR countries35 in our sample,
compared to 33.4 for other countries. The estimated
coefficient suggests that WHOWPR membership
accounts for a difference of 9 deaths per 100,000,
about a third of the total difference. This estimated
effect is statistically insignificant because the
WHOWPR variable is one of two SARS-related
variables, and the two are quite closely correlated
(r=-0.55). If either of the two variables is included
without the other, it attracts a larger and highly
significant coefficient.36 We prefer to leave both
in, since they each provide a plausible part of the
knowledge transmission story.37 We should also
note, and report in the statistical appendix, that
the two SARS variables are statistically dominated
by an indicator variable for the East Asian countries
that are the focus of Chapters 3 and 4. We choose

How do our policy-related variables fit in to help
explain the likelihood of a successful strategy
being chosen? The first two variables relate to
scientific understanding, the next one to political
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We do not have a full global sample measure
for social trust, so we use income inequality as
a strong proxy variable because social trust is
generally lower in countries where income
inequality is higher.42 We have previously found43
that inequality of subjective well-being is an even
stronger predictor of social trust. We find here
that income inequality is more predictive than
is happiness inequality as a factor limiting the
population’s ability or willingness to follow
COVID-19 virus-suppression guidelines. There is
some early evidence44 of empirical linkages
between income inequality and COVID-19 death
rates, supported by pre-COVID evidence of links
between income inequality and health45 beyond
those flowing through social trust. There is also
evidence from within countries46 that various
COVID-19 impacts are worse for those with
relatively low incomes, and this might have a
counterpart in cross-country analysis. Hence, we
are not surprised to find inequality of income to
be a stronger predictor of COVID-19 death rates
than is well-being inequality. The coefficient of
0.78 suggests than to move from a country with a
Gini coefficient of 27 (like Denmark or Sweden) to
47 (like Mexico or the United States) is associated
with COVID-19 death rates higher by 16 per
100,000 population.

not to use that variable here, since it risks being
a description of the considerable differences to
be explained rather than being, as we prefer, an
attempt to explain them. But we recognize
that we have thus far not provided a complete
explanation.38 Chapter 3 describes the timing and
content of the policies that enabled those countries
to achieve results even better than would be
expected from their SARS experience and lessons.
Turning to political leadership, there are many
specific examples where national leaders have
strengthened or weakened the prospects for
policy strategies aimed at minimizing COVID-19
deaths. We focus here on one objectively easyto-measure characteristic of national leadership
– whether the head of government is a man or
a woman. Several of the 23 female heads of
government have favoured making policy with
overall well-being as the objective,39 making the
suppression of community transmission an even
more obvious choice for them. Countries that
rank highly on a range of social features likely to
support a virus suppression strategy are also
more likely to have chosen a female leader.40
Having a female leader is associated with death
rates lower by 19 per 100,000 population.
Confidence in public institutions supports the
choice and successful application of the preferred
strategy because those living in such societies are
more likely to accept the necessity of fast and
sometimes painful policy measures, and are
personally more likely to follow policy advice and
to reach out to help others in their communities.
We use the same measure of confidence in public
institutions that we used in Table 2.4 of World
Happiness Report 2020. It is derived from the first
principal component of several Gallup World Poll
questions about confidence in various public
institutions.41 It has a global average of 0.3, and is
highest in Southeast Asia (0.56) and lowest in
Eastern Europe (0.20). The coefficient of -48
suggests that to have the level of institutional
trust in Brazil (0.11) rather than Singapore (0.86)
would be matched by COVID-19 death rates
higher by 36 per 100,000. This is more than
one-third of the actual difference in deaths, which
were fewer than 1 per 100,000 in Singapore and
92 in Brazil.

Another powerful measure of social capital is the
expected rate of wallet return if found by a
stranger or a neighbour. Equation (16) in Appendix
Table A2 shows that adding that measure of
community benevolence has a large impact on
lives saved, above and beyond that explained by
the main institutional trust variable. A country
where wallet return is seen as very likely, when
compared to a country where such return is seen
as very unlikely, is estimated to have had almost
50 fewer deaths per 100,000 population, about as
large an effect as provided by institutional trust
on its own.47 We do not use the wallet return
variable as part of our base model, because of
the smaller number of countries covered. It
nevertheless provides important evidence that
strong benevolent community connections and
trusted public institutions are both crucial
supports for successful COVID-19 strategies. The
model including all three trust-related variables –
institutional trust, community wallet return, and
46
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aerosol transmission.52 These characteristics
require masks53 and physical distancing to slow
transmission, rapid and widespread testing54 to
identify and eliminate community55 outbreaks,
and effective testing and isolation for those
needing to move from one community or country
to another. As shown in Chapter 3,56 countries
that quickly adopted all these pillar policies were
able to drive community transmission to zero.
By doing so, and then using widespread testing
and targeted lockdowns when faced with fresh
outbreaks, those countries were able to avoid the
high levels of community exposure that have been
responsible for subsequent waves that have in
many countries been even more deadly than the
first. Countries that did not drive their community
transmission to zero almost always found
themselves with insufficient testing, tracking and
tracing capacities to stop subsequent waves of
infection. They also made the infection risks
worse for everyone by providing large community
pools of infection that provided more scope for
mutations to develop and spread. Hence it was
unsurprising that the first new variants appear to
have come from countries (the United Kingdom,
South Africa, and Brazil)57 with widespread
community transmission of the original virus.
Although it still remains something of a mystery
why what seem to be obvious lessons were so
slow to be learned, our policy-related variables
each pick up possible parts of the story. The three
building blocks include ready access to good
examples, effective leadership capable of acting
quickly and appropriately, and a receptive society.

income inequality, suggests that the trust
differences between Finland and Mexico could
explain a difference of 41 deaths per 100,000 in
2020, almost half of the total difference between
the two countries. COVID-19 deaths in 2020 were
10.1 per 100,000 in Finland compared to 97.6
in Mexico.48

Taken together, our measures of risks of infection
and policy supports combine to explain two-thirds
of the differences in death rates among countries.
Countries with death rates much higher than the
model predicts, as shown in Table A2 of statistical
appendix 2, were sometimes places where there
was scepticism at the highest political level about
the severity of the virus (e.g. Brazil, United States).
In some other jurisdictions where actual deaths
exceed predicted values there was a shared view
by governments and health authorities that there
was a trade-off to be exploited between virus
suppression and the overall health of the economy
and society (e.g. Sweden, United Kingdom).

The fact that experts and governments in countries
distant from the earlier SARS epidemics did not
get the message faster about the best COVID-19
response strategy provides eloquent testimony
to the power of a “won’t happen here” mindset,
vividly illustrated by the death rate impacts of
distance from SARS countries and membership
of the Western Pacific Region of the WHO.49
There was very early evidence that COVID-19
was highly infectious, spread by asymptomatic50
and pre- symptomatic51 carriers, and subject to
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Asia. But there was no offsetting gain on the
economic front, as GDP in 2020 is estimated to
have shrunk by 1.3% in East Asia compared to a
6.5% decline in Western Europe.

There is a special group of countries where actual
death rates were bounded at zero while the
model predicts values below zero. Think of this as
representing an exam, where the highest possible
mark is 100%, but some students had more than
enough knowledge and beneficial circumstances
to achieve 100%. Our model adds up the factors
adding to their likely success, which were clearly
more than enough to keep their death rates close
to zero. These countries include some African
nations with young populations far removed from
major centres of infection. It also includes several
countries that were among the earliest and most
effective adopters of an infection elimination
strategy, including Bhutan, New Zealand, Singapore
and Laos. Bhutan is an especially relevant case in
making explicit use of the principles of Gross
National Happiness in mobilizing the whole
population in collaborative efforts to avoid even
a single death58 from COVID-19 in 2020, despite
having strong international travel links.

Moving into 2021, those countries with low death
rates have managed to reopen successfully, while
the high death rate countries have continued to
face unhappy combinations of fatalities and
lockdowns. As further evidence of the continued
applicability of our results, we have re-estimated
our base model using death rates up to the end
of February 2021, and find that it fits even more
tightly now.59
It is useful to compare New Zealand with Sweden,
since both have high social capital and institutional
trust. In both countries COVID-19 strategies were
developed with the full collaboration of governments and health authorities. Both countries are
always in the top group of countries ranked by
happiness, and both had citizen trust levels high
enough to support a wide range of COVID-19
strategies. They chose very different routes right
from the outset. New Zealand chose to take
community transmission to zero and keep it there,
while Sweden60 preferred instead to keep its
society and economy open. COVID-19 death rates
in 2020 averaged 86.4 per 100,000 population in
Sweden compared to 0.5 in New Zealand. By
early 2021, a comparison of the two countries’
openness showed them to be equally open on six
of ten indicators. New Zealand was one step more
open on three indicators – non-essential businesses,
school and youth activities, and social gatherings
– and less open only for cross-border travel.61 And
being an island was not an essential part of the
story, as a comparison between Sweden and its
Nordic neighbors Norway, Finland and Denmark
makes clear. Their COVID-19 strategy was more
akin to that of New Zealand than of Sweden, and
their death rates a fraction as large. For example,
Norway’s COVID-19 death rate was less than
one-tenth as large as that of Sweden, its economy
shrunk less in 2020, and at the beginning of 2021
it was equally or more open62 on all measures
except border controls. Both countries had their
Gallup World Poll surveys centred in April 2020,
and showed similar small drops in life evaluations
and worse emotions when compared to 2019.63 It

Another notable group of countries are those
whose exposure and other factors suggested
large expected death rates, but which were able
to achieve very low death rates. Examples include
South Korea, Hong Kong, Japan and China and
Taiwan in East Asia and Iceland, Norway and
Finland in Europe. At the end of 2020, which
marks the cut-off for the data we are considering
in this report, neither the health effects nor the
economic and social consequences of COVID-19
are finished, so it is premature to make final
judgments as to whether those countries that did
not choose to suppress community transmission
were able to deliver economic or social benefits
to support their more open strategies.
The evidence from 2020 suggests strongly that
countries that gave priority to suppressing
transmission have also managed to achieve better
results in the economic and social dimensions.
Both globally and within each region, where
disease risk and exposure are more comparable,
the countries that kept their COVID-19 death
rates low have also achieved better economic
performance, as measured by preliminary
estimates of 2020 GDP compared to that in 2019.
We have already seen that COVID-19 death rates
were far higher in Western Europe than in East
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must remain tentative. We found for 2020 that
the same six factors supporting well-being
(income, health, someone to count on, freedom,
generosity, and trust) continue to do so in almost
exactly the same way as in previous years, and
our measures of support have also been generally
maintained. People were just as likely to have
someone to count on, even though the ways in
which this support is delivered have been upended.
People have not toured the world, but many have
rediscovered their neighbourhoods. Respondents
over 60 years of age were in 2020 significantly
less likely than in earlier years to report having
health problems, despite being the age group
most at risk from COVID-19. They were also the
group showing a significant increase in having
someone to count on in times of trouble, suggesting
that, at least for them, neighbours and Zoom calls
were filling in for the face-to-face contacts being
put on hold.

is to be expected that further evidence from 2021
will support the conclusions reached here, that
driving community transmission to zero and
keeping it there has been better for all the pillars
supporting happy lives: good health, good jobs,
and a society where people can connect easily
with each other in mutual trust and support.

Summary
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This has been a challenging year for the world,
and for the preparation of the World Happiness
Report. Millions of lives have been lost, and
billions of others shaken to their core. COVID-19
has altered how people live, how they think about
life, and even how surveys can be used to assess
these consequences. Many strands of data have
been pieced together to produce a picture of
almost astonishing resilience. This general pattern
shows up in a number of different large-sample
surveys with different timing and sampling methods,
so we have some confidence that the pattern is
there, especially as the surveys taken more
frequently match the pandemic stages and
severity appropriately. Who are we most likely to
be missing? The surveys employed to measure
happiness cannot be taken within many of the
hardest-hit groups, including those living in
elder-care, prisons, hospitals, refugee camps, and
on the streets. But they can still represent the
vast majority of the world’s population, including
rich and poor, healthy and sick, employed and
unemployed, living in very supportive or very
divided communities and countries. Although
there were significant increases in average
sadness and worry, we found that overall life
evaluations, and happiness rankings, were
surprising stable. The top countries before the
pandemic remained the top countries in 2020,
so there is little change in the overall rankings.
The top countries already had higher levels of
trust and lower levels of inequality, both of which
helped them to keep death rates low and social
cohesion high, and hence to maintain their
favourable positions.
As we go to press in early March of 2021,
the pandemic is still far from over, and our
conclusions about happiness during COVID-19
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Trust has been the key
common factor linking
happiness and COVID-19
control.

Countries with experience from the SARS epidemic
seemed to have absorbed the relevant lessons, as
did countries with female leaders. Countries with
less inequality of income also had significantly
lower death rates from COVID-19. This is partly
because high social trust tends to go along
with less income inequality. The economically
disadvantaged in many countries faced the
greatest chances of illness and death from
COVID-19. The countries that chose to control
the pandemic showed no trade-off between a
healthy economy and a healthy population. On
average, those countries with lower deaths rates
had lower drops or bigger gains in expected
2020 growth rates for GDP (r=-.36). In 2021, the
advantages of virus control look to be even larger,
as many of the less controlled countries are still
facing high case counts and death rates coupled
with deep restrictions on economic and social life.

We looked for differences in COVID-19 happiness
effects by gender and age. We found no significant
gender differences, as in our global sample
females retained their advantage in life satisfaction,
and greater frequency of both positive and
negative emotions. The well-being of those over
60 rose significantly relative to the middle age
group. while in some countries, but not for the
global sample as a whole, the young lost their
advantage. In some regions, but not for the world
as a whole, we found a significant reduction in the
average life evaluations of the foreign-born. We
found no significant changes in the inequality of
well-being within the surveyed populations.
Trust was shown to be the key factor linking
happiness and COVID-19. Of all the six factors
supporting happiness, only trust played an equally
strong role in helping countries to find and
implement successful COVID-19 strategies. It was
shown to be as important as ever in supporting
happiness during the pandemic, and was found to
be even more important when COVID-19 required
the whole structure of private and public lives to
be refocused on fighting the pandemic. Societies
with higher trust in public institutions and greater
income equality were shown to be more successful
in fighting COVID-19, as measured by 2020 rates
of COVID-19 deaths. Death rates differed, as
expected, by population age structure and
geography, being lower in young populations and
on islands, and for countries less exposed to early
infections nearby. The most successful strategy
was shown to be to drive community transmission
to zero, and to keep it there. Countries that did
so saved lives and achieved more open societies
and economies at the end of 2020. This is likely
to help them to be happier societies in 2021
and beyond.
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Endnotes
1	See ONS (2021b). For earlier evidence, see St-Pierre &
Béland (2004), where telephone respondents gave lower
answers for self-assessed obesity, smoking, and ever
driving after two drinks, similar to findings in other
mode-effect studies. But the answers to the physical and
mental health questions (on a multi-point scale) were the
same whether asked in person or by telephone.

20	For example, if we regress 2020 COVID-19 death rates on
the 2017-2019 national averages of the main variables used
in Table 2.3 to support life evaluations and emotions, only
institutional trust has a significant effect of the correct sign
(-92, t=4.2). The log of GDP per capita is the only other
significant variable, and it shows that higher income
countries have generally had higher COVID-19 death rates.

2	We adjust the original Gallup sample weights to ensure
equal weights across countries/territories in a year.

21	Fraser and Aldrich (2020), looking across Japanese
prefectures, found that those with greater social connections
initially had higher rates of infection, but as time passed
they had lower rates. Bartscher et al. (2020) use withincountry variations in social capital in several European
countries to show that regions with higher social capital
had fewer COVID-19 cases per capita. Wu (2021) finds that
trust and norms are important in influencing COVID-19
responses at the individual level, while in authoritarian
contexts compliance depends more on trust in political
institutions and less on interpersonal trust.

3

See Office for National Statistics (2021a).

4

See Recchi et al. (2020) and Perona and Senik (2020).

5	See several chapters of World Happiness Report 2018, and
Helliwell, Shiplett and Bonikowska (2020).
6	This is consistent with panel evidence from Singapore,
where although a number of satisfaction measures
decreased during lockdown, there was an increase in
satisfaction with health. See Cheng et al. (2020).

22 Elgar et al. (2020).

7	See several references in the next section, especially Fraser
and Aldrich (2020) and Bartscher et al. (2020).

23 See Rothstein and Uslaner (2005).
24	See Statistical Appendix 2 for a comparison with ways of
linking demography to COVID-19 fatalities.

8	See Helliwell et al. (2018) and Table 2.3 in Chapter 2 of
WHR 2020.
9

25	This alternative mortality risk variable is the ratio of an
indirectly standardized death rate to the crude death rate
for each of 54 countries. The indirect standardization is
based on interacting the US age-sex mortality pattern for
COVID-19 with each country’s overall death rate and its
population age and sex composition. Use of this variable
adjusts, in a more precise way than does the median age,
for the COVID-19 mortality implications of each country’s
population distribution by age and gender. Data from
Heuveline and Tzen (2020).

See Aldrich (2011).

10	See Yamamura et al. (2015) and Dussaillant and Guzmán
(2014).
11	See Toya and Skidmore (2014) and Dussaillant and Guzmán
(2014).
12 See Kang and Skidmore (2018).
13	For the logic and first use of the wallet questions, see
Soroka et al. (2003). To make the question of equal
applicability in countries where wallets or their equivalent
are not normally used, the Gallup World Poll version refers
to an object of great personal value, with name and
address attached.

26 Well-surveyed by Head and Mayer (2014).
27 See Poot et al. (2016).
28	See Xia et al. (2004) for an early application of a
gravity-based modelling of infection risk for explaining
within-country transmission of measles. There have been
subsequent further applications of the gravity model to
help explain the spatial transmission of disease.

14 See Aknin et al. (2011).
15 See Knack (2001) and Helliwell and Wang (2011).
16	Cohn et al. (2019). The researchers were surprised to find
the rates of return of the wallets with money included are
even higher than if there was no money.

29	The bilateral distances are taken from the GeoDist Database
provided by CEPII. The GeoDist was developed in Mayer
and Zignago (2005) to analyze market access in global and
regional trade flows. Detailed explanations of the distance
measures can also be found in Mayer and Zignago (2011).

17	To obtain an index of expected wallet return in the Lloyd’s
data, the three possible responses: very likely, somewhat
likely, and very unlikely were coded at 1.0, 0.50, and zero.

30 See World Health Organization (2017).

18	Life evaluations for those who think it highly likely a wallet
will be returned whether found by police, a neighbour, or a
stranger are estimated to be 1.094 points higher on a 0-10
scale (t=8.4). This is based on a micro regression for the
Cantril ladder using the Gallup World Poll data for the 2019
survey wave in which the wallet question was included.
Income, unemployment, age, education, gender, and marital
status were included as controls.

31 See Gelfand et al. (2021).
32	The age/mortality adjustment variable takes the value of
0.85 in Western Europe, and 5.18 in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Based on a sample of 154 countries, the estimated coefficient
on the index is 9.23, as shown in equation 18 of Table A1 in
Statistical Appendix 2. The age structure difference
between the two regions predicts a 4.23*9.23=39.0
difference in COVID-19 death rates.

19	The other risks asked about in the same personal harm
answer format included personal harm from food, water,
severe weather, powerlines and appliances.
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47	Adding the community wallet return variable to equation
(2) in Table 2.6 lowers the coefficient slightly on institutional
quality, to 42.0, and the coefficient on the Gini index from
0.77 to 0.73, as shown in equation (16) in Appendix 2 Table
A1. Note the sample size is smaller in equation (16). The
combined effects of the wallet variable and institutional
quality in the equation where both appear are 42+49=92
deaths per 100,000 for what would be an impossibly large
increase from 0 to 1 in both variables. Actual country-based
calculations are shown in the text and matching end-note.

33	To consider the possibility that the exposure variable
perhaps gives too much credit for infections that could
have been stopped, we constructed an alternative exposure
index that depended only on factors that influence the
spread on the disease but do not depend on a country’s
policy strategy. These were the distance from China, a
country’s remoteness from all other countries, and whether
a country was in the Schengen group of European
countries that had abolished border controls for population
movements within the Schengen zone. The predicted
exposure index was lower for countries further from China,
lower for countries far from other centres of population,
and higher for countries in the Schengen zone. This
alternative did not significantly change the predicted gap
between Europe and East Asia, but worsened the overall fit
of the model, since it ignored the actual spread of the virus.
So we continue to use the exposure index based on the
actual virus spread by March 31.

48	The contributions were 0.734*(47.5-25.9)=15.85 for the
Gini, 41.95*(0.55-0.129)=17.7 for institutional trust, and
49.0*(0.645-0.285)=17.6 for community wallet return,
making a total of 51.2. Coefficients are from equation (16)
in Table A1 in Statistical Appendix 2, and the values of the
variables from the on-line datafile.
49	There is experimental evidence that chess players at all
levels of expertise are subject to the Einstellung (or
set-point) effect, which limits their search for better
solutions. The implications extend far beyond chess. See
Bilalic and McLeod (2014). See also Rosella et al. (2013).

34 See Sin (2018).
35	We include Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan as part of our
WHOWPR group of countries, even though they are not
official members, because both were heavily affected
by SARS.

50	See Emery et al. (2020), Gandi et al. (2020), Li et al.
(2020), Savvides et al. (2020) and Yu and Yang (2020).

36	Using just WHOWPR, the coefficient is 19.4 (t=2.7,
p=0.008), while on its own the SARS distance variable
takes a coefficient of -19.6 (t=3.5, p=0.001). Combining the
two variables into one, as supported by the equality of their
coefficients, gives an even more significant coefficient, 13.0
(t=3.6, p<0.001). Most of the explanatory power is coming
from the SARS distance variable.

51 See Wei et al. (2020) and Savvides et al. (2020).
52	See, for examples, Assadi et al. (2020), Setti et al. (2020),
Godri Pollitt et al. (2020), and Wang & Du (2020).
53	See Chernozhukov et al. (2021) for causal estimates from
US state data, Ollila et al. (2020) for a meta-analysis of
controlled trials, and Miyazawa & Kaneko (2020) for
cross-country analysis of the effectiveness of masks.

37	We also found that WHOWPR membership was even
more important in explaining international differences in
infection rates.

54 See Louie et al. (2020).
55	For an early community example from Italy, see Lavezzo
et al. (2020).

38	2020 death rates averaged 1.1 per 100,000 in the six East
Asian countries (China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, South
Korea and Mongolia) and 31.8 in the rest of the world.

56 See also Tan et al. (2020).
57 See Mahase (2021).

39	There was a meeting of well-being leaders in Reykjavik,
with Iceland hosting New Zealand and Finland, all three
countries having female heads of government.

58	See Ongmo and Parikh (2020) for an explanation of the
Bhutanese strategy. Although there were no deaths in 2020
there was a death on January 8, 2021.

40	Evidence for both parts of this linkage is provided by
Coscieme et al. (2020).

59	See equation (20) in Table A1 in Appendix 2. The adjusted
R-squared rises from .653 to .703 using death rate data
updated to include the first two months of 2021.

41	To get our binary measure, we start by taking the first
principal component of the following five measures:
confidence in the national government, confidence in
the judicial system and courts, confidence in the honesty
of elections, confidence in the local police force, and
perceived corruption in business. This principal component
is then used to create the binary measure using the 75th
percentile as the cutoff point.

60 See Claeson and Hanson (2021).
61	As downloaded on February 17, 2021 from
https://www.reopeningaftercovid.com
62	As downloaded on March 2, 2021 from https://www.
reopeningaftercovid.com The contrasts between Sweden
and Norway are replicated almost equally for Sweden’s
other Nordic neighbours Finland and Denmark.

42 See Rothstein and Uslaner (2005).
43 See Goff et al. (2018).

63	For example, negative affect rose (from 2019 to April 2020)
from .194 to .215 in Norway, and from 0.203 to 0.220 in
Sweden, in neither case a large enough change to be
statistically significant. The 95% confidence intervals for
the magnitude of the change had widths of about .05 with
roughly 1,000 observations in each case.

44	See Elgar et al. (2020) using data for a smaller sample
of countries.
45 See Pickett and Wilkinson (2015).
46	See Blundell et al. (2020) for UK evidence, Demenech et al.
(2020) for Brazil, and Oronce et al. (2020) for the United
States.
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Introduction

also essential to have multi-pronged strategies
and comprehensive use of mobility restrictions
combined with other interventions. In addition,
as the pandemic continues across the globe,
East Asian governments have built up the capacity
of their public health systems, and they have
explored dynamic response protocols that are
more targeted and sustainable in their prevention
of major resurgences. Specifically, proactive
screening, rapid government response to local
outbreaks, and extensive testing, tracing, and
isolation measures have been the pillars of
COVID-19 control mechanisms in these countries,
aiming for a swift resumption of normal life
alongside the virus, i.e., the “new normal.” We
also show that the early success of government
policies in the East Asia regions in combating
COVID-19 is similarly found in Australia and
New Zealand. These successes have shown that
effective virus control policies can be implemented
in more typical Western democracies.

COVID-19, which was first discovered and reported
in Wuhan, China in December 2019, spread across
the world at a fast and terrifying pace throughout
2020. The pandemic has affected many key
aspects of life around the world. Government
policies and personal behaviors in coping with the
pandemic have varied greatly across countries
and regions, and the resulting infection and death
rates have differed correspondingly. In general,
some countries in East Asia and the Pacific had
better performance in containing the spread of
COVID-19, compared to the rest of the world.
This chapter explores how the East Asian countries
or regions (hereafter “East Asian regions,” for
simplicity) have dealt with the pandemic and how
both the infection and government policy have
affected emotional well-being. Our study focuses
on five regions: mainland China; Hong Kong SAR
of China (hereafter “Hong Kong SAR”); Taiwan,
China (hereafter “Taiwan”); South Korea; and
Japan. We then compare the East Asian regions’
performance with a selected group of Western
countries with large populations and economies,
including: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. We will
also compare them with two Western countries
located in the Asia-Pacific region, Australia and
New Zealand, which have done quite well in
controlling the spread of COVID-19.

In addition to rapid and systematic government
responses, citizens in East Asia (except for Japan)1
were generally more compliant with government
mandates for mask-wearing, improving personal
hygiene, and maintaining physical distance than
citizens in the selected Western countries. We
argue that certain cultural traits (defined in
Hofstede’s model of national culture), such as
being less individualistic, more long-term oriented,
and less indulgent may help to explain the more
self-regulated behavior and greater compliance
with government policies in East Asia.2 However,
these cultural tendencies alone are not indispensable for controlling the pandemic. The successes
of Australia and New Zealand suggest that even in
countries with more individualistic, short-term
oriented, and more indulgent citizens, a responsible
government still can implement very effective
policies to contain the spread of COVID-19.

Our analysis shows that East Asia’s success,
compared with the six selected Western societies,
can be attributed to stronger and more prompt
government responses, as well as better civic
cooperation. In particular, East Asian governments
implemented more stringent mobility control and
physical distancing policies, as well as more
comprehensive testing, tracing, and isolation
policies (except for Japan) since the early stages.
The weaker policies in Japan are associated with
the worst performance in containing COVID-19
among the five East Asian regions.

Finally, we examine the impact of COVID-19 and
mobility control and physical distancing policies
on emotions. We find individual emotions to be
significantly impacted by COVID-19 in East Asia.
An increase in daily new confirmed cases is
associated with a lower level of publicly expressed
happiness in mainland China, and a higher level of
negative affect in the other four regions. Mobility

A detailed summary of the policies in the five East
Asian regions shows the importance of restructured
and strong government response systems in
providing the necessary institutional infrastructure
for effectively enforcing control measures. It is
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Some countries in East Asia
and the Pacific had better
performance in containing the
spread of COVID-19, compared
to the rest of the world.

infections and another for the new infections
imported by visitors from outside mainland China.
A few small bumps can be found in April, which
are mainly caused by imported cases. The
bumps around April 17, June 14, and July 31 were
due mainly to local outbreaks, which were all
contained within approximately one month. In
most days, the new infections were largely due
to imported cases.

control and physical distancing policies are found
to play an important role in people’s well-being, as
they can largely offset the decrease in happiness
that occurs due to the rise in the daily new
confirmed cases. In summary, more stringent
government responses not only reduce the spread
of COVID-19, but also help to buffer the negative
impact of new daily infection rates on emotions
in East Asia.

The dynamics of infections in Hong Kong SAR are
reported in Panel B. New infections remained low
until early March 2020 with a peak in late March.
The infection was then largely controlled until
another peak emerged on July 22, but the curve
was compressed in about two weeks. The infection
rate remained low until mid-November, followed
by a small bump starting in late November. The
curve for total infections clearly shows three
periods of rising infections in March, July, and
November. The total cumulative infections were
still below 9,000 at the end of December 2020.

An overview of COVID-19 in East Asia

Infections in Taiwan, as shown on Panel C, have
been very low for the whole study period. New
infections were mainly recorded in the second
half of March and early December. The peak of
27 infections was observed on March 20. The total
cumulative number of infections was just 799 by
December 31.

COVID-19 in East Asia
We first present the dynamics of infection in the
five East Asian regions. In Figure 3.1, the left axis
shows new infections, and the right axis shows
total infections. Panel A illustrates the dynamics
in mainland China, where the COVID-19 virus was
first discovered and reported. Figure 3.1 shows
that new cases in mainland China started to
increase rapidly in early January, and reached a
peak on February 12, with 14,106 cases reported.
New cases then declined to fewer than 1,000 on
February 19, and further fell below 500 at the
beginning of March. New case rates have since
remained at a very low level. From the lockdown
of Wuhan on January 23, it took about two
months to reduce local community infection cases
below 100 and almost fully contain the spread of
COVID-19 in mainland China: The total amount of
infections rapidly increased from late January
2020 to over 80,000 cases on March 1, but then
remained flat until the end of December 2020.

South Korea has experienced three waves of
infections. The first two waves were largely
related to indoor religious activities and political
assemblies organized mainly by religious groups.3
The first wave occurred from late February to
early March, and the second wave took place in
late August. The infection rate of the second peak
was 441 new cases on August 26, which was
much lower than the first peak of 851 cases on
March 3. For most days between the peaks, new
infections were successfully controlled with a rate
below 100 cases per day. The third wave recorded
higher infections than the first two waves and
lasted longer as a result of more scattered
infections in metropolitan areas. On December 31,
the total amount of infections reached 61,769,
which is more than double the amount of infections
at the beginning of the third wave.

We report the quantity of new infections for the
period March 1 to December 31 in Appendix
Figure 1, as new infections are too infrequent to
be displayed clearly in Figure 3.1. There are two
curves in the figure, one for total daily new
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Figure 3.1: Daily total and new confirmed COVID-19 cases in Mainland China,
Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan
(December 31, 2019 – December 31, 2020)
Figure 3.1: Daily Total and New Confirmed COVID-19 Cases in Mainland China, Hong Kong
SAR, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan (December 31, 2019 – December 31, 2020)
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The COVID-19 data of mainland China before January 15, 2020,
come from World Health Organization, and the data
44
from January 15, 2020, are from China Data Lab (2020), which scraped the data from DXY.cn. The COVID-19 data of
Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan come from John Hopkins University Center for Systems Science and
Engineering (JHU CSSE). The data start from January 22, 2020. The few negative numbers of new confirmed cases due
to corrections by public health are replaced with zeros when we produced the figure.
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second lowest since mid-April, with the highest
rate of infection at 6.1 per 100,000 on December
31. The infection rates in Hong Kong SAR and
South Korea were similar at the end of 2020, with
117 and 120 per 100,000 respectively. Japan’s
infection rate started to increase rapidly beginning
in mid-July, and the country recorded 186.4 per
100,000 by the end of the year.

Japan has also experienced three waves of
infections. The first peak was in mid-April, with
701 new cases on April 11. The second peak was in
late July and early August, with 1,762 new cases
on July 30, and the third peak had not yet arrived
by until December 31, when the highest daily
cases exceeded 4,500. The number of infections
at the three peaks are much higher than those in
other East Asian regions. The total number of
infections was over 230,000 on December 31.

Even though Japan seems to have a high number
of infections in comparison to other East Asian
peers, Japan’s infection rates are much lower than
many Western countries, as shown in Panel B of
Figure 3.2. The recorded infection rates in France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and
the United States remained low until the end of
February, but they started to rise rapidly in March
and April. Italy and Spain’s infection rates rose
above 100 per 100,000 on March 23 and March
25, respectively. The remaining four countries
reached 100 per 100,000 about two weeks later.
The infection rate in Spain on March 30 (188 per
100,000) was already higher than the highest
infection rates in East Asia (i.e., Japan) by the
end of 2020.

Comparisons with western countries
This section compares the infection rates observed
in the five East Asian regions to six Western
countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. These Western
nations offer a useful comparison because of their
relative size and income level in the Western
sphere. We use the per capita rates of infection to
account for population size and to enable easier
comparisons across countries and regions, as
larger nations may have higher infection counts
due to the size of their population. Panel A of
Figure 3.2 shows the cumulative daily confirmed
cases per 100,000 people in the five East Asian
regions. In the early stage (January and February),
mainland China recorded the highest infection
rate, mainly due to the outbreak in Wuhan and
other cities in Hubei province. China’s infection
rate was surpassed by South Korea in late February,
Hong Kong SAR in late March, and then Japan in
mid-April. The infection rate in Taiwan was the
lowest among the five regions for most of this
period, reaching 3.3 per 100,000 on December 31.
The infection rate in mainland China has been the

All six countries, which rank top in population size
and income level in the western sphere, have
recorded high growth rates of infections, particularly since October. The infection rate in Germany
was the lowest among the six countries and
increased at the lowest speed, but the infection
rate in Germany at the end of the year was 2,101
per 100,000, which is still about 11 times the rate
of Japan. Italy and the United Kingdom recorded
higher infection rates, with 3,485 and 3,677 per
100,000 respectively. Spain and France had even
higher rates, both over 4,100 per 100,000. The
United States departed from other countries, with
an almost linear increase in the infection rate up
to 2,760 per 100,000 in late October. The U.S.
infection rate increased at an even higher rate
until it reached 6,060 per 100,000 by the end of
2020. The unique trend of the infection rate in the
United States may imply that very limited effective
anti-COVID-19 measures were adopted. By the
end of 2020, the infection rates of the six selected
Western countries were about 11 to 32.5 times the
rate of Japan, and 340 to 991.6 times the rate of
mainland China.
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The COVID-19 data of mainland China before January 15, 2020, come from World Health Organization,
and the data from January 15, 2020, are from China Data Lab (2020), which scraped the data from
DXY.cn. The COVID-19 data of Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan come from John
Hopkins University Center for Systems Science and Engineering (JHU CSSE). The data start from
January 22, 2020. The few negative numbers of new confirmed cases due to corrections by public health
are replaced with zeros when we produced the figure.

Figure 3.2: Daily total confirmed cases per 100k in 5 East Asian regions,
Australia, New Zealand, and the other 6 western countries
(December
31, 2019 – December 31, 2020)
Figure 3.2: Daily Total Confirmed Cases per 100k in 5 East Asian Regions, Australia,
New Zealand, and the other 6 Western Countries (December 31, 2019 - December 31,
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outbreak and the subsequent waves. Second, we
summarize the similarities and differences of the
response systems and the non-pharmaceutical
and pharmaceutical interventions adopted by the
five East Asian governments to demonstrate
successful responses that other countries can
46
draw upon for their own
responses. We also
discuss government responses to the COVID-19
pandemic in Australia and New Zealand and point
out the possibilities for Western countries.

To provide some middle ground between the five
East Asian economies and the six selected Western
economies, we have added the infection rates in
Australia and New Zealand in both panels of
Figure 3.2. These are countries which adopted
COVID-19 control strategies very similar to those
employed in the five East Asian regions. Their
results are considerably better than the other
Western countries shown in Panel B and are much
more comparable to those for the five countries
in Panel A. Australia and New Zealand’s relative
curves in Panels A and B reveal the striking
difference in infection between East Asia and the
six Western countries.

An overall picture
To compare the government responses in East
Asian and Western regions, we rely on information
from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response
Tracker (OxCGRT), which collects publicly available
information for 17 indicators of government
responses from more than 180 countries. We
focus on the stringency index, which consists of
nine indicators of policies whose primary goal is
to restrict people’s mobility and behaviors.
Indicators include school closures, workplace
closures, public event cancellations, restrictions

Government responses
Governments across the world have gradually
adopted a wide range of measures in response
to the COVID-19 outbreak. In this section, we first
compare the government responses of the five
East Asian regions with those of six Western
countries, including the early stages of the
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The success in East Asia and
the Pacific points to the
importance of strong government
leadership and the use of
rigorous non-pharmaceutical
and pharmaceutical measures in
fighting the COVID-19 pandemic.

Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan at the earliest stage
of the outbreak helped to reduce the spread
of the virus in these two regions. Despite the
comparably stringent policies at this early stage,
the relatively poor performance of Italy in
containing the virus may be attributable to less
compliance with those policies or insufficient and
inconsistent testing, tracing and quarantine6.
On the other extreme, the governments of
Germany, Spain, the United States, and the United
Kingdom were among the slowest to respond:
their stringency indexes were only 25, 25, 22,
and 11 respectively when the 1,000th case was
confirmed in each country even though the
indexes rose substantially right after that. Weak
government responses in these countries at the
early stages inhibited them from preventing the
rapid spread of the virus. The governments of
mainland China, Japan, South Korea, and France
had relatively weak policies when the 10th case
was confirmed but raised the strictness of mobility
control and physical distancing measures
considerably when the 100th or 1,000th case
was confirmed. Overall, the governments of the
five East Asian regions implemented stricter
interventions than those of the four western
countries including Germany, Spain, the United
States and the United Kingdom at the earlier stages
of the outbreak. This helps to explain the relatively
mild first waves in the East Asian countries.

on gatherings, public transport closures, stayat-home requirements, restrictions on internal
movement, international travel controls, and
public information campaigns. The index is an
additive score of the nine indicators measured on
an ordinal scale, rescaled to vary from 0 to 100
(100 = strictest).4 We acknowledge that this
stringency index, though simple for international
comparison, may not provide enough detail for
each of these policies in mobility control and
physical distancing. More detailed policies in the
five East Asian regions will be discussed in the
following subsection. This index may also not fully
represent the effectiveness and efficiency of the
policies, since neither actual enforcement, civic
engagement, nor individual compliance is covered
by the index.
Figure 3.3 shows the stringency index for the five
East Asian regions and the six Western countries
from December 31, 2019 to December 31, 2020.
We also indicate the level of the stringency index
for each region when the 10th, 100th, or 1,000th
COVID-19 case was confirmed.5 The left axis
corresponds to the stringency index, and the right
axis corresponds to daily new confirmed cases.
Although the governments of most of the 11
regions implemented quite stringent policies in
mobility control and physical distancing when the
COVID-19 situation became more severe, we find
that the stringency of these policies varied
significantly at the early stages across these
regions. The governments of Hong Kong SAR,
Italy, and Taiwan responded the fastest to the
outbreak among all the regions; when the 10th
case was confirmed, their stringency indexes were
already 49, 28, and 19, respectively. It seems that
the strictness of the government responses in

Testing and contact tracing also appeared to be
effective in managing COVID-19, alongside early
adoption of mobility control and physical distancing
policies. Each of the five East Asian regions and
the six Western countries offered comprehensive
testing, such as testing of anyone showing COVID-19
symptoms or open public testing. When the
situation got much worse (i.e., having more than
1,000 cases confirmed). However, some countries
offered more extensive testing than others at
earlier stages. France and the United States did
not have any testing policies when the 10th case
was confirmed, while all of the five East Asian
regions and the other four Western countries
offered testing to those who both had symptoms
and met certain criteria (e.g., essential workers,
admitted to hospital, came into contact with a
known case, and returned from overseas). When

64

World Happiness Report 2021

Figure 3.3: Stringency index and daily new confirmed for 5 East Asian regions
and 6 western countries (December 31, 2019 – December 31, 2020)
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Figure 3.3: Stringency index and daily new confirmed for 5 East Asian regions
and 6 western countries (December 31, 2019 – December 31, 2020) continued

G. Germany

H. Italy
45000
40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

60000

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

50000
40000
30000
20000
10000

19
1/
31
/2
0
2/
29
/2
0
3/
31
/2
0
4/
30
/2
0
5/
31
/2
0
6/
30
/2
0
7/
31
/2
0
8/
31
/2
0
9/
30
/2
0
10
/3
1/
20
11
/3
0/
20
12
/3
1/
20

12
/3
1/

12
/3
1/

19
1/
31
/2
0
2/
29
/2
0
3/
31
/2
0
4/
30
/2
0
5/
31
/2
0
6/
30
/2
0
7/
31
/2
0
8/
31
/2
0
9/
30
/2
0
10
/3
1/
20
11
/3
0/
20
12
/3
1/
20

0

Daily New Confirmed

Stringency Index

Daily New Confirmed

Stringency Index

The 10th Case Confirmed

The 100th Case Confirmed

The 10th Case Confirmed

The 100th Case Confirmed

The 1,000th Case Confirmed

The 1,000th Case Confirmed

J. United Kingdom

I. Spain
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

60000

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

50000
40000
30000
20000
10000

Stringency Index

The 10th Case Confirmed

The 100th Case Confirmed

40000
30000
20000
10000
0

12
/3
1/

1/
31
/2
0
2/
29
/2
0
3/
31
/2
0
4/
30
/2
0
5/
31
/2
0
6/
30
/2
0
7/
31
/2
0
8/
31
/2
0
9/
30
/2
0
10
/3
1/
20
11
/3
0/
20
12
/3
1/
20

12
/3
1/

19

Daily New Confirmed

50000

19
1/
31
/2
0
2/
29
/2
0
3/
31
/2
0
4/
30
/2
0
5/
31
/2
0
6/
30
/2
0
7/
31
/2
0
8/
31
/2
0
9/
30
/2
0
10
/3
1/
20
11
/3
0/
20
12
/3
1/
20

0

60000

Daily New Confirmed

Stringency Index

The 10th Case Confirmed

The 100th Case Confirmed

The 1,000th Case Confirmed

The 1,000th Case Confirmed

K. United States
300000

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

250000
200000
150000
100000
50000

12
/3
1/

19
1/
31
/2
0
2/
29
/2
0
3/
31
/2
0
4/
30
/2
0
5/
31
/2
0
6/
30
/2
0
7/
31
/2
0
8/
31
/2
0
9/
30
/2
0
10
/3
1/
20
11
/3
0/
20
12
/3
1/
20

0

Daily New Confirmed

Stringency Index

The 10th Case Confirmed

The 100th Case Confirmed

The 1,000th Case Confirmed

Notes: The left axis corresponds to the stringency index; the right axis corresponds to daily new confirmed cases.
The stringency index comes from Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) and is a simple additive
score of nine indicators of mobility control and physical distancing or “lockdown style” policies measured on an ordinal
scale, rescaled to vary from 0 to 100. The nine indicators include school closures, workplace closures, public events
cancelations, restrictions on gatherings, public transport closures, stay-at-home requirements, restrictions on internal
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tracing at the early stages, but the policies were
loosened after more than 1,000 cases were
confirmed. The time periods during which these
three countries loosened their contact tracing
policy unfortunately coincided with periods in
which daily new confirmed cases surged. However,
the United States only had very limited contact
tracing and did not conduct tracing for all identified
cases throughout the whole time period under
investigation. Japan, France, and Spain did not
practice contact tracing for all identified cases until
the total number of confirmed cases reached
nearly 120,000, 178,000, and 890,000, respectively.

the number of confirmed cases reached 100,
France and the United States began to implement
testing policies, whereas three of the East Asian
regions–Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan, and South
Korea–broadened the criteria for testing at this
stage. Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan offered testing
to anyone showing COVID-19 symptoms, and,
most impressively, South Korea offered open
public testing to asymptomatic people.
Another strength of most of the East
Asian regions is their much more aggressive
contact-tracing efforts. Table 3.1 presents the
comprehensiveness of contact tracing in each
of the 11 regions at various stages of the outbreak.
It shows that four out of the five East Asian
regions (mainland China, Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan,
and South Korea) implemented comprehensive
contact tracing at the early stages and continued
making their efforts later (even when the situations
improved). There is more heterogeneity on
contact tracing among the six Western countries.
The governments of Italy, Germany, and the
United Kingdom made great efforts for contact

Most of the regions experienced a second and third
wave of the COVID-19 pandemic after the spring.
When these subsequent waves arrived, Hong
Kong SAR, South Korea, and Japan responded
quickly by raising the stringency of mobility control
and physical distancing policies. In mainland
China and Taiwan, there have been no significant
subsequent waves mainly because of consistent
comprehensive testing, contact tracing, and
quarantine policies that quickly and fully suppressed

Table 3.1: Responses of contact tracing to COVID-19
(December 31, 2019 – December 31, 2020)
Mainland Hong Kong
China
SAR

Taiwan

South
Korea

Japan

France

Germany

Italy

Spain

United
Kingdom

United
States

The 10th Case
Confirmed

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

The 100th Case
Confirmed

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

The 1,000th
Case Confirmed

●

●

n/a

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

More than
1,000 Cases
Confirmed

●

●

n/a

●

●●

●●

●●●

●●●●

●●

●●●●●

●

● No contact tracing
● Limited contact tracing; not done for all cases
● Comprehensive contact tracing; done for all identified cases
Note: Japan, France, and Spain did not have comprehensive contact tracing until the total number of confirmed cases
reached nearly 120,000, 178,000, and 890,000, respectively; Germany loosened the contact tracing policy between
March 18 and June 14 when the total number of confirmed cases exceeded 10,000 but did not reach 188,000; Italy
loosened the contact tracing policy for 17 days in October and after November 9; The United Kingdom loosened the
policy between March 12 and May 31 when the total number of confirmed cases exceeded 1,000 but did not reach
258,000 and between August 30 and December 16 when the total number of confirmed cases exceeded 336,000 but
did not reach 1,920,000.
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Figure 3.4: Stringency index and daily new confirmed for Australia and
New Zealand (December 31, 2019 – December 31, 2020)
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Overall, the success of the East Asian regions in
controlling subsequent waves is mainly attributable
to the timely enforcement of more stringent
policies for mobility control and physical distancing,
together with continued extensive testing and
comprehensive contact tracing.

some regional outbreaks.7 On the other hand,
France and the United Kingdom did not enforce
stricter mobility control and physical distancing
measures quickly enough when subsequent
waves hit. The United States did not significantly
raise the stringency of control measures until
mid-November when the situation became most
severe. Overall, the lack of government responses
regarding mobility control and physical distancing
policies in these Western countries during subsequent waves partly explains why they experienced
much stronger waves than the East Asian regions.

The success stories in battling the COVID-19
pandemic have not only taken place in East Asia.
Australia and New Zealand, two Western countries
located in the Asia-Pacific region, appear to be
successfully suppressing the pandemic. As shown
in the two panels of Figure 3.4, both countries
enforced strong mobility control and physical
distancing policies, similar to the East Asia regions;
the stringency index was already about 19 and 36
when the 10th cases were confirmed in Australia
and New Zealand, respectively. These levels of
stringency were higher than those of not only
most of the other Western countries, but some of
the East Asian regions under study at the earliest
stage of the outbreak. The policies also became
rapidly stricter in response to the rise in new

All of the East Asian regions, except Japan, have
made testing available to the general public. In
comparison, only three out of the six Western
countries–France, Germany, and the United
States– had similar levels of testing when the
second wave arrived. Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom continued to only test those with
symptoms. None of the Western countries have
conducted contact tracing as thoroughly as the
four East Asian regions (not including Japan).
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severe resurgence of infections. Restructured and
strong government response systems, early and
rigorous mobility control, extensive screening,
testing, contact tracing and isolation, coordinated
resource allocation, clear communication, enforced
self-protection practices, and supportive economic
measures have jointly contributed to the
comparatively low COVID-19 rates in the East
Asian regions.8 Table 3.2 provides a summary of
government responses in East Asia. In addition,
as COVID-19 continued to spread globally,
these regions have built up their capacities and
explored sustainable response protocols that are
more targeted and proactive in the prevention
and control of COVID-19 outbreaks, as well as
rejuvenating their economies.9

confirmed cases, especially in New Zealand.
Furthermore, the level of stringency of the policies
was raised immediately wherever subsequent
infections appeared to hit the two countries. These
restrictions were directly aimed at the locality
subject to new infections. Australia and New
Zealand also had comprehensive contact tracing
policies (i.e., doing contact tracing for all identified
cases) from the very beginning of the outbreak.
A closer look
East Asian governments have adopted control
and mitigation measures that were found to be
effective in combating the COVID-19 pandemic,
enabling a swift resumption of normal life without

Table 3.2: Summary table of government responses in Mainland China,
Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan
Policy

Mainland China

Hong Kong SAR

Taiwan

South Korea

Japan

Nationwide directive
(YES/NO)

YES

YES1

YES1

YES

YES

Multisectoral coordination
(YES/NO)

YES

YES

YES

YES

NO

Central-Local government cooperation
(YES/NO)

YES

YES2

YES3

YES

NO

Comprehensive
Enforced

Targeted
Enforced

Targeted
Enforced

Targeted
Enforced

Targeted
Requested

Testing(Extensive/Targeted)

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Targeted

Tracing(Extensive/Targeted)

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Targeted

Mandatory
Institutional

Mandatory
Mixed

Mandatory
Mixed

Mandatory
Mixed

Mandatory
Mixed

YES

YES1

YES1

YES

NO

Timely
Clear

Timely
Equivocal

Timely
Clear

Timely
Clear

Delayed
Clear

Required

Required

Required

Required

Requested

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Free treatment
(YES/NO)

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Hospitalization of mild cases required
(YES/NO)

YES

NO

NO

YES

NO

1. Response system

2. Nonpharmaceutical Interventions
Mobility restriction and social distancing
(Comprehensive/Targeted)
(Enforced/Requested)

Isolation and quarantine
(Mandatory/Voluntary)
(Institutional/Home-based/Mixed)
Nationwide coordinated resource allocation and
mobilization
(YES/NO)
Communication
(Timely/Delayed)
(Clear/Equivocal)
Self-protection practice
(Required/Requested)
Economic support
(YES/NO)
3. Pharmaceutical Interventions

1. “Nationwide” here refers to regionwide.
2. “Central” here refers to the Chinese central government for Hong Kong SAR.
3. “Central” here refers to the central government within Taiwan province of China.

69

World Happiness Report 2021

Response systems

government departments in Taiwan, such as
Ministries of Labor, Economics, Transportation,
and Education.17 As early as January 4, the Hong
Kong SAR government launched the Preparedness
and Response Plan Novel Infectious Disease of
Public Health Significance (the Plan) and activated
the “Serious Response Level,” which was then
raised to “Emergency Level” on January 24. Under
the Plan, a Steering Committee, consisting of
directors and permanent secretaries of multiple
departments of the government, was formed.18

Fostered by the experience with previous epidemics
such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
Coronavirus (MERS), all of the five East Asian
governments, except Japan, have improved their
crisis management systems and established
relevant regulatory procedures to address public
health emergencies.10 Though legal and policy
bases for the public health systems need further
strengthening,11 strong nationwide directives,
multi-departmental coordination, and collaboration
between different levels of government in these
East Asian regions have provided the institutional
infrastructure for aggressive and/or timely response
to the COVID-19 pandemic.12

South Korea. To coordinate the governmentwide response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the
South Korean government assembled the
Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures
Headquarters, which consisted of multiple
relevant ministries and was headed by the Prime
Minister. The Korean CDC led the prevention and
control efforts under the Headquarters, with
assistance from the Minister of Health and
Welfare and the Minister of Interior and Safety,
to coordinate among the central and local
governments. Local Disaster and Safety
Management Headquarters were established at
the local level with support from the central
government for necessary resources.19

Mainland China. Despite the delayed response
to the outbreak in its very early stage,13 a
“whole-of-government” and “whole-of-society”
approach was subsequently followed. On January
24, 2020, the State Council of China established
the Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism (the
Mechanism) which consisted of 32 departments
of the government. The Mechanism, led by the
National Health Commission, played a crucial role
in coordinating collective actions and facilitating
cooperation for, “epidemic prevention and control,
medical treatment, scientific research, publicity,
foreign affairs, logistics support, and frontier
work.”14 Within five days of January 24, 31 Chinese
provinces, municipalities, and autonomous
regions declared a Level I (the highest level)
response to the COVID-19 epidemic. At the local
level, the Epidemic Prevention and Control
Headquarters System was launched for leading
and commanding the response and mobilization
of community engagement.15

Japan. On January 30, 2020, three days after the
Prime Minister declared COVID-19 as an infectious
disease, Japan established the Novel Coronavirus
Response Headquarters, with a task force
consisting of 36 senior officers from different key
ministries. However, the authority of both the task
force and the Japanese government to implement
epidemic countermeasures was greatly restricted by
the Constitution.20 Even with further amendments
of the emergency law later in March, the governments still lacked superseding emergency power
over ministries and stood in need of support for
multisectoral and central-local collaboration for
COVID-19 responses.21

Taiwan & Hong Kong SAR. Both regions benefitted
from the legacy of the SARS epidemic and were
able to activate public health emergency management mechanisms in response to the COVID-19
outbreak from its onset.16 For example, on January
20, 2020, the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control
(TCDC) activated the Central Epidemic Command
Center (CECC) under the National Health Command
Center (NHCC), with the minister of health and
welfare as the designated commander. CECC
coordinated the response efforts of multiple

Non-pharmaceutical interventions
Mobility restriction and physical distancing
Measures to control mobility and physical
distancing were widely adopted, but the extent
and intensity of these measures varied among
the five East Asian regions. Dynamic and
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enforced in high-risk areas. Although their
proportionality was controversial, the drastic
measures that characterized the Phase I
containment efforts of mainland China were
shown to have been effective in delaying and
reducing the size of epidemic in China.24 The
prolonged interventions in Wuhan, and the
gradual relaxation of mobility control and
physical distancing measures, instead of a
sudden and premature lifting, also helped prevent
early resurgence.25

incremental control measures were also
introduced in these regions in response to new
outbreaks and resurgence.
Mainland China. Mainland China introduced
comprehensive and rigorous interventions to
control mobility and physical distancing.22 The
epicenter, Wuhan city, implemented a complete
lockdown which lasted for 76 days beginning on
January 23, followed by lockdowns in other
prefectures in Hubei province beginning the next
day. Unprecedented mobility control measures,
including travel bans, suspension of public
transport, bans of all public gatherings, cancelling
of public events, strict stay-at-home requirements,
and lockdowns of communities were instituted.
Mobility restrictions and physical distancing policies
were also adopted early in the rest of China.23 For
example, cross-regional travel restrictions, health
checkpoints, rules for public gatherings, and
stay-at-home orders were mandated in most
areas during the Spring Festival. Schools of all
levels remained closed until June, and workplace
closures and community lockdowns were strictly

When the initial outbreak was suppressed, the
COVID-19 response strategy of mainland China
shifted to Phase II containment.26 To prevent
importation of cases from overseas, international
travel restrictions were tightened in March 2020.27
In addition, testing and disinfection requirements
for imported cold-chain foods were enhanced,
according to the plan of “full-chain, closed-loop,
traceable management” introduced by the
Mechanism.28 Dynamic control measures were
refined by local governments and tailored to risk
levels of COVID-19 infections (high vs. medium vs.
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these border control measures. In Hong Kong
SAR, testing for COVID-19 was required and
administered at the airport for inbound travelers
from high-risk areas or who were symptomatic.
Other physical distancing measures, including
school closures, work-from-home requirements
(for civil servants in Hong Kong SAR), closing
of leisure venues, reducing the capacity of
restaurants, and restricting public gatherings were
also introduced incrementally later in response to
accelerating risk of local transmission.30

low risk). These measures were targeted to
contain outbreaks promptly at a scale as granular
as the community level while the country worked
hard to revive socioeconomic life. For example, to
avoid large-scale lockdowns, outbreaks in Beijing,
Qingdao, Shanghai, and other mainland cities
were quickly identified and suppressed within less
than a month by tightening mobility control
measures on the community level.
Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan. These neighbors of
mainland China adopted targeted mobility control
measures rather than regionwide lockdowns. One
reason for their success at keeping COVID-19
under control is their early, incremental, and
stringent border control.29 For instance, Taiwan
started onboard quarantine of passengers from
Wuhan as early as December 31, 2019. In all three
regions, entry of Wuhan residents and all foreign
nationals were banned in late-January and
mid-March respectively, with a health declaration
and 14-day quarantine mandated for inbound
travelers. Imported cases were greatly reduced by

South Korea. South Korea avoided full lockdowns
and had less restrictive border controls than
Taiwan and Hong Kong SAR. While the Korean
government banned the entry of foreigners with
a travel history to Hubei on February 4, 2020, its
border remained relatively open. However, South
Korea instituted rigorous screenings at the border
including requirements of health declarations,
testing, and quarantine for inbound travelers.
When potential new outbreaks emerged,
measures including physical distancing, limitations
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short supply and slow turnaround, mainland China
offered free testing services to potential COVID-19
patients beginning in late January and introduced
affordable COVID-19 tests to the general public in
April. More recently, testing was made free and
required on a regular basis for high-risk groups,
essential workers, and imported products, which
helped proactively screen and contain COVID-19
infections. In Hong Kong SAR, through multiple
testing and surveillance programs, free testing for
COVID-19 was made available to people with
symptoms at public and private clinics and hospitals, as well as for inbound travelers, inpatients,
and healthcare workers. On May 23, 2020, Taiwan
CECC also lowered restrictions on testing, as they
allowed the general public to take COVID-19 tests
at their own expense for emergency reasons, or
for work, study, and travel purposes. The “testing,
tracing, treating” model for containing COVID-19
was adopted by South Korea, whose testing
capacity was greatly enhanced after the MERS
outbreak in 2015. With cooperation between the
government and the private sector, South Korea
was able to conduct large-scale and rapid testing
at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic by setting
up triage centers and innovations such as the
“Drive-through/Walk-in” testing approach. Testing
was free to confirmed cases and potential contacts
but available to all in need of a test. Moreover, in
later stages, rapid population-level mass testing
for COVID-19 has been conducted in a number of
cities across China such as Beijing, Wuhan, Qingdao,
Dalian, and Hong Kong SAR, as well as in South
Korea, allowing for rapid identification of clusters
and resurgence of COVID-19 to avoid the second
wave of massive infection.

on public gatherings, closure of public schools,
churches, and nightclubs, and working-fromhome recommendations were also introduced or
tightened.31 In particular, starting in June, South
Korea adopted a 3-stage physical distancing
system and implemented control measures
according to the severity of COVID-19 infections,32
which were recently further refined and modified
at local levels.
Japan. The Japanese government did not
implement comprehensive and intense mobility
control measures such as lockdowns due to the
constitutional restrictions. The countermeasures
of the Japanese governments were targeted at
border control and the quarantine of the Diamond
Princess (the cruise ship with suspected/
confirmed cases anchored at Port of Yokohama)
at the early phase of the outbreak. Subsequent
amendments to the law made it possible to
declare a “state of emergency” in several
prefectures and at the national level. Nevertheless,
most mobility restrictions and physical distancing
measures were still voluntary rather than
mandatory. Central and local governments in
Japan therefore only made appeals to the public,
and they requested school closures, remoteworking of non-essential business employees,
and avoidance of public gatherings in multiple
prefectures.33 While there is some evidence that
supports the effectiveness of the non-enforced
requests in reducing the spread of COVID-19 in
Japan,34 critics also noted that the lack of clear
incentives delayed behavioral changes in the early
phase of the pandemic.35
Testing

Japan. Testing was targeted rather than extensive
in Japan as compared to the other East Asian
regions. Testing services were only available to
people with potential symptoms, close contacts
of confirmed cases, and inbound travelers. Testing
costs were covered by the government or health
insurance for confirmed cases. Until August 2020,
although testing was widely used for cluster
identification, testing capacity was still low in
Japan and restrictions remained high. Often,
requests for testing by clinicians were rejected by
bureaucrats at local healthcare centers.36

Testing was the cornerstone public health
measure for controlling the COVID-19 epidemic,
as it was essential in preventing and containing
resurgence in COVID-19 cases. Although testing
capacities increased over time, testing policies
varied in terms of availability and scale in the five
East Asian regions.
Mainland China, Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan and
South Korea. These regions aimed for extensive
testing by aggressively increasing public access
to COVID-19 tests. For example, despite initial
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Tracing

Isolation and quarantine

Extensive tracing of COVID-19 cases and close
contacts were introduced and enhanced by the
use of big data and information technologies in
all of the East Asian regions except Japan.
Large-scale contact tracing was shown to play
an important role in suppressing local epidemics
and enabling rapid government response to
prevent resurgence.37

Case isolation was important in controlling
COVID-19 outbreaks and more effective when
combined with contact tracing and physical
distancing measures. All of the East Asian regions
enforced mandatory and monitored isolation and
quarantine for confirmed COVID-19 cases,
suspected cases, close contacts, and inbound
travelers, though with varying requirements for
isolation venues.

Mainland China, Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan and
South Korea. In these regions, comprehensive
and rapid epidemiological investigations were
conducted in communities, hospitals, and triage
centers for tracing potential COVID-19 patients.
Extensive tracing was aided by the use of big
data from surveillance infrastructure, border
controls, medical records, and transportation
systems, as well as mobile GPS and transaction
records. Mainland China launched nationwide
individual risk assessment services, called health
barcodes, which utilized big data from multiple
sources and machine learning algorithms.38
Taiwan integrated data from mobile GPS,
immigration and customs, health insurance, and
health declaration at entry to screen and trace
potential patients.39 South Korea also made use
of card transactions and surveillance data, as well
as mobile phone apps (“Self-Quarantine Safety
Protection App” and “Self-Diagnosis App”) for
tracking.40 In Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan, and South
Korea, wristbands paired with mobile phones
were also used as “electronic fences” to track
people under quarantine. Moreover, mobile phone
apps that map COVID-19 cases were developed
in these regions to help people avoid areas
of infection.

Mainland China. Institutional isolation of all
confirmed and suspected cases, and centralized
quarantine of close contacts and inbound travelers,
were required. Under institutional quarantine or
isolation, living necessities, triage, basic medical
care, frequent monitoring, and rapid referrals
were provided.42 Recent evidence suggests that
institutional isolation was more effective than
home-based isolation in reducing within-household and community transmission.43
Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan.
Unlike in mainland China, both home-based and
institution-based quarantine were allowed in
different circumstances. For example, in Hong
Kong SAR, inbound travelers were subject to a
14-day self-quarantine at home or at designated
quarantine centers, while institutional quarantine
was required for close contacts of inbound
travelers who tested positive.44 Either homebased or institutional isolation were required for
close contacts of COVID-19 cases in these regions,
where home-based isolation was monitored
electronically or physically by community
workers. In particular, fines and/or imprisonment
were enforced in Hong Kong SAR,45 Taiwan,46
and South Korea47 for non-compliance with
isolation requirements.

Japan. Japan adopted a contact tracing strategy
that was targeted for early clustering identification.
However, Japanese authorities had limited access
to personal information other than that from
confirmed cases. The download of tracking apps
was also voluntary. Therefore, contact tracing and
screening in Japan were not as extensive as in
other regions, and often failed when clusters
became large and widespread.41

Resource allocation and mobilization
In the five East Asian regions excluding Japan,
allocations of medical and non-medical resources
were coordinated across regions, prioritized for
the frontline and for the treatment of severe
COVID-19 patients, and facilitated by the use of
information technology and partnership between
government and private sectors.
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Mainland China and Hong Kong SAR. The Chinese
government boosted the domestic production of
medical products through a host of supporting
measures, such as providing tax reductions,
subsidies, and social security benefits. International procurement of medical supplies by
governments and private firms (e.g., tech giant
Alibaba) was coordinated to help meet local
needs. The government also promoted the import
of medical products from overseas and shift of
sales from export to domestic markets by local
firms and encouraged manufacturers to reconfigure
production lines to produce medical equipment.
Health workers from the military and other
provinces were paired with and sent to cities at
the epicenter in Hubei, Hong Kong SAR, as well as
to cities with resurgence. Medical resources were
also concentrated through temporary redistribution
systems to frontline workers. In addition, makeshift
hospitals were established for separately treating
patients with mild and severe conditions. Local
governments, community workers, volunteers,
and private sector entities, such as e-commerce
platforms and logistic firms, worked together for
distribution of vital products.48

Japan. In contrast to other East Asian regions,
Japan has a regionalized public health system.
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Japan
expanded its hospital networks and restructured
the triage pathway at local levels. However, local
health systems still lacked adequate redistribution
of resources and national support.50
Communication
In mainland China, Taiwan, South Korea, and
Japan, public information campaigns provided
consistent and clear messages about government
response efforts, guidelines, the risks of COVID-19,
and self-protection measures, while the government
in Hong Kong SAR was equivocal with regard to
the use of protective face masks at the early
stages of the outbreak.51 Both traditional and social
media were used to facilitate communication
efforts and trust in government, though these
efforts were less successful in Hong Kong SAR
and Japan.52 Efficient and timely case reporting
systems were also crucial for the public health
response and behavioral changes. Daily reporting
and release of COVID-19 data was timelier in
mainland China (despite its early failure in
transparency), Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan, and
South Korea than in Japan, where data sharing
and reporting between different stakeholders
and prefectures was delayed due to manual data
entry systems and the norm of using fax machines
and paper.53

Taiwan and South Korea. Domestic supply of face
masks and PPE in Taiwan and South Korea was
enhanced by banning the export of N95 (or
similar standard, such as KF94 in South Korea)
and surgical masks, the requisition of domestically
produced face masks, and the expansion of
production lines. In South Korea, the initial
epicenters Daegu and Cheongdo were designated
as “special care zones” in order to allow more
resources to be allocated there. In addition, a
national-level coordination center was set up in
South Korea to allocate COVID-19 patients to
hospitals and across regions.49 Coordinated
supply of resources was also made possible
by the use of information technologies. Both
Taiwan and South Korea introduced face mask
rationing and distribution systems based on
health insurance information. The Taiwanese
health insurance administration and private
developers also cooperated in providing real-time
information about the availability of face masks
on a “Mask Map.”

Self-protection practice
In these East Asian regions, strict self-protection
measures were either requested or mandated. For
example, wearing a face mask was only requested
on public transportation and at hospitals in Japan,
while it was required in mainland China, Taiwan,
Hong Kong SAR and South Korea, where
non-compliance might lead to rejection of services.
Economic support
All five East Asian governments implemented
supportive fiscal measures such as tax cuts,
subsidies, wage support, and rent concession to
help small businesses and households. While
mainland China and Taiwan mainly provided
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than any of these strategies implemented alone.56
For example, both Australia and New Zealand
implemented early bans on travel from China.
A subsequent sharp rise of COVID-19 infections
in Australia in March prompted a series of strict
physical distancing measures, including workplace
closures, restrictions of indoor and outdoor
gatherings, and strict institutional quarantine
requirements on returning nationals. Starting on
March 26, the New Zealand government also
implemented a stringent nationwide lockdown to
eliminate the virus that lasted for 7 weeks.57
Similar to East Asia, the stringent border controls
and intense physical distancing in Australia and
New Zealand bought them time to build up
testing and tracing capacities,58 and the resulting
widespread testing and contact tracing in those
regions enabled governments to rapidly and
efficiently suppress COVID-19 infections.59

consumer vouchers to households as part of
their economic stimulus packages, South Korea,
Hong Kong SAR, and Japan rolled out emergency
cash payment programs either universally
(Japan, Hong Kong SAR) or among low-income
populations (South Korea).54

Pharmaceutical interventions
Treatment
All five East Asian governments provided free
treatment for COVID-19 for their citizens/residents
through government health insurance programs
and/or government budgets.
Hospitalization of mild cases
Hospitalization and institutional isolation of mild
cases varied across the five East Asian regions.
Mainland China and South Korea required all
COVID-19 patients to be institutionalized despite
the limited capacity in the healthcare system.
They activated makeshift hospitals or observation
admission centers to accommodate COVID-19
patients with mild to moderate symptoms, while
saving beds at COVID-19-designated hospitals
for more severe cases.55

Civil engagement
Personal behaviors
Responsible civil engagement in East Asia is also
important in explaining the efficacy of government
action and resulting low rates of infection. Citizens
in East Asia were usually willing to abide by antiCOVID guidelines, such as avoiding unnecessary
gatherings, maintaining physical distance, wearing
masks in public spaces, improving personal
hygiene, and cooperating with testing and
isolation. YouGov’s COVID-19 Public Monitor
provides some evidence of these behaviors.60
Figure 3.5 uses YouGov data to show six panels
of personal behavior during the pandemic in the
East Asian regions (except South Korea due to
missing data), Australia, and the six Western
countries, up to the end of 2020. Except for
Japan, citizens in the East Asian regions were
generally performing better in all personal
behaviors than in the Western countries. Australia,61
also shown on each panel, is doing very well
except for wearing masks and avoiding raw meat.

Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan, and Japan did not
mandate hospitalization of patients with mild
symptoms.

Silver lining
There have been concerns of whether the stringent
control measures adopted in East Asia would
prove useful in the Western world. As we have
shown earlier in this section, some Western
countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, also
managed to keep their COVID-19 infections low
and re-opened their economies without major
second waves. The success in East Asia and the
Pacific points to the importance of strong
government leadership and the use of rigorous
non-pharmaceutical and pharmaceutical
measures in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. In
particular, extensive testing, tracing, and isolation,
combined with dynamic physical distancing that is
responsive to infection risks, were found to be more
efficient in controlling the spread of COVID-19

Panel A shows the share of respondents wearing
a face mask when in public spaces. Mainland
China, Hong Kong SAR, and Taiwan all had high
mask-wearing levels, mostly above 80% in the
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Figure 3.5: Percentage of respondents adopting personal behaviors to slow the
spread of COVID-19 during the Pandemic
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With effective government
policies, COVID-19 can be
successfully contained in
countries with cultures quite
different from those of East Asia.

period. Japan had the lowest share of people
avoiding going to work among East Asian regions
before May. Taiwan had a low share for the whole
year, as the pandemic was largely under control
there. The share of people who avoided going to
work in the Western countries increased in early
April but soon declined to a low level, followed by
a small upward trend since October.
Panel D shows the share of respondents avoiding
raw meat. Evidence shows that COVID-19 can
survive on the surface of many objects.62 Raw
meat is generally kept under a low temperature
through the storage and transport, and this low
temperature can prolong the survival of SARSCoV-2.63 The figure shows a clear distinction
between consumption of raw meat in the East
Asian regions (except Japan) and Western
countries. The levels in mainland China, Hong
Kong SAR, and Taiwan are much higher than
those in Japan and Western countries.

whole study period. This percentage is much
higher than in the Western countries, especially
during March and April. The share of mask-wearing
in Japan was the lowest among the four East
Asian regions until late March, but there was
no data for the later period. Japan’s personal
behaviors are consistent with the worst COVID-19
situation among the five East Asian regions in
our study. Though the share of mask-wearing in
Japan was relatively low, it was still higher than in
Western countries, except Italy, during the same
period. Italy’s share of mask-wearing increased
early and rose above 80% around mid-April. Spain
and France also followed, but Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States adopted
mask-wearing very slowly, and still had a lower
level of mask-wearing than East Asian countries
by the end of 2020.

Panel E illustrates the share of respondents
avoiding crowded public places. The shares in
mainland China and Taiwan were much higher
than those in other countries and regions in
March. The share in Japan was lower in the
beginning but caught up in May. Western countries
also caught up since early April. Panel F shows a
related behavior, which is about respondents
avoiding physical contact with tourists. Mainland
China, Hong Kong SAR, and Taiwan were most
frequently achieving the highest levels. Japan
has a very low level during the survey period
(early April to late May). Most western countries,
particularly the United Kingdom and Italy, have
significantly lower levels than the East Asian
regions (except for Japan) from the very early
period till the end of 2020.

Panel B presents the level of personal hygiene
habits. Similar to mask-wearing, mainland China,
Hong Kong SAR, and Taiwan all adopted improved
personal hygiene measures (e.g., washing hands
frequently, using hand sanitizer, etc.) in the early
stages of the pandemic and maintained high
compliance over the whole period. Japan’s data
was only available before the end of May. During
the survey period, the share of people in Japan
with improved personal hygiene was lower than
that of other East Asian regions. Among the seven
Western countries with data, Spain was the only
country that adopted similar practices. Australia
and Italy had similar trends as Spain but with lower
levels. All other Western countries in the study had
much lower levels and peaked in late April.

Cultural traits
In addition to being educated or required by the
government, East Asian residents’ civil engagement
may be deeply rooted in their culture. We consider
three relevant traits of Hofstede’s national culture
model to compare East Asia with the six Western
countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the
United Kingdom, and the United States), Australia,
and New Zealand.64 The panels of Figure 3.6 show
three dimensions of culture: individualism versus

Panel C shows whether people avoided going to
work during the pandemic. Mainland China had
the highest share of respondents who answered
yes before early August. The level for Hong Kong
SAR was also quite high during the whole study
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regions all have lower scores for individualism
than the six selected Western countries. Moreover,
mainland China, Hong Kong SAR, South Korea,
and Taiwan all have much lower scores than the
Western countries. Japan seems to be an exception,
as its score is much higher than the other four
Asian regions but similar to Spain’s. The United
States has the highest score for individualism.
Citizens with a higher level of individualism tend
to place higher weights on personal rights such as

collectivism, long-term orientation versus short
term normative orientation, and indulgence
versus restraint. The countries on each panel are
ranked from left to right by infection rate (by the
end of 2020) from low to high. Panel A shows the
score of individualism in the 13 countries/regions.
The total score for each cultural trait is 100,
with higher
scores
a(F) higher
level
(E) Avoiding
Crowdedindicating
Public Places
Avoiding Physical
Contactof
with Tourists
individualism, long-term orientation, or less
restraint. We can observe that the five East Asian

Figure 3.6: Comparisons on three dimensions of culture across
5 East Asian regions and 8 western countries (ordered by the infection rate
Notes: These data for figures come from YouGov’s COVID-19 Public Monitor
(https://yougov.co.uk/topics/international/articles-reports/2020/03/17/personal-measures-takenby
December 31, 2020)
avoid-covid-19).
Figure 3.6: Comparisons on Three Dimensions of Culture across 5 East Asian Regions
and 8 Western Countries (Ordered by the Infection Rate by December 31, 2020)
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higher scores – South Korea has the highest score
among them, and it is also the maximum score. In
contrast, five of the six Western countries have
lower scores. Germany, which has a score slightly
lower than mainland China, is an exception. The
United States has the lowest level of long-term
orientation. Countries with higher levels of
long-term orientation have been more successful
in controlling COVID-19.

Photo by Lisanto on Unsplash

Lastly, we show that the degree of restraint is also
correlated with the performance in containing
COVID-19. Restraint in this context means that a
society places less emphasis on the relatively
quick and easy gratification of basic and natural
human drives related to enjoying life and having
fun. Such restraint is likely to improve acceptance
and adoption of non-pharmaceutical rules such as
keeping physical distance and avoiding gatherings.
Mainland China, Hong Kong SAR and South Korea
have high scores in this cultural trait. Both the
United Kingdom and the United States have much
lower scores.
Australia and New Zealand seem to be outliers.
Their citizens have higher levels of individualism,
lower levels of long-term orientation, and lower
levels of restraint than East Asia, but still show
cooperative behaviors in several key respects, as
discussed above. This implies that cultural traits,
though important, are not the only determinants
of people’s behaviors and the outcome of the
pandemic control. With effective government
policies, COVID-19 can be successfully contained
in countries with cultures quite different from
those of East Asia.

freedom, and they are less likely to consider the
implications of their actions (spillover effect)
on others. For example, mask wearing, which
protects both mask wearers and others, was not
successfully adopted in some countries with high
individualism. The externalities of a pandemic like
COVID-19 imply that the personal anti-virus
choices that ignore negative externalities prevent
the achievement of socially optimal outcomes.
The relative level of individualism across
countries is largely consistent with the pattern of
total infection.

Infections, actions, and emotions
This section investigates the effects of the COVID-19
pandemic on individual happiness in the five East
Asian regions, and the role that mobility control
and physical distancing policies may have played
in shaping these effects.

Containing the virus requires that people sacrifice
their short-term interests, such as personal
freedom and not wearing masks, for long-term
benefits. Therefore, a country’s attitude towards
long-term or short-term interests is likely important.
We show the histogram of the long-term orientation
trait in Panel B of Figure 3.6. Hong Kong SAR has
the lowest score, which is the same as Italy. All of
the other four East Asian regions have much

Mainland China
Our data on happiness comes from nearly
34.5 million geotagged microblog tweets posted
on the Chinese largest microblog platform, Sina
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Having stricter mobility control
and physical distancing policies
could considerably offset
the decrease in happiness due
to the rise in the daily new
confirmed cases.

Weibo (the Chinese equivalent of Twitter), of
2 million active users for mainland China.65 The
data cover 337 Chinese cities over the period
December 1, 2019 to April 30, 2020. We apply the
“Tencent” natural language processing (NLP)
platform for each Weibo post, a machine-trained
sentiment analysis algorithm from computational
linguistics, to measure the sentiment. The overall
happiness for the region on a given day is
constructed by calculating the median sentiment
value for that day. This measure of expressed
happiness ranges from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating
a strongly negative and 100 a strongly positive
mood.

represented by the stringency index) by themselves
are associated with lower levels of expressed
happiness. However, stringent policies could
significantly mitigate the negative effect of the
number of daily new confirmed cases. Specifically,
at the average level of strictness (stringency
index=47.45), those policies can offset about
60% of the negative effect of daily new confirmed
cases on expressed happiness. More detailed
analysis suggests that those policies are
particularly important to expressed happiness
when COVID-19 conditions become more severe
(i.e., when the number of daily new confirmed
cases exceeded 1,000) in mainland China.

The results from the regression analysis are
presented in Table 3.3. We find that a larger
number of daily new confirmed cases is associated
with a lower level of public expressed happiness
in mainland China: a one-standard-deviation
increase in the number of daily confirmed cases is
associated with a 0.2-standard-deviation decrease
in expressed happiness. On the other hand, more
daily recovered cases are associated with a higher
level of happiness. More stringent policies (as

Table 3.3: The effect of COVID-19 on expressed happiness and the role of
mobility control and physical distancing policies in Mainland China
Dependent Variable: Expressed Happiness
Number of Daily New Confirmed Cases

(1)

(2)

-0.000516**

-0.0278***

Stringency Index

(0.000225)

(0.00744)

-0.0654***

-0.0670***

(0.00861)
Number of Daily
New Confirmed Cases ✕ Stringency Index

(0.00798)
0.000360***
(9.84e-05)

Number of Daily New Recovered Cases
Observations
R-squared

0.00112***

0.000918***

(0.000301)

(0.000280)

150

150

0.694

0.745

Note: Each column reports the coefficients from OLS estimation, controlling for day-of-week fixed effects,
day-of-month fixed effects, and holiday dummies, including Christmas, New Year, Lunar New Year, and Qing Ming.
Natural log transformation of the COVID-19 variables was also performed, and the results appear to be consistent.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Hong Kong SAR, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan

(i.e., Apathy, Boredom, Frustration, Fear, Irritability,
and Sadness) as a proxy for overall negative
emotional states or negative affect.68

For the other four regions, we collect data from
Google Trends, which supplies the relative popularity
of Google searches over the time period requested
in a geographic area. A search term query on
Google Trends provides searches for an exact
search term, while a topic query includes related
search terms in any language. We obtain daily
data on relative popularity for eight well-being
related topics between December 1, 2019 and
August 31, 2020: Apathy, Boredom, Frustration,
Fear, Irritability, Sadness, Death, and Hospital. The
index of relative popularity (or search intensity)
for each topic ranges from 0 to 100, where 100
indicates the peak popularity for that topic over
the time period, and 0 means that there was not
enough search volume for the topic on a given
date.66 Our qualitative investigation into each
search topic query suggests that the relative
popularity of each topic of negative effect should
be a good proxy for the corresponding negative
mood state.67 We derive a “negative affect search
index” by taking the simple average of the relative
popularity of all the six topics of negative affect

A rise in the daily new confirmed cases is found
to be associated with an increase in negative
affect, as measured by an increase in the negative
affect search index (Table 3.4). Specifically, a
one-standard-deviation increase in the number
of daily new confirmed cases per 100,000 is
associated with a 0.09-standard deviation increase
in the negative affect search index. Stricter
mobility control and physical distancing policies
are associated with a decrease in negative affect
in these four regions. They are also able to
moderate the increase in negative affect due to
the rise in daily new confirmed cases: at the
average level of strictness for the four regions
(stringency index=33.38), mobility control policies
can offset about 46% of the positive influence of
daily new confirmed cases on the interest in the
topics on negative affect. A rise in the daily
number of new recovered cases is associated with
a decrease in negative affect, but the relationship
is not statistically significant. We also examine the

Table 3.4: The effect of COVID-19 on overall negative affect search and
the role of mobility control and physical distancing policies in Hong Kong SAR,
Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea
Dependent Variable: Expressed Happiness
Number of Daily New Confirmed Cases per 100K
Stringency Index

(1)

(2)

1.779***

9.082***

(0.581)

(2.175)

-0.0563***

-0.0404**

(0.0198)

(0.0203)

Number of Daily New Confirmed Cases per 100K
✕ Stringency Index

-0.125***
(0.0354)

Number of Daily New Recovered Cases per 100K

-0.0230

-0.0351

(0.736)

(0.700)

Observations

1,090

1,090

R-squared

0.530

0.536

Note: Each column reports the coefficients from OLS estimation, controlling for country fixed effects and date fixed
effects. Natural log transformation of the Covid-19 variables was also performed, and the results appear to be consistent.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: The effect of COVID-19 on the searches for the topic of death and
hospital and the role of mobility control and physical distancing policies in
Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea
Dependent Variable

Death

Hospital

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1.168

10.81***

4.629***

-2.001

Number of Daily New Confirmed Cases
per 100K

(0.762)

(3.882)

(0.985)

(2.750)

Stringency Index

0.0424*

0.0634***

0.0203

0.00591

(0.0244)

(0.0239)

(0.0305)

(0.0320)

Number of Daily New Confirmed Cases
per 100K ✕ Stringency Index
Number of Daily New Recovered Cases
per 100K

-0.165***

0.114**

(0.0577)

(0.0471)

-1.356**

-1.372**

-4.254***

-4.243***

(0.594)

(0.565)

(1.306)

(1.316)

Observations

1,090

1,090

1,090

1,090

R-squared

0.761

0.765

0.690

0.692

Note: Each column reports the coefficients from OLS estimation, controlling for country fixed effects and date fixed
effects. Natural log transformation of the Covid-19 variables was also performed, and the results appear to be consistent.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

interaction term between the number of new
confirmed cases and the stringency index, we find
that the number of daily new confirmed cases
becomes significantly positively associated with
interest in the topic of Death. However, more
stringent policies can mitigate the increase in the
interest due to the rise in daily new confirmed
cases (column (2)). We also demonstrate that it is
the interaction between the number of daily new
confirmed cases and the strictness of the mobility
control and physical distancing policies that led to
a rise in interest in the topic of Hospital (column
(4)). Finally, an increase in the number of new
recovered cases is associated with a decrease in
interest in both topics.

searches for the six topics of negative affect
separately (Appendix Table 2). People appear to
have more emotions of apathy and fear when the
number of daily new confirmed cases increases.
More stringent policies are associated with less
apathy and frustration but more fear. However,
the stricter policies help to reduce the rise in fear
due to the increase in daily new confirmed cases.
Besides, a rise in the daily new recovered cases is
associated with a decline in the emotion of fear.
In general, our findings align with those from
a recent COVID-19 study, which shows that
announcing a national lockdown is associated
with better mental well-being in the United
Kingdom and worldwide.69 70
With respect to the searches for Death and
Hospital, two topics particularly related to the
pandemic, we find, as expected, that a rise in
new confirmed cases is associated with an increase
of interest in the two topics, even though the
relationship is statistically significant only for
Hospital (columns (1) and (3) of Table 3.5). Stricter
policies are associated with a decrease in the
interest in the topic of Death. After adding the

Conclusion
COVID-19 spread across the world at an alarming
pace, causing a tremendous impact on every
aspect of life. Many countries have recorded very
high infection rates, while a handful of countries,
such as East Asian countries, had much better
performance. This chapter discusses the lessons
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control, extensive screening, testing, contact
tracing and isolation, coordinated resource
allocation, clear communication, enforced
self-protection practice, and supportive economic
measures are important in fighting COVID-19
outbreaks and resurgence. People in East Asia,
except for Japan, were generally more compliant
with government rules and guidance than the
selected Western countries. Not surprisingly,
weaker policies and less individual compliance
in Japan has been associated with its worst
performance among the five East Asian regions.

from five East Asian regions, including mainland
China, Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan, Japan, and South
Korea, with respect to government responses
and civic engagement. We also examine the
impact of COVID-19 on people’s emotions and
the potential role of mobility control and physical
distancing policies.
In general, we find that the relatively successful
story of the five East Asian regions, compared
with the six western societies, can be attributed
to the stronger and more prompt government
responses and better civic cooperation. Except
for Japan, all of the East Asian governments
implemented more stringent mobility control
and physical distancing policies, as well as more
comprehensive testing and contact tracing,
especially at the early stages of the outbreak.
A summary of the government interventions and
anti-COVID measures in the East Asian regions
indicates that a combination of strong government
response systems, early and rigorous mobility

Certain cultural traits (being less individualistic,
more long-term oriented, and more restrained)
may have contributed to more self-regulated
behaviors and greater compliance with government policies, impacting the overall battle with
COVID-19. But, this does not mean that COVID-19
can only be controlled in countries with cultures
similar to East Asia. We show that East Asia’s
successful government actions can be transplanted
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to other nations with different cultural backgrounds,
such as Australia and New Zealand, which are
more similar to other Western counties in terms
of cultural traits.
Finally, we showed that the impact of COVID-19
on individual emotions is significant in East Asia.
A rise in the daily number of new confirmed cases
is associated with a lower level of the public
expressed happiness in mainland China, and a
higher level of negative affect in the other four
regions. Fortunately, having stricter mobility
control and physical distancing policies could
considerably offset the decrease in happiness due
to the rise in the daily new confirmed cases.
Therefore, more stringent government responses
seem to reduce the spread of the virus and help
to improve people’s emotions throughout the
pandemic in East Asia. However, we have yet
to see the impact of government actions on
emotions in the long run, and how other policies,
such as population-level vaccination and
international cooperation, could mitigate the
shock caused by the pandemic and emerging
mutations of the virus. Although recent data from
Israel, the world leader in mass vaccination,
showed early signs that COVID-19 vaccines
were effective in reducing infections and
hospitalizations among the elderly population, it
is difficult to gauge the size of effect as extensive
lockdowns were still in place.71 While aggressive
vaccination programs have begun in both the
west and the east, strong non-pharmaceutical
interventions such as mobility restrictions, testing,
and contact tracing are likely to be still crucial in
controlling the pandemic, and their impact on
well-being should be closely monitored.
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Endnotes
1

27	For example, on March 26, the Civil Aviation Administration
of China announced the so-called “Five One” policy. Under
this policy, all Chinese airlines/foreign airlines were allowed
to maintain one international route to/from any specific
country from/to China, with no more than one flight per
week. China also denied the entry of most foreign nationals
starting March 28. Negative COVID-19 test and mandatory
14-day institution-based quarantine were required for
inbound travelers from overseas.

We only have Japanese behavioral data before early June.

2	The cultural traits are defined by Hofstede model of
national culture (Hofstede et al., 2010). Similarly, Gelfand
et al. (2021) also use cultural traits (tightness–looseness) to
explain COVID-19 cases and deaths.
3	See https://qz.com/1808390/religion-is-at-the-heart-ofkoreas-coronavirus-outbreak for details.
4	Please see https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/COVIDstringency-index for more information on the components
and the construction of the stringency index.

28	For example, see http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/
2020-11/09/c_139503825.htm.
29 See Cowling et al. (2020).

5	We realize that using case numbers may make more
populous countries look slower to respond. The main
reason we chose to use case numbers rather than case
rates is that COVID-19 is a highly infectious disease.
Therefore, it is important for governments to react
according to the absolute numbers of cases.

30 See Wong et al. (2020).
31	For instance, see https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-health-coronavirus-southkorea-idUSKCN26G0E0.
32	See https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?Seq_
Code=154470

6	See Pisano, Sadun, and Zanini (2020) for more discussions
on the Italy case.

33 See Tashiro and Shaw (2020).

7	Based on the information we collected, the stringency
index of mainland China may not be accurate from May to
November 2020. The true levels of stringency may be lower
during that period of time.

34 See Yabe (2020).
35 See Shimizu (2020).
36 See Sawano et al. (2020).

8	See Chowdhury et al. (2020), Hsiang et al. (2020), Koh et
al. (2020), and You (2020),

37 See Aleta et al. (2020) and Kucharski et al. (2020).
38 See China Watch Institute (2020).

9	https://www.who.int/westernpacific/news/commentaries/
detail-hq/from-the-new-normal-to-a-new-future-asustainable-response-to-covid-19

39 See Wang et al. (2020).

10 See An and Tang (2020).

40	See Development Finance Bureau at Ministry of Economy
and Finance (2020).

11

41 See Tashiro and Shaw (2020).

See Bouey (2020) and Wang et al. (2020).

12 See An and Tang (2020).

42 See Dickens et al. (2020).

13	See for example, https://www.theregreview.
org/2020/04/20/delayed-response-wuhan-revealslegal-holes/

43 See Dickens et al. (2020).
44 See Wong et al. (2020).
45 See Wong et al. (2020).

14 See Chen and Xiao (2020).

46 See Su and Han (2020).

15 See Ning et al. (2020).

47	See Development Finance Bureau at Ministry of Economy
and Finance (2020).

16 See An and Tang (2020).
17 See Wang et al. (2020).

48 See China Watch Institute (2020).

18 See Hartley and Jarvis (2020).

49 See Oh et al. (2020).

19	See Development Finance Bureau at Ministry of Economy
and Finance (2020).

50 See Hamaguchi et al. (2020).
51 See Hartley and Jarvis (2020).

20 See An and Tang (2020).

52 See Legido-Quigley et al. (2020).

21 See Kazuto and Murakami (2020).

53 See Hamaguchi et al. (2020).

22 See China Watch Institute (2020).

54 See https://COVID19policy.adb.org/policy-measures.

23 See China Watch Institute (2020).

55 See Chen et al. (2020), Oh et al. (2020) and Shaw (2020).

24	See Chen et al. (2020), Fang et al. (2020), and Kraemer
et al. (2020).

56 See Chowdhury et al. (2020) and Kucharski et al. (2020).

25 See Prem (2020).

57 See Baker et al. (2020).

26 See Zhou et al. (2021).

58 See Summers et al. (2020).
59 See Jefferies et al. (2020).
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60	See YouGov’s COVID-19 Public Monitor (https://yougov.
co.uk/topics/international/articles-reports/2020/03/17/
personal-measures-taken-avoid-covid-19).
61	There is no YouGov survey data in New Zealand, so only
Australia is included.
62	See van Doremalen et al. (2020), Han et al. (2020), and
Harbourt et al. (2020).
63	See Han et al. (2020), Harbourt et al (2020), and Fisher et
al. (2020). Avoding raw meat is just an indicator about how
cautions people generally are during the pandemic, and
whether the virus is truly transmitted through meat surface
or not does not change the story behind.
64	The data is retrieved from https://www.hofstede-insights.
com/product/compare-countries/.
65	The active Weibo user is defined by four rules: 1) follows
number >50; 2) fans number>50; 3) tweets number>50;
and 4) recent post<30 days. Based on this definition, active
users account for 8% of the total number of users.
66	For one query, daily data on searches is only provided for a
period of no more than 270 days. To obtain daily search
trends between December 1, 2019 and August 31, 2020,
we downloaded daily data between December 6, 2019
and August 31, 2020 and between June 1, 2019 and
February 25, 2020 separately and then rescaled the values
for December 1 to 5, 2019 to make them comparable to the
data between December 6, 2019 and August 31, 2020.
67	We also collected data on the search intensity for topics
related to positive mood states, including Happiness,
Well-being, Optimism, and Contentment. However, similar
to Foa et al. (2020), we concluded that those topics are
a poor proxy for positive mood states based on our
qualitative investigation into the related queries of each
search topic query.
68	To construct the “negative affect search index”, we also
tried conducting principal component analysis on the
relative popularity of the 6 topics of negative affect and
obtained the scores of the first principle component or
taking the average of the z-score of relative popularity
of the 6 topics, and our regression results remained
consistent.
69 See Fetzer et al. (2020).
70	Using data from 36,520 adults in England, Fancourt et al.
(2021) suggest that individuals experienced the highest
levels of depression and anxiety at the early stages of
lockdown but those mental health problems got improved
as individuals adapt to circumstances.
71 See Chodick et al. (2021).
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Asia-Pacific region, the unweighted average was
a mere 0.18 deaths per day per million population,
42X lower than the North Atlantic.

One of the keys to human well-being is the ability
of societies to confront urgent societal challenges.
Societal crises demand pro-sociality: the ability
of societies to work harmoniously and rationally
towards common objectives. In the case of
COVID-19, the most dramatic global peacetime
crisis since the Great Depression, pro-sociality is
required at all scales of interactions. Individuals
must abide by pro-social behaviors, such as
physical distancing and wearing face masks.
Governments must attend to human needs of
the most vulnerable citizens. And nations must
cooperate with each other in order to bring the
global pandemic to a halt.

The Asia-Pacific success in suppressing the
pandemic has been consistent since last spring.
On April 8, 2020, I wrote the following:2
East Asian countries are outperforming the
United States and Europe in controlling the
COVID-19 pandemic, despite the fact that
the outbreak began in China, to which the
rest of East Asia is very closely bound by
trade and travel. The US and Europe should
be learning as rapidly as possible about the
East Asian approaches, which could still save
vast numbers of lives in the West and the
rest of the world.

COVID-19 has exposed many acts of heroism,
notably among front-line workers and healthcare
workers who have battled the disease at great
peril to their own safety, often without the benefit
of even rudimentary personal protective equipment
(PPE). Yet COVID-19 has also exposed the shortcomings and outright failures of pro-sociality in
many countries, including many of the richest
countries, for which lack of material resources is
not an issue. This paper explores the differences
in pro-sociality between the countries of the
Asia-Pacific region, where the pandemic was
effectively contained to low levels of community
transmission, and the countries of the North
Atlantic region, where community transmission
and excess mortality have been extremely high
throughout the course of the pandemic.

The main sources of the successes of East Asia,
and more broadly the Asia-Pacific, were also
discernible at an early stage. The Asia-Pacific
countries, in contrast with the North Atlantic,
were actively engaged in a wide range of intensive
Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs), including
tight border controls; quarantining of arriving
passengers; high rates of face-mask use; physical
distancing; and public health surveillance systems
engaged in widespread testing, contact tracing,
and quarantining (or home isolation) of infected
individuals. I also document such differences
across the two regions in a companion paper.3
The successes of the NPIs in the Asia-Pacific
region reflected both the leadership of governments and the strong support of the public for
the government’s bold leadership. The Asia
-Pacific successes were both top-down, with
governments setting strong control policies, and
bottom-up, with the general public supporting
governments and complying with government
-directed public health measures.

Perhaps the most notable variation across world
regions of the COVID-19 pandemic has been the
far lower mortality rate (deaths per million) in
the Asia-Pacific region (northeast Asia, southeast
Asia, and Oceania) compared with the NorthAtlantic region (the US, Canada, the UK, and
the European Union).1 Both regions are home
to temperate-zone, urbanized, and developed
economies and are broadly comparable in
economic structure. Yet, the death rates were
vastly lower in the Asia-Pacific than the North
Atlantic in every quarter of 2020 and in January
2021, the most recent month at the time of
completing this paper (Table 4.1). In January 2021,
for example, the countries of the North Atlantic
region had an unweighted average of 7.6 deaths
per day per million population, while in the

One key factor in the success of the Asia-Pacific
was the preparedness of the region for newly
emerging zoonotic diseases, a point also
emphasized by Helliwell et al. in this report.
The Asia-Pacific region was on the front line of
the battle against SARS in 2003 and also was
mobilized in the H1N1 (2009) and MERS (2012)
crises. Southeast Asia is battle-hardened against
dengue fever. The practical import of the earlier
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Table 4.1: Deaths per day per million population, averages per quarter
Country

2020:Q1

2020:Q2

2020:Q3

2020:Q4

2021:Jan

Australia

0.04

0.04

0.33

0.01

0.00

Brunei

0.05

0.05

0.00

0.00

0.00

Burma

0.18

0.00

0.06

0.47

0.27

Cambodia

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

China

0.03

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.00

Indonesia

0.23

0.11

0.31

0.45

0.93

Japan

0.06

0.08

0.05

0.15

0.63

Laos

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Malaysia

0.07

0.03

0.01

0.11

0.29

New Zealand

0.03

0.05

0.01

0.00

0.00

Philippines

0.10

0.12

0.42

0.37

0.44

Singapore

0.02

0.04

0.00

0.00

0.00

South Korea

0.08

0.03

0.03

0.11

0.32

Taiwan

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Thailand

0.00

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.01

Vietnam

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Average Asia-Pacific

0.06

0.03

0.08

0.10

0.18

Austria

1.35

0.71

0.11

6.56

5.37

Belgium

4.50

8.61

0.25

8.98

4.35

Bulgaria

3.32

0.35

0.93

10.59

6.82

Canada

0.93

2.50

0.18

1.83

3.66

Croatia

3.94

0.27

0.46

9.64

8.70

Cyprus

0.40

0.14

0.04

1.20

2.95

Czech Republic

2.60

0.33

0.31

11.14

14.24

Denmark

1.08

0.98

0.09

1.21

4.61

Estonia

0.63

0.54

-0.04

1.35

4.62
0.64

Finland

0.22

0.62

0.03

0.42

France

2.50

4.46

0.36

5.49

5.65

Germany

1.29

1.08

0.07

3.14

9.00
2.96

Greece

1.10

0.15

0.21

4.65

Hungary

2.09

0.65

0.21

9.88

9.97

Ireland

1.38

3.72

0.15

0.95

6.99

Italy

3.88

4.07

0.20

6.81

7.66

Latvia

1.63

0.18

0.04

3.43

9.58

Lithuania

2.12

0.23

0.06

6.85

11.99

Luxembourg

2.44

1.53

0.24

6.47

4.23

Malta

1.69

0.32

0.65

4.54

3.51

Netherlands

2.51

3.28

0.21

3.22

4.86

Poland

2.29

0.42

0.30

7.51

7.35

Portugal

2.65

1.53

0.42

5.27

17.64

Romania

2.56

0.90

1.80

6.20

4.31

Slovakia

2.09

0.06

0.04

4.16

14.79

Slovenia

4.13

0.51

0.20

13.36

12.51

Spain

4.34

4.71

0.81

4.45

5.16

Sweden

3.72

5.38

0.60

3.04

9.15

United Kingdom

2.55

6.17

0.28

5.03

15.56

United States

1.93

4.07

2.62

4.71

9.26

Average North Atlantic

2.26

1.95

0.39

5.40

7.60

Source: Our World in Data, https://ourworldindata.org/
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epidemics is a regional preparedness strategy,
“Asia-Pacific Strategy for Emerging Diseases and
Public Health Emergencies” (now in its third
version, APSED III), coordinated by the Western
Pacific Regional Office (WPRO) of the World
Health Organization.

•Health-system coverage: COVID-19 mortality
is reduced by access to Intensive Care
Units (ICUs) and the interventions they
provide (respirators, therapeutics). Disparities
in health-system infrastructure affect
mortality rates.

Yet something more than preparedness is at work.
Cultural and educational differences are also
apparently playing key roles. The countries of the
North Atlantic region have now had a year to
learn from the Asia-Pacific countries, but by and
large, they have not done so. The North Atlantic
countries have failed to implement comprehensive
NPIs during the entirety of 2020 and early 2021.
Even after the first wave of infections was
brought down in the summer of 2020 following
lockdowns during the spring, the North Atlantic
countries failed to introduce rigorous control
systems akin to those of the Asia-Pacific. This
article explores the puzzle as to why the North
Atlantic failure persisted throughout 2020 and
now into 2021.

• Contact patterns: The transmission of the
COVID-19 virus (SARS-CoV-2) depends
on structural factors such as time spent
indoors (where transmission is more likely)
versus outdoors, and thus on temperature,
seasonality, employment patterns, urbanization, and the like.

Structural features in
COVID-19 mortality rates
Before delving into the policy and behavioral
differences between the two regions, we should
note that cross-country differences in COVID-19
mortality rates depend not only on policy and
behavioral factors but also on structural factors in
societies that shape the COVID-19 epidemiology.
There are at least five key structural factors:
•A
 ge of the population: The age-specific
mortality rate from COVID-19 is far higher
among individuals aged 65+, so populationwide mortality is higher in countries with a
higher proportion of elderly people.
•C
 omorbidities of the population: COVID-19
mortality is associated with a number of
comorbidities, including cardiovascular
disease, obesity, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, diabetes, and
others, so countries with higher rates of
these comorbidities would have higher
mortality rates.

• International travel: The frequency of new
infections arriving from abroad depends
on the magnitude of international arrivals.
More connected regions are more vulnerable
to new introductions of the virus from abroad.
Such structural factors help to explain the
low-to-moderate mortality rates observed in
Africa and South Asia. In Africa and South Asia,
death rates are far lower than in the North Atlantic
despite less healthcare coverage (e.g., fewer
hospital beds per capita). However, in Africa and
South Asia, populations are younger; comorbidities
are less prevalent; more time is spent outdoors
because of higher temperatures, more farm work,
and lower rates of urbanization; and there are
fewer international tourist arrivals than in the
North Atlantic.
Yet, such structural factors do not explain the
differences in mortality rates between the
Asia-Pacific and the North Atlantic regions. Both
regions share broad structural commonalities in
climate, population age structure, healthcare
access, prevalence of comorbidities, and the flows
of international tourist arrivals. In a cross-country

Cross-country differences in
COVID-19 mortality rates depend
not only on policy and behavioral
factors but also on structural
factors in societies.
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government curfew policies, public confidence
in government policies was seriously eroded.4
Another part seems to be both cultural and
cognitive, reflecting the public’s own higher
readiness to adopt pro-social health-seeking
behaviors based on social norms and better
scientific understanding of the pandemic.

regression of total deaths per million as of
January 2021, the Asia-Pacific region has far lower
mortality rates after controlling such structural
factors (see supplementary information).

Higher public support for
NPIs in the Asia-Pacific

Consider, for example, the proportion of the
population wearing face masks in public places,
shown in Figure 4.1 for the period March 2020
to January 2021. The public in the Asia-Pacific
countries, in red, adopted face mask-wearing
earlier and then at consistently higher rates of
use compared with Europe and North America.

We have useful comparative information on public
attitudes towards NPIs from YouGov, the UK survey
company. YouGov surveys cover 18 countries
across the two regions, including nine in the
Asia-Pacific and nine in the North Atlantic.
According to almost all behavioral indicators, the
public in the Asia-Pacific countries has regarded
the pandemic with greater concern and with
larger behavioral responses than in the North
Atlantic region. Part of this improved public
response is no doubt due to the clarity of policies
in the Asia-Pacific based on the region’s readiness
for emerging diseases. When public officials
sent contradictory messages, such as violating

This higher face mask use in the Asia-Pacific is
consistent with the public’s fears of catching the
infection (Figure 4.2). A far higher proportion
of the public in the Asia-Pacific region is “very”
or “somewhat” scared of contracting COVID-19,
compared with the North Atlantic region.
Remarkably, these differences in fears have
persisted throughout the pandemic, even though,
in fact, the North Atlantic region has incurred far
higher rates of infection and mortality.
The publics of the Asia-Pacific have also endorsed
tough public policy measures by the government.
According to the YouGov survey data, the publics
in the Asia-Pacific has consistently supported two
core pillars of NPIs: quarantining all inbound
airline passengers (Figure 4.3) and quarantining
(or locking down) locations in regions hit by
infection (Figure 4.4). Such strong measures are
key to suppressing transmission, and public
support is vital for implementation, but these
measures do not garner majority backing in many
countries in the North Atlantic region.
Another indicator of public support or opposition
to NPIs is the frequency and intensity of public
protests against COVID-19 lockdowns. The Al
Jazeera news agency monitors large-scale
protests against COVID-19 control measures
(defined as those that lead to arrests), resulting
in the global map of protests in January 2021
shown in Figure 4.5.5
The map records 11 major protests in the North
Atlantic region but just one in the Asia-Pacific
region in Wellington, New Zealand.
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Figure
4.1:behaviour
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masks
YouGov COVID-19
changes face
tracker: Wearing
a face

Figure 4.2: Fear of catching
COVID-19
YouGov COVID-19 tracker: fear of catching

mask when in public places

% of people in each market who say they are: Wearing a face mask when in public places.
From

Feb 21, 2020

To

Feb 22, 2021

1m

Zoom

3m

YTD

% of people in each market who say they are "very" or "somewhat" scared that they will
contract COVID-19 (coronavirus).

All

100%

80%

Singapore

Hong Kong
China

90%

From

Malaysia

Feb 21, 2020

To

Feb 22, 2021

Zoom

90%

Vietnam

70%

3m

YTD

All

Malaysia

Taiwan

Indonesia

Vietnam

UAE

1m

100%

80%

Philippines
60%

Brazil Japan

70%

France

Italy

Thailand

Singapore
India

50%

60%

Canada

Finland
Norway

Australia

40%

Germany
Italy

30%

50%

UK

France
UK

Denmark

Denmark

40%

Spain

USA
20%

Spain

Sweden
Norway

30%

Finland

Netherlands

Sweden
10%

Germany

20%

USA

Fe
b

10%

18

Ja
n

Ja
n

Fe
b

4

7

21

r

r
M
ay
M
ay
11
Ju
n
25
Ju
n
9
Ju
l
23
Ju
l
6
Au
g
20
Au
g
3
Se
p
17
Se
p
1O
ct
15
O
ct
29
O
c
12 t
N
ov
26
N
ov
10
D
ec
24
D
ec
14

28

r

Ap

Ap

M
ar

Ap

30

16

2

5

19

M
ar

0%

0%
Mar '20

Figure 4.3: Quarantining inbound
YouGov COVID-19 measures supported tracker: quarantining
airline
passengers
all inbound airline passengers
Apr 3, 2020
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4.4: Quarantining locations
YouGov COVID-19 measures supported tracker: Quarantining
any location in country that a contaminated patient has been
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Figure 4.5: Cities with large-scale demonstrations or protests, January 2021
Imposed widescale lockdowns in 2021 ● No ● Yes

Source: Al Jazeera and news agencies • Last updated: February 1, 2021

Sweden, United Kingdom and United States)
score an average of 55.4%. Only Indonesia scores
low in the Asia-Pacific region, at 43%, whereas
none of the North Atlantic countries reaches a
score of 70% of “most people” following the
COVID-19 rules.

Another key determinant of NPI success in the
Asia-Pacific is the public’s adherence to government
protocols. While we do not have authoritative
data on public compliance with NPIs, we do have
an interesting data point from a YouGov survey
covering the period December 7-20, 2020. In
this survey, individuals were asked whether they
and others in their country were following the
government’s COVID-19 rules. In general, the
survey respondents gave themselves quite high
grades for compliance (between 77% and 94%)
but reported much lower compliance rates
by “most people” in their local neighborhood
(Figure 4.6).

Culture and the failure of the
North Atlantic region to learn
from the Asia-Pacific
The North Atlantic region was perhaps too
inexperienced with emerging pandemic diseases
to react promptly and decisively to the COVID-19
pandemic when it first emerged in late 2019/early
2020. This was true even after the WHO declared
COVID-19 a “public health emergency of international concern” on January 30, 2020. By the time
the dramatic scale of the pandemic was widely
understood in mid-March 2020, the transmission

Interestingly, the five locations in the Asia-Pacific
region (Australia, China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia,
and Singapore) score an average of 67.4% for
“most people” following COVID-19 rules, while
the nine locations in the North Atlantic region
(Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain,
98
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Figure 4.6: You/Others generally following your country’s COVID-19 rules

Source: How good are Americans at following COVID rules, compared to other countries? https://today.yougov.com/
topics/international/articles-reports/2021/01/15/how-good-are-americans-following-covid-rules

Journal’s editorial board completely disregarded
the evidence from the Asia-Pacific throughout
2020. In the course of dozens of editorials,
the Wall Street Journal editorial board utterly
overlooked the lower mortality rates in the
Asia-Pacific and consistently failed to inquire how
those low rates could be achieved in the US.

of the virus was far too high for the understaffed
and limited systems for testing, tracing, and
quarantining.
Therefore, most countries in the world adopted
stringent lockdowns in the spring of 2020, which
brought the incidence of new infections to
relatively low levels by June (around ten new
confirmed cases per million per day in the UK and
European Union on average in June). Yet even
then, with incidence drastically lower, the North
Atlantic region did not dramatically scale up its
testing, tracing, and quarantining activities. By last
summer, precautionary behavior had dissipated,
and Europeans and Americans vacationed, setting
the stage for a second and even larger wave of
the pandemic in the fall.

The real puzzle is why there was so little learning
during 2020. The lockdowns should have been
followed by a massive scale-up of NPIs in order to
keep incidence low. Why did this did not happen?
Part of the problem, no doubt, was the
incompetence of some of key leaders, including
former President of the United States Donald
Trump. Trump incorrectly believed that the only
choice facing the US was whether or not to close
the economy. His biggest mistake (which probably
cost him the election in November 2020) was to
overlook the NPI option. The US Government’s
top infectious disease scientist, Dr. Anthony Fauci,
recently put the situation this way: “My influence

Amazingly, the mainstream media also failed
to draw any lessons from the glaring gap in
performance between the Asia-Pacific and the
North Atlantic. The leading business daily in the
United States is the Wall Street Journal. The
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The researchers Iveta Silova, Hikaru Komatsu, and
Jeremy Rappleye have recently and cogently
argued that that excessive individualism of the
Western nations made these countries resistant
to the kinds of pro-social policies needed to end
human-induced climate change7 and COVID-198.
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Figure 4.7a: Face masks and
individualism, June 2020
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The failure obviously goes well beyond Trump. It
was common to the European Union as well. The
blunders ran both from the top-down and the
bottom-up, in a kind of folie a deux between
politicians and the public. In many North Atlantic
countries, there were public protests against even
the most basic public health measures, such as
wearing face masks, with agitators rejecting
mask mandates in the name of “liberty.” Nobody
explained to these would-be libertarians that the
first dictum of classic libertarianism is that the
right to liberty does not include the right to harm
others. John Stuart Mill famously put it this way:
“The only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others.” A government requirement to wear
face masks would surely have passed Mill’s
strict scrutiny.

The higher individualism of the North Atlantic is
correlated with lower public support for NPIs,
such as face masks. The proportion of the face
mask use (according to the YouGov survey data)
is a negative function of Individualism for June
2020 (Figure 4.7a) and January 2021 (Figure 4.7b).
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with [Trump] diminished when he decided to
essentially act like there was no outbreak and
focus on re-election and opening the economy.
That’s when he said, ‘It’s going to go away, it’s
magical, don’t worry about it.’”6
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In their statistical analysis, the authors feature a
cross-country measure of individualism originating
from the work of Hofstede et al.9 The measure
ranges from 0 (complete collectivism) to 100
(complete individualism). It includes scores for
nine countries in the Asia-Pacific region and 18 in
the North Atlantic region. The mean score for the
Asia-Pacific countries is 38.3, compared with
64.9 for the North Atlantic. The difference is
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. All of the
Asia-Pacific countries score below 50 (that is, are
more collectivist) except for Australia (90) and
New Zealand (79). In contrast, all of the North
Atlantic countries score above 50 (that is, are
more individualist) except for Greece (35) and
Portugal (27).
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Figure 4.7b: Face masks and
individualism, January 2021
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The lower public support for NPIs in the North
Atlantic countries also helps to explain the poorer
performance of contact tracing in these countries.
Many individuals in Europe and the United States
were simply unwilling to disclose personal
information, even their contacts, to public health
officials. A recent report in Nature summarized
the situation as follows:10
For contact-tracing to work, people with
COVID-19 must be prepared to answer
questions about their whereabouts, and they
must isolate themselves from others while
unwell. In many places, that’s not happening.
A survey of attitudes to contact-tracing
across 19 countries in August found that
nearly three-quarters of respondents would
be willing to provide contact information.
But rates varied. In Vietnam, only 4% of
participants said that they wouldn’t provide
this information. In the United States and
Germany, the proportion was 21%, and in
France, it was 25%. Concerns around data
privacy and tracking are partly to blame,
says researcher Sarah Jones at Imperial
College London, who co-led the survey.
“Many health authorities and governments,
especially in North America and Western
Europe, may need to urgently improve
public-health messaging to mitigate
concerns about contact-tracing,” she says.
Similarly, the public in North Atlantic countries
rejected phone applications to signal proximity
to COVID-positive individuals, with such apps
widely criticized as invasions of privacy. Though
considerations of privacy are important, the
failure of testing, tracing, and isolating in the
North Atlantic countries has had devastating
consequences on mortality rates, suggesting that
claims of liberty have been carried too far.
Another research team tested the cultural concept
of “tightness-looseness” of social norms as a
related factor in public behavior.11 The measure of
tightness-looseness “captures the strength of
norms in a nation and the tolerance for people
who violate norms.” It is based on respondents
attitudes to six statements such as, “There are
very clear expectations for how people should act

in most situations,” and “In this country, if
someone acts in an inappropriate way, others
will strongly disapprove.” The authors show that
countries with high levels of cultural tightness
(strictness of social norms) have had far fewer
cases and deaths per capita compared with
countries with high levels of cultural looseness.
The Asia-Pacific region rank far higher in cultural
tightness than the North Atlantic countries
(see supplementary material).
The indicators of individualism and cultural
tightness are negatively correlated. For the
22 countries in our sample of Asia-Pacific and
North Atlantic countries with scores on both
individualism and cultural tightness, the correlation
coefficient is -0.49, p = 0.02 (see supplementary
material). Nonetheless, there are some discrepancies. Sweden, for example, is scored as high in
cultural tightness as well as individualism.

Scientific knowledge and
public behavior
Another possible source of poor performance in
the North Atlantic is the public’s insufficient
scientific understanding of the pandemic. The
pandemic has been accompanied by an “infodemic”
of fake news. Trump actually used his social media
to propagate conspiracy theories, fake cures to
COVID-19, and other misinformation in the US. As
a recent article in Nature puts it, “a world leader
amplified once-obscure conspiracy theories, with
each tweet and retweet strengthening the ideas
and emboldening their supporters.”12 A recent
study shows how social media are conducive to
the spread of fake news because of the tendency
of individuals to spread false information on social
media without thinking carefully as to whether
the information is true.13
The same study shows that the public’s susceptibility
to fake news also depends on the quality of the
public’s scientific knowledge, which in turn
depends on the quality of public education in
science and mathematics. The authors report:
“In particular, science knowledge was negatively
correlated with belief in false headlines and
positively correlated with belief in true headlines,
whereas science knowledge was negatively
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correlated with sharing false headlines [on social
media] and uncorrelated with sharing of true
headlines” (p.744).
Therefore, we may gain some additional insight
into the comparative performance of countries in
controlling the pandemic by comparing the
science skills of students across these countries.
The Programme on International Student
Assessment (PISA) of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
offers us the needed data. The 2018 scores on
science knowledge and skills show that several
of the East Asian countries, including China,
Singapore, Vietnam, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan,
significantly outperform countries in the North
Atlantic region, though a few of the ASEAN
countries (Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand)
score low.
What is also notable is that the PISA science
score is highly correlated with the YouGov score
on public compliance with COVID-19 rules:
countries with high science scores also have high
compliance scores. This intriguing albeit limited
evidence is shown in Figure 4.8, based on a
regression of Compliance (YouGov) on PISA
(Science). The two countries with highest
(perceived) compliance with COVID-19 rules,
China and Singapore, are also the two countries
with the highest PISA science scores. Indonesia

20

Figure 4.8: Compliance with
COVID-19 rules and PISA(Science)
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The failure of effective control in
many countries may result from
the public’s lack of proper
understanding of the scientific
challenges, and as a consequence,
low public compliance with or
acceptance of COVID-19 NPIs.
scores the lowest in the group on both assessed
compliance with COVID-19 rules and PISA science
scores. While such data are suggestive at best,
they raise a pertinent concern: are the publics in
all countries sufficiently knowledgeable about
assessing the basic epidemiology of COVID-19
and, therefore, the appropriate control measures?
The failure of effective control in many countries
may result from the public’s lack of proper
understanding of the scientific challenges, and
as a consequence, low public compliance with or
acceptance of COVID-19 NPIs.

Conclusions and follow up
One of the most striking facts of the COVID-19
pandemic is the very high mortality rates in the
North Atlantic countries compared with the
Asia-Pacific region. No doubt, the Asia-Pacific
region was better prepared for a newly emerging
zoonotic pandemic. No doubt, the region put in
place a successful package of NPIs that eluded
the nations of Europe and North America and the
public in the Asia-Pacific countries generally
encouraged the strong measures taken by the
governments.
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What is less clear and more puzzling is why the
North Atlantic countries persisted in their failures
despite the strong and growing evidence of the
successes of the Asia-Pacific region. The North
Atlantic countries demonstrated a persistent
inability or unwillingness to learn from the
Asia-Pacific experience. Part of this reflected a
persistent conceptual failure in the US and some
of the European countries; specifically the belief
that the pandemic could not be controlled
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through NPIs, short of locking down the economy.
Since political leaders were loath to close the
economy, they essentially gave up on the idea of
controlling the pandemic.
Yet beyond this lay public attitudes. The public
in the North Atlantic region was less supportive
of NPIs, less compliant with public policies, and
more resistant to stringent control measures.
We surmise that this resistance reflects two
considerations: an excessive individualism at play
in the North Atlantic societies and a poor level
of scientific awareness, which increases the
public’s susceptibility to fake news and
undermines their readiness to comply with
necessary control measures.

policies. This information should routinely include
data on best practices from other parts of
the world. The third is a public debate and
recalibration of the appropriate boundaries of
individual liberty in the face of urgent collective
challenges such as COVID-19 and climate change.
The fourth is the need to improve science and
math education and the public’s ability to reject
fake news and conspiracy theories.
None of this will be easy or quick. We will need
years to recover from this devastating shock. Yet,
our future happiness depends on our coming to
grips with the societal weaknesses and failures
that led us into our current difficulties.

While these conclusions are merely suggestive at
this stage, they direct our attention to the need
for four prongs of action. The first is much better
technical advice provided to national governments.
The second is better information and explanation
by the government to the general public to build
support for and compliance with more effective
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Endnotes
1	In this paper, the Asia-Pacific region includes 17 locations:
three for China (mainland, Hong Kong SAR, and Taiwan),
plus Japan and Korea in East Asia; Australia and New
Zealand in Oceania, and the 10 countries of ASEAN in
southeast Asia. The North Atlantic includes 30 locations: the
US, Canada, and the UK, plus the 27 members of the EU.
2	Sachs, J. D. (8 April 2020). The East-West Divide in
COVID-19 Control. Project Syndicate.
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/westmust-learn-covid19-control-from-east-asia-by-jeffreyd-sachs-2020-04
3	Sachs, J.D. “Comparing Covid-19 Control in the Asia-Pacific
and North-Atlantic Regions,” Asian Economic Papers, 2021
(forthcoming).
4	See Fancourt, D., Steptoe, A. and Wright, L, “The Cummings
effect: politics, trust, and behaviours during the COVID-19
pandemic,” Lancet, 396, August 15, 2020, correspondence
5	Haddad, M. (2 Feb 2021). Mapping coronavirus antilockdown protests around the world. Al Jazeera.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/2/mappingcoronavirus-anti-lockdown-protests-around-the-world
6	Fletcher, M. (19 February 2021). Anthony Fauci exclusive
interview: ‘When I publicly disagreed with Trump he
let terrible things happen’. The Telegraph.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/0/dr-anthonyfauci-had-publicly-disagree-trump-allowed-terrible/
7	Komatsu, H., Rappleye, J., & Silova, I. (June 2019). Culture
and the Independent Self: Obstacles to environmental
sustainability? Anthropocene, 26. doi:https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ancene.2019.100198
8	Silova, I., Komatsu, H., & Rappleye, J. (14 January 2021).
Covid-19, Climate, and Culture: Facing the Crisis of (Neo)
Liberal Individualism. https://www.norrag.org/COVID-19climate-and-culture-facing-the-crisis-of-neoliberalindividualism-by-iveta-silova-hikaru-komatsu-andjeremy-rappleye/
9	Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J., & Minkov, M. (2010). Cultures
and Organizations: Software of the Mind, 3rd edition. New
York: McGraw Hill.
10	Lewis, D. (14 December 2020). Why many countries
failed at COVID contact-tracing — but some got it right.
Nature, 588, 384-387. https://www.nature.com/articles/
d41586-020-03518-4#ref-CR9
11	Gelfand, M. J., et al., “The relationship between cultural
tightness-looseness and COVID-19 cases and deaths:
a global analysis,” Lancet, online, 29 January 2021.
12	Tollefson, J. (11 February 2021). How Trump Turned
Conspiracy-Theory Research Upside Down. Nature, 590,
192-193.
13	Pennycook, G., et al., “Fighting COVID-19 Misinformation
on Social Media: Experimental Evidence for a Scalable
Accuracy-Nudge Intervention,” Psychological Science, 31(7),
770-780, 2020.
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Introduction

In interpreting and bringing together the various
measures and evidence, it is useful to consider the
various mechanisms2 by which different stressors3
associated with the pandemic might affect broad
mental health measures and the time frames over
which these mechanisms might play out. With
regard to the former, four main types of mechanisms
may be important, differentially so for different
types of individuals.

From the outset, it has been clear that the
potential mental health effects of the COVID-19
pandemic and the various physical distancing,
social restrictions, and stay-at-home related
policies introduced in response to it, would be
one of the most important challenges of the
pandemic. Mental health is a key component of
subjective well-being in its own right and is also a
risk factor for future physical health and longevity,1
which will be a leading indicator of the future,
indirect long-run health consequences of the
pandemic. Mental health will influence and drive
a number of other individual choices, behaviours,
and outcomes.
This paper summarises and discusses the emerging
evidence on the mental health consequences of
COVID-19. Our focus is on negative mental health
consequences, such as depression and anxiety,
and does not cover life-satisfaction more broadly.
Analysis of factors such as social cohesiveness
and sense of community, which may relate to
positive mental health, are discussed in Chapter 6
of this report. Additionally, it is worth noting that
the evidence we discuss here relates only to
adults and almost entirely to adults in wealthy
industrialised countries, with a strong focus on
the U.K. and the U.S. There has been less evidence
emerging outside of these domains to date, but
as new data become available, these will be
important avenues for investigation.
A consistent finding of the rapidly emerging
evidence discussed here is that the COVID-19
pandemic has been associated with a substantial
rise in symptoms of mental ill-health. In the
months following the initial outbreak and lockdown,
however, trajectories improved. There is still much
uncertainty surrounding the pandemic’s second
and third waves and how the associated lockdowns
of economic and social activities will affect
mental health, including the pandemic’s long-run
consequences on mental health trajectories and
mental health services. In keeping with other
consequences of COVID-19, the pandemic has
also appeared to increase inequalities in mental
health, both within the population as a whole
and between demographic groups.

First, there will be mechanisms related to
health-related anxieties directly arising from
COVID-19, such as the likelihood of being infected,
the chance of being hospitalised or dying, the
probability of infecting others, and indeed the
possibility of loved ones being infected or dying.
These may differ according to an individual’s
vulnerabilities and exposure (which affect the
underlying probabilities themselves) and also
according to perceptions of, and attitudes to,
the health risk.
Second, there will be the mental health
consequences of worries resulting from how
the pandemic affects an individual’s financial
situation, both in the short and the long run.
These worries will likely differ according to
socioeconomic position, to which countries,
regions, or sectors individuals live and work in,
and the way in which their economies and
economic policies are affected.
There will be a third mechanism related to the
complications that arise from domestic family
arrangements during times of lockdown or
shelter-in-place regulations. In this dimension, one
might expect variation according to demographic
status (the presence of pre-school or school-age
children, housing conditions, etc.).
Finally, the fourth mechanism relates to the direct
mental health effects of the loss or restriction
of otherwise fulfilling activities caused by the
pandemic and the various lockdown policies.
These effects might plausibly differ according
to pre-pandemic lifestyles and levels of social
contact or social networks and by individual
differences in the extent to which people can
create and gain benefit from online and other
types of positive social connections.
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As well as varying across individuals, these
different mechanisms will play out to different
degrees over different time horizons. Figure 5.1
shows four key phases that outline the pandemic’s
mental health impacts. The initial two phases are
short-run responses within the pandemic. First,
to fear of the virus and worries about lockdown
measures, and second, to the broader adversities
(whether economic or social) created by the
pandemic and governments’ responses to it.
There will also be longer-term effects of the
pandemic due to its subsequent effects on the
demand for, and supply of mental health services,
as well as the even longer-term mental health
consequences of recession, unrest and poverty. It
is important to note that this phenomenon will be
relevant even in countries where the pandemic
has not had sizeable direct health effects since
there will still be economic consequences through
disruptions in trade and travel.

Given the time of this paper’s writing and the
available data and research, our summary of
quantitative evidence focusses on phases one
and two in Figure 5.1. The latter stages relating
to the supply of mental health services and the
demand for such services amid rising mental
health inequalities and long-term mental health
consequences of the pandemic’s macroeconomic
impacts, may well be substantial. Whilst we don’t
have much evidence on these phases to date,
they should be uppermost in policymakers’ and
researchers’ minds. More generally, the precise
scale, timing, and duration of these phases (which
are only plotted indicatively in Figure 5.1), as
well as any interactions between them, will be
necessary to analyse. Disruption to mental health
services, and specific challenges in accessing
mental health medication and support during
lockdowns, for example, will affect all the other
phases. We will return to some of these issues in
our conclusions below.

Figure 5.1: Time horizons of key mental health effects of the pandemic

Immediate fear and
response to lockdown

Psychological impact

Long-term consequences:
Recession, unrest, poverty
Immediate response to
pandemic adversities

Insufficient mental
health support

Time
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Measuring mental health during
the pandemic

high-frequency data from both before and after
the pandemic. The drawback is that these data
typically contain very little information on
demographics and other characteristics and may
not represent the general population.

One of the many challenges of COVID-19 has been
the difficulty in collecting evidence, whether
through new real-time studies or the continuation
of pre-existing data collection activities such as
cross-sectional or longitudinal household surveys.
The research community has stepped up to the
challenge, and the availability of new data has
been impressive. There is, however, considerable
variation in the data sources underlying the
emerging evidence on mental health. In particular,
data on mental health during the pandemic
comes from one of three types of sources.

Given the variation in data sources and data
collection methods, it is not surprising many
mental health measures are in use. Survey data,
and the primary studies used in our empirical
analysis, typically include summary measures of
overall mental health such as the GHQ-12,4 more
specific measures such as the GAD-7 for anxiety,5
the CES-D6 or PHQ-97 for depression, or short
screening scales such as the PHQ-4 that cover
both.8 Such surveys often also measure other
factors (for example, the UCLA scale for loneliness
or various social isolation measures) that can be
crucially important in understanding mental
health and its drivers. Harvested data contain
other proxy outcomes for mental health, such
as suicides, self-harm, the number of calls to
helplines, and internet searches for mental
health-related keywords.

A number of pre-existing cross-sectional or
longitudinal surveys have implemented other
COVID-19 data collections, typically online and by
phone. The availability of pre-COVID-19 data is a
clear advantage of such surveys. The drawback is
that the sample sizes in new COVID-19 waves tend
to be relatively small (compared to other data
sources discussed below). Many surveys have
carried out just one or two observations during
the COVID-19 period. A notable exception is the
Understanding Society (UKHLS) panel in the U.K.,
used in this paper, which implemented monthly
and bi-monthly surveys from April 2020 onwards.

As there is no single dominant measure or data
source on mental health during the pandemic, it
is not straightforward to quantify effects across
studies. In what follows, we draw on data sources
as appropriate. Evidence from pre-existing surveys
and harvested data help to identify and quantify
the initial causal impacts of COVID-19. Bespoke
surveys are useful in tracing out variation in
mental health trajectories over the course of the
pandemic. What is apparent is that the key
themes emerge regardless of the measurement
issues - the triangulation of data from studies
using different samples and methodological
approaches provides some reassuringly consistent
messages as to the mental health impact of
the pandemic.

Second, many bespoke COVID-19 studies have
been set up to track mental health over the
course of the pandemic (see https://www.covid
minds.org/longitudinal-studies). Key among these
is the UCL COVID-19 Social Study, the USC
Understanding America Panel, and equivalent
studies in European countries. Whilst these studies
provide large-scale, high-frequency data on changes
in mental health during the pandemic, they do not
contain information from before the onset of
COVID-19, which makes it difficult to estimate the
impact of the pandemic. Further, sampling techniques have varied from random samples to quota
or weighted samples to convenience samples. The
data’s representativeness and comparability can
be challenging in interpreting findings.

The initial mental health effects
of the pandemic
Most developed countries saw a large immediate
decline in mental health after the pandemic
outbreak compared to earlier points in time,
typically measured between 2017 and 2019. By
comparing different cross-sectional surveys in the

Finally, researchers have drawn on harvested data
from internet searches, helplines, and hospital
records. A key strength of these sources is that
they tend to provide large sample sizes and
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U.K., the ONS reported a 12.3 percentage-point
fall in numbers reporting low happiness and a
28.6 percentage point rise in those reporting
elevated anxiety between the last quarter of 2019
and March 2020. Over the same broad period,
feelings of life being worthwhile fell from 7.86 to
7.42, and life satisfaction fell from 7.67 to 6.91,
both measured on a scale of 0 to 10.9 Repeated
cross-sectional surveys also show a rise in the
prevalence of depressive symptoms, from 9.7%
among adults in July 2019-March 2020 to 19.2% in
June 2020.10 In the U.S., bespoke COVID surveys
in April-May 2020 show significantly higher rates
of poor mental health compared to comparable
surveys in 201811 and higher levels of loneliness.12
Data from representative cohort studies across
the world also show increases in average scores
of psychological distress and a rise in the share of
people experiencing clinically significant levels of
mental illness in the first few weeks of lockdown,
compared to data collected prior to the pandemic.13

health improving in the spring and summer
months and declining in the autumn and winter.
A sample observed entirely at one point in time
(for example, April 2020) is not comparable to
samples in previous surveys, typically interviewed
over an entire year.
Causal estimates of the initial effects
of the pandemic
Given these issues, researchers have adopted
two strategies to estimate the causal effect
of COVID-19 on mental health. One strand of
research uses variation in the timing of the
disease outbreak and/or the public health
response across different areas (countries or
different regions within a country) to identify the
causal effect. Much like a randomised trial, the
underlying assumption is that mental health
trajectories across areas would have evolved
to preserve pre-existing differences, so any
subsequent deviations between areas can be
attributed to the pandemic. Another set of
studies attempt to explicitly model mental health
levels over time using historical longitudinal data
in a single country or area, in order to create a
counterfactual prediction for what would have
happened without COVID-19. The assumption
here is that pre-pandemic trends, defined for
specific demographic groups, would have
continued in the absence of the pandemic, so
deviations from those trends can be interpreted
as the effects of the pandemic. We now discuss
each type of evidence in turn.

Whilst important, comparisons of mental health
levels before and after the pandemic cannot be
taken as estimates of the pandemic’s causal
effect. They do not account for what would have
happened in the absence of the pandemic. For
example, some mental health measures in the
U.K. had already been worsening in recent years,
before the COVID-19 outbreak. Since this trend
may well have continued even in the absence of
the COVID-19, attributing the entire decline in
mental health between pre-pandemic years
and Spring 2020 to COVID-19 would lead us to
overstate the effect of the pandemic. Importantly,
Banks and Xu14 show that pre-existing mental
health trends differ across demographic groups:
mental health deteriorated much more sharply
among younger age groups than older groups
between 2014 and 2018. This means that naïve
before-after comparisons could also lead to
incorrect estimates of the relative effect of
COVID-19 across groups.

Variation in the timing of the pandemic
and lockdown
Typically, studies that use variation in events’
timing require high-frequency data and have
relied on trends in Google searches and calls to
helplines as proxies for mental health, rather than
survey data with conventional mental health
measures. Brodeur16 track Google searches for
well-being related keywords in Western European
countries and the U.S., comparing searches
pre- and post-lockdown in 2020 to the same
dates in 2019, controlling for seasonal patterns of
searches within countries and states. They find a
substantial increase in the search intensity for

Secondly, simple comparisons do not account for
seasonal trends in mental health, which may be
necessary when assessing mental health at a
single point in time, as is typical in ‘real-time’
COVID-19 studies. Banks and Xu15 show that there
are seasonal trends in GHQ scores, with mental
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German federal states and controlling for differences in infection rates, they find larger effects in
states that imposed stricter lockdown measures,
suggesting that the deterioration in mental health
was partly driven by the public health response to
the virus instead of the virus itself. In contrast,
helpline data from Switzerland do not show an
increase in the total volume of calls resulting from
the pandemic,21 with an increase only in calls
directly related to the virus (calls by the elderly
and calls about fear of infection).

boredom, at two standard deviations in Europe
and over one standard deviation in the U.S., as
well as smaller statistically significant increases in
searches for loneliness, worry, and sadness. On
the other hand, search intensity for suicide and
divorce fell when lockdowns were imposed.
Analysing changes in Google searches over time
(but not variation in timings across areas), Knipe17
and Tubadji18 also find a fall in searches for
suicide. However, the former finds an increase in
searches for fear, and the latter increases in
searches for death, starting in March 2020. Foa19
finds that most of the rise in ‘negative’ search
terms (psychological stress, boredom, fear, etc.)
in developed countries took place before the start
of the first lockdown, before stabilising and falling
over the course of lockdown.

The results suggest some deterioration in mental
health as a direct result of the pandemic, though
not along all dimensions, with some contradictory
results. Conflicting findings may reflect differences
in impacts across countries (for example, Germany
versus Switzerland) or the manifestation of
mental health issues in different behaviours (for
example, the link between suicidal ideation in
Google searches versus helpline calls). But it is
difficult to draw clear conclusions from this
evidence, partly because the outcome measures
used cannot be directly related to common
measures of mental health. Furthermore, because
they rely on data from a self-selected group

Armbruster and Klotzbuecher20 find that the
number of calls to Germany’s largest online and
telephone counselling helpline service increased
by 20% in the first week of lockdown. Analysis of
the conversations’ content suggests that this
increase was driven by heightened loneliness,
anxiety, and suicidal ideation rather than fear of
the virus or financial worries. Looking across
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(those who use Google search or those prone to
calling helplines), their findings may not represent
the general population.
Studies that use variation in timing to identify
effects typically use harvested data, making it
challenging to study how the pandemic’s mental
health impact varies across demographic
groups.22 One notable exception is the study by
Adams-Prassl23 who use two survey waves in
March and April 2020 and identify the causal
effect of lockdowns across the U.S. using variation
in the timing of stay-at-home orders. They measure
mental health using the WHO-5 module and find
that mental health deteriorated by 0.1 standard
deviations in states that imposed lockdowns in
April, with the effect entirely driven by women.
These states had had similar mental health levels in
March. As the surveys contain detailed information
on people’s experiences over lockdown, they can
establish that women’s differential effect cannot
be explained by increased financial worries or
additional childcare responsibilities.
Modelling counterfactual mental health levels
The second strand of research tries to identify
the pandemic’s causal effect by estimating
counterfactual levels of mental health in the
absence of the pandemic, using longitudinal data
from previous years. Banks and Xu24 model
individual-level counterfactuals in April 2020
using longitudinal data spanning several years
before the pandemic, taking account of age
profiles in mental health, seasonal trends,
gender- and age-specific trends, and changes in
observed personal circumstances between the
latest pre-pandemic wave (in 2017-18) and the

A number of sources have
suggested that during COVID-19,
mental health deteriorated prior
to lockdown or stay-at-home
orders coming in. Once lockdowns were introduced, mental
health stabilised and even
began to improve.

period immediately before the pandemic. They
estimate that average GHQ scores using the Likert
0-36 point metric rose by 0.9 points as a result of
the pandemic, indicating a worsening of mental
distress by 0.17 of a standard deviation of the
pre-pandemic distribution. The causal effect is
smaller than the simple difference between April
2020 and 2017-18 (1.2 points) for the reasons
discussed above. Still, it is a considerable
deterioration, roughly equivalent in size to the
mean difference in GHQ scores between the top
and bottom quintiles of the income distribution
in 2017-18, and nearly double the deterioration
between 2013 and 2018. The GHQ-12 caseness
score, which captures the number of mental
ill-health dimensions reported as being worse
than usual, deteriorated even more. Individuals
reported an average of 0.9 more mental health
problems25 out of a possible 12 – a difference
equivalent to 0.3 of a standard deviation and
twice the pre-pandemic difference between the
top and bottom income quintiles. Finally, the
share of the population reporting one or more of
the 12 dimensions being ‘much more than usual’
more than doubled relative to the counterfactual
prediction, from 10% to 24%. Pierce26 adopts a
similar approach, estimating the deviation from
individual-level predictions using the same
dataset, finding a 0.5-point increase in average
GHQ scores. However, their main estimates may
well be an underestimate of the causal effect due
to the particular modelling approach taken.27
The advantage of modelling counterfactual
mental health levels using rich survey data is
that it allows us to examine differences between
groups and the mechanisms through which
mental health changes arise. However, one
drawback is that results may be sensitive to the
model specification. As shown by the differences
between Banks and Xu,28 and Pierce29 model
specifications for the counterfactual will matter.
Results are also sensitive to the period used to fit
the model and predict the counterfactual. They
use data up to 2017-18, as this was the latest wave
of the survey available at the time each analysis
was conducted. Since then, survey data up to
2019 has been released, allowing us to revise and
improve our estimate of pre-pandemic trends,
hence the pandemic’s estimated initial impact.
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Table 5.1: Estimated impact of COVID-19 on mental health in the UK, April 2020:
Effect on GHQ scores
GHQ score (Likert)

GHQ score (caseness)

2019

Predicted

Actual

Impact

2019

Predicted

Actual

Impact

16-34 Women

12.8

13.5

15.3

1.8

2.6

35-64 Women

12.3

12.5

13.7

1.2

2.3

2.8

4.2

1.4

2.3

3.4

65+ Women

10.8

10.8

12.0

1.2

1.1

1.4

1.4

2.4

1.0

16-34 Men

12.2

12.2

13.0

35-64 Men

11.3

11.1

11.5

0.7

2.2

2.0

2.9

0.9

0.4

1.8

1.6

2.1

65+ Men

9.4

9.7

10.1

0.6

0.4

0.8

0.9

1.5

0.6

All

11.5

11.7

12.6

0.9

1.9

1.9

2.8

0.9

Note: GHQ Likert scores range from 0-36; GHQ caseness scores count the number of dimensions reported as being
worse than usual and range from 0-12.

epidemics. A number of sources have suggested
that during COVID-19, mental health deteriorated
prior to lockdown or stay-at-home orders coming
in. Once lockdowns were introduced, mental health
stabilised and even began to improve. Initial U.K.
evidence on this began to emerge quite rapidly
from the study of trajectories between March and
June.33 We provide some further evidence on
trajectories over the six months leading up to
September 2020, both in the U.K. and elsewhere.

Table 5.1 shows the updated estimates of the
mental health impacts of COVID-19, incorporating
the 2018-2019 data and based on the methodology
of Banks and Xu.30 Estimates of the overall impact
in April 2020 are unchanged – GHQ-19 scores rose
by 0.9 points relative to the predicted value in
April 2020 of 11.7, representing a deterioration in
mental health of 7.9% using the GHQ-12 Likert
metric. The GHQ-12 caseness score, capturing the
number of dimensions reported worse than usual,
rose by 47% from 1.9 to 2.8. As with the previous
analysis (and as discussed in detail in section “The
evolution of mental health during the pandemic”
below), Table 5.1 shows clearly that the pandemic
had the most considerable effects on women and
young people.31

Changes in the U.K. between April
and September
The section, The initial mental health effects of the
pandemic, discussed the immediate impacts of
the COVID-19 outbreak on mental health during
the first lockdown in the U.K. and elsewhere. From
May 2020 onwards, many of the early stringent
restrictions were relaxed. Schools reopened in many
countries and regions, and as sector shutdowns
were lifted and businesses learned to adapt to the
new environment, many furloughed workers
returned to work. Nevertheless, individuals’
lifestyles, and their material circumstances, were
still dramatically affected compared to before the
pandemic, so it is natural to ask how these changes
affected subsequent trajectories of mental health
after the first initial shock.

The evolution of mental health
during the pandemic
The findings on the initial effects of the pandemic
on mental health discussed above echo those from
studies of previous epidemics such as SARS
(severe acute respiratory syndrome), during which
individuals who had to quarantine experienced
increases in symptoms of depression and PTSD.32
But it has now become clear that the trajectory of
subsequent experiences has differed from previous
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Figure 5.2a: Impact of COVID-19 on mental health in the U.K. in April and
September 2020. Difference between observed levels and ‘no-COVID’
predictions, by age and sex
GHQ-12 Score

All
16–34 Women
35–64 Women
65+ Women
16–34 Men
35–64 Men
 April 2020
 September 2020

65+ Men

0		

0.5

1

1.5

2

Note: Authors calculations using UKHLS COVID-19 data (NApril=11,751; NSept=9,506).

Figure 5.2b: Impact of COVID-19 on mental health in the U.K. in April and
September 2020. Difference between observed levels and ‘no-COVID’
predictions, by age and sex
GHQ-12 Number of problems

All
16–34 Women
35–64 Women
65+ Women
16–34 Men
35–64 Men
 April 2020
 September 2020

65+ Men

0		

0.4

0.8

1.2

Note: Authors calculations using UKHLS COVID-19 data (NApril=11,751; NSept=9,506).
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We repeat the exercise in Banks and Xu34 using
the September wave of the UKHLS, estimating
the pandemic’s impact on mental health in the
U.K. in September by comparing actual mental
health levels to individual-level counterfactual
predictions for that month. Figure 5.2 presents
the pandemic’s estimated causal effects across
age and gender groups in April 2020 and
September 2020. The bars labelled April 2020
correspond to the ‘impacts’ of the pandemic in
April, as listed in Table 5.1 above. The second
series is the equivalent estimates for September
2020. Figure 5.2 shows that mental health across
the population improved substantially over the
course of the summer, though by September, it
had not yet returned to counterfactual trend
values, with average GHQ scores still 0.3 points
above the counterfactual prediction (compared
to 0.9 points above in April 2020).
There are considerable differences in the relative
persistence of initial effects across demographic
groups. Young women age 16-34 had by far the
worst initial mental health shocks (their GHQ
scores increased by twice the overall increase),
but they were not much worse off than the
general population by September. In contrast, the
mental health shock suffered by elderly women
was remarkably persistent, and by September,
they were the group experiencing the most
considerable deterioration relative to the
counterfactual. These patterns of adaptation and
persistence mean that the impact of COVID-19 on
mental health was much less unequal (across age
and gender groups) in September than in April.

was severely affected in both waves; this large
group experienced a sustained period of poor
mental health relative to their previous levels. On
the other hand, and in keeping with evidence in
Figure 5.2, there was also evidence of improving
trajectories. Almost half of those who were badly
affected in April were no longer ‘badly’ affected in
September (i.e., their GHQ-12 score worsened by
less than one point). Whilst a non-negligible
fraction of the population (13.6%) had entered the
badly affected group, the overall affect is still a
reduction in the size of the badly affected group
by September. When split by age and sex, these
trajectories also show important differences in
the persistence of mental health effects across
groups. For example, whilst younger women were
most severely affected in April, their recovery rate
was relatively high. Looking at the groups with
the highest prevalence of persistent poor mental
health, older women and younger men have been
most affected. Men of all ages, and older men, in
particular, are least likely to have been in the
persistently badly affected group.

Using the balanced panel of respondents to UKHLS
who responded to both the April and September
surveys, we can also explore trajectories at the
individual level. We define an individual as ‘badly
affected’ if, at the point of the interview, their
GHQ-12 score was one or more points worse than
would have been predicted given their (individualspecific) ‘no-COVID’ counterfactual value for that
month. We then assign individuals to one of four
groups according to whether they were ‘badly
affected’ in each of the two waves.

With multiple covariates available, it is
possible to look deeper into the individual-level
determinants of membership of these transition
groups. We estimate a simple logit model to

Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of April to
September trajectories by age and gender group.
A substantial fraction of the population (22.5%)
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Figure 5.3: Persistence of mental health effects in the U.K. Balanced panel sample,
April and September 2020

All
16–34 Women
35–64 Women

22.5%

25.9%

26.5%

18.5%

65+ Men

18.1%

0		

17.6%

0.25

37.0%

14.4%

14.1%

Bad, bad

Bad,
not bad
Not bad, bad
Not bad, not bad

40.2%

14.3%

19.8%

20.0%

34.7%

13.3%

19.7%






42.6%

13.8%

23.4%

29.0%

35–64 Men

13.6%

25.6%

23.1%

65+ Women
16–34 Men

21.2%

39.3%

47.5%

12.6%

51.6%

0.50

0.75

1.0

Note: Authors’ calculations using UKHLS COVID-19 data (N=10,387). ‘Bad’ is defined as GHQ-12 score one point or
worse than the counterfactual level in April or September, respectively.

Detailed evidence from within-pandemic
trajectories

look at the characteristics of the persistently
badly affected group, including controls for
individuals’ health, economic situation, and social
and demographic circumstances.35 Substantial
differences between age-sex groups remain,
even when controlling for the differential other
circumstances. Women over 65 are 1.77 times
more likely to be persistently badly affected than
the reference group of middle-aged men, and
16-34-year-olds of both sexes are around 40%
more likely to be in the persistently badly affected
group, even controlling for the other circumstances
of these groups. The covariates in these models
show some preliminary evidence of the various
mechanisms by which the pandemic might affect
mental health, as discussed in the introduction.
Those with COVID-19 symptoms in either April or
September, those who lost work after April 2020,
or those reporting closer friends pre-pandemic, were
all more likely to be in the persistently badly affected
group.36 Those in strong romantic relationships
(who reported their relationship quality as ‘very
happy’ or better) had a reduced likelihood of
being persistently badly affected, highlighting the
importance of the nuclear family at a time when
social circles have shrunk outside of the household.

Since detailed COVID-19 studies have started up
since the onset of the pandemic, it is also possible
to look at within-pandemic trajectories with much
more specific measures of mental health, both in
terms of the mental health measures themselves
and in terms of the periodicity of measurement.
In this section, we begin by looking again at the
U.K. context before turning to evidence from
other countries.
The UCL COVID-19 Social Study involves repeated
weekly assessments of a large sample of over
70,000 adults living in the U.K. from the start of
the first U.K. lockdown in March 2020. As the
study lacks pre-pandemic data on respondents,
it does not aim to provide prevalence data on
symptoms. Instead, it identifies how and when
psychological and social experiences changed
during the pandemic and how these changes
coincided with changes in the spread of the virus,
social restrictions, and broader societal disruptions.
Exploring the average symptom trajectories of
anxiety and depression across the first lockdown
and beyond, Fancourt, Steptoe and Bu37 show
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Figure 5.5: Worries and anxiety about the COVID-19 pandemic in Denmark,
France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
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Figure 5.6: Mental health trajectories in the United States,
March 2020-December 2020
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announced, the national nature of the restrictions,
and the social emphasis on self-care, including the
continued allowance of outdoor exercise and
proliferation of online leisure activities) may have
led to a different kind of psychological experience
than previous epidemics.43 But there are other
potential explanations too. If we consider the
literature on other types of isolation, such as
incarceration, studies have shown that depression
levels can stabilise and even improve over time
as people adjust to their new circumstances
and develop coping strategies. It is possible
that adults in the U.K. and elsewhere faced a
similar psychological adjustment process during
lockdown.

Figure 5.6 presents data for the United States
from the USC Understanding Coronavirus in
America Study and shows the same improvement
after the initial lockdown, both in the prevalence
of anxiety and depression, and in other mental
health measures such as self-perceived stress.
Notably, there is consensus among a number of
international studies that mental health started to
improve early during the lockdown, suggesting
that the pandemic’s psychological burden was, on
average, felt most acutely by individuals in the
early stages before decisive actions to control the
virus were brought in. This finding went against
some predictions that lockdown itself could drive
increases in poor mental health, and diverges
from data on previous epidemics, where mental
health worsened during periods of quarantine.42
One explanation for these differing results is
that the unique circumstances of the COVID-19
pandemic (such as the substantial lead-in period
to, and thus anticipation of, lockdown being

Furthermore, the instigation of lockdown brought
an immediate reduction in the number of stressors
relating to the pandemic. People reported
experiencing fears about catching or becoming
seriously ill from the virus to concerns about
finances and jobs (potentially owing to the
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measures brought in by the government around
the same time) and worries about accessing food
and other essentials.44 Notably, both the worries
about these adverse experiences and experiencing
them first-hand were related to worse anxiety and
depression during lockdown. Future research
using these detailed COVID-19 studies will
identify correlations between these mental health
trajectories in a multivariate setting.

COVID-19 and mental health
inequalities
The pandemic has so far led to a substantial
initial deterioration in mental health, followed by
a degree of recovery, but these effects have
not been evenly felt across different groups.
Differences between groups reflect and shed light
on the mechanisms through which the pandemic
affects mental health – fear of the virus, health
impacts, social restrictions, economic recession,
and so on – which differentially affect parts of the

population. In many ways, the initial impact of
COVID-19 has exacerbated pre-existing mental
health inequalities between men and women, the
old and the young, and between ethnic groups.
However, these impacts are evolving as the
pandemic goes on.
Many studies, using a variety of data sources and
mental health measures, show that the pandemic
led to a larger decline in mental health among
women, who already had worse levels of mental
health than men before the pandemic hit.45 Whilst
women bore the brunt of the additional childcare
that resulted from school closures,46 additional
caring duties explain only a small fraction of the
gender differences in the initial impact of the
pandemic.47 Nor can they be explained by
differences in men’s and women’s exposure to the
pandemic’s health and economic consequences, for
example, the fact that women disproportionately
work in sectors affected by physical distancing.48
Instead, Etheridge and Spantig49 point to the
importance of social factors in explaining gender
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down during the first lockdown (retail, hospitality,
creative industries, etc.) experienced larger
impacts even if their jobs were not directly
affected.55 People of lower socioeconomic
positions were also more likely to experience
adversities, including loss of employment and
income, challenges meeting basic needs (such as
accessing food and medications), and experiences
directly relating to the virus, including contracting
or becoming seriously ill from COVID-19.56
Moreover, these experiences were more strongly
related to poor mental health amongst those
with lower household incomes.57

differences and demonstrating that women had
larger social networks than men before the
pandemic. They argued that they were therefore
hit harder by the social restrictions imposed as
part of the public health response.
In the pandemic’s initial stages, the mental health
impact was also much larger on young people.50
Since young people had worse mental health
levels before the pandemic, this served to widen
mental health inequalities by age. However, (as
shown in the section, The evolution of mental
health during the pandemic above) the gap
narrowed over the course of the pandemic as
young people’s mental health returned to
normal more quickly51 – perhaps reflecting higher
adaptability to shocks among this group as well
as positive changes in circumstances that
disproportionately benefitted the young, like the
(temporary) lifting of social restrictions and the
reopening of schools and universities. Data from
the U.S. (presented in Appendix Figure A2) show
that the percentage of people experiencing
psychological distress was greatest in the under
40 age group. In contrast, to mental health levels
that would be expected without covid, there
has been less catch-up or convergence as the
pandemic has progressed.
The pandemic has also disproportionately affected
the physical health of ethnic minorities both in the
U.K. and the U.S.52 Research that examines mental
health impacts by coarse ethnic groups (white/
non-white, or pooling across genders) has typically
not found statistically significant differences, after
removing effect of factors such as gender, age,
and exposure to the virus’s health and economic
impact.53 Looking at finer ethnic groups and
disaggregating by gender, Proto and QuintanaDomeque54 find a larger initial impact on mental
health among men of Bangladeshi, Indian and
Pakistani ethnicities in the U.K. An important
question for future research is whether ethnicity
differences are also found in other developed
countries and how much they remain in models
that control exposure to the pandemic’s various
socioeconomic effects.
Those who lost their jobs and suffered income
shocks saw particularly sharp deteriorations in
mental health. Workers in sectors that were shut

There is also some evidence that healthcare
workers have suffered particularly bad mental
health shocks.58 These are likely to have exacerbated the already high rates of pre-existing
mental health problems among this group.59
Alonso,60 for example, use a bespoke large scale
survey (N=9138) to estimate that, on average,
1 in 7 healthcare workers in Spain presented a
disabling mental disorder, with this fraction
becoming 4 in 10 for those workers with any
pre-pandemic mental health disorder. However,
critical workers in general (including other
occupations like teachers, retail food workers,
and delivery drivers) appear to have experienced
better mental health trajectories, perhaps due to
the greater recognition given to their professions
as a result of the pandemic.61
Finally, inequalities in mental health levels
between certain groups are an ongoing cause for
concern, even if the groups with poor mental
health pre-pandemic were not disproportionally
affected by the pandemic. Figures A3 and A4 in
the appendix reveal stark differences in mental
health between income groups in both the U.S.
and U.K. that have persisted throughout the
pandemic so far. Similarly, differences in the
household composition may be significant.
Without identifying causal effects relative to a
counterfactual, trajectory data from the U.K. show
that adults living alone experienced worse levels
of depressive symptoms (although their mean
anxiety levels were no different from those living
with others). This could be due to higher levels of
loneliness caused by social restrictions, which
were felt more amongst this group.62 Individuals
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living with children showed higher levels of
anxiety and depressive symptoms initially but a
faster rate of improvement, potentially due to the
growing public awareness of research suggesting
that children were less affected by COVID-19.63
Whilst these inequalities are well reported outside
of pandemic settings, the wider gap between the
groups seen in the early stages of the pandemic
suggests an exacerbation of such inequalities
during COVID-19.

Conclusions
There is no doubt that the initial effects of
the COVID-19 pandemic on mental ill-health
symptoms were large, negative, and remarkably
consistent across the data and studies discussed
here. It is worth reiterating that these relate only
to adults and solely to wealthy industrialised
countries. These effects were worst in younger
age groups and women, ethnic minorities, and
those with pre-existing mental health problems,
thus reinforcing many pre-existing mental
health inequalities.
In the months following the outbreak, however,
the story has been more positive. The evidence
in many countries suggests that, following the
initial shock to mental health, measures in all
dimensions recovered considerably, although not
completely. In the U.K., for example, one simple
metric of mental health worsened by 7.9% initially,
and we estimate that by September 2020, it was
still 2.2% below the level it would have been in the
absence of the pandemic. In addition, while there
is very little large-scale evidence on the most
extreme consequences of mental health problems
- suicide and self-harm – what evidence there is
has yet to show any consistent or significant
trends64 in terms of causal effects of the
pandemic. And the rapid discovery of a vaccine,
leading to the immediate roll-out of vaccination
programmes, will provide grounds for optimism
for many individuals.
Notably, mental health has quickly risen high on
policymakers65 and researchers’ agenda, as
evidenced by the Lancet COVID-19 Commission
Mental Health Task Force, which will report in
February 2021. Indeed, those without previous

specialisation in mental health issues will
have considerably more appreciation for the
importance and role of mental health and key
factors such as loneliness, social isolation, and
social support than before. This new energy,
coupled with the vast amounts of data collection
that are now going on, should lead to important
new insights, both on the COVID-19 effects and
drivers of mental health levels more generally.
Indeed, the varied experiences of countries and
regions within the pandemic provide fertile
ground for researchers studying the drivers of
mental health in a way that can and will inform
policy going forwards. There are already exciting
prospects for longitudinal research on trajectories
for anxiety, depression, and loneliness that will
distinguish between the roles for the virus, the
economic consequences of policy responses
to the virus, and the local physical distancing
and stay-at-home restrictions. And as more
internationally comparable data emerge, there will
be further prospects for international comparative
research. Both will provide a more global
understanding of mental health effects around
the world and enable researchers to exploit
international differences in the impact of the
pandemic and governments’ reactions to it to
identify causal processes.
Given our analysis’s timing, there is still much
uncertainty on how the full mental health
consequences of COVID-19 will play out. We can
only speculate at this point, but there are many
potential causes for ongoing concern. With
regard to the first two phases of effects that we
identified in Figure 5.1: Whilst the improving
trajectories post-May 2020 suggest that the
second phase may not have been as bad as
feared on average, it is still the case that a
substantial group of individuals have had
persistent large, negative shocks to their mental
health. Furthermore, at the time of writing, many
countries are going into lockdowns and extensive
social and economic restrictions as a result of the
second and third waves of the virus and its new
highly infectious variants. In the U.K., COVID-19
Social Study data are already showing some
deterioration again. It remains to be seen how
relative impacts will evolve as the gradual vaccine
roll-out alleviates the pandemic’s health risks,
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that bear more heavily on older people, whilst
the ensuing recession and lockdowns damage
job prospects and social activities of all, but
particularly the young.
Perhaps more importantly, however, is that the
third and fourth phases of mental health effects
that we identified in Figure 5.1 are only just
beginning to play out, and these may turn out to
be the most consequential. Certainly, mental
health and inequalities in mental health will need
to be foremost in policymakers’ minds as they
respond to the pandemic’s continued challenges
and then the need to rebuild the economy. With
regard to phase three, there is already emerging
evidence of disruption to mental health services
around the world (WHO 2020), and the increased
burden on such services (and on healthcare in
general) could exacerbate current and future
mental health problems and mental health
inequalities. Indeed, the pandemic’s effect on
healthcare itself may make it hard to return to
normal mental health care levels, let alone
provide the additional services needed given the
increased burden caused by COVID-19. And
looking beyond this- the long-run effects of the
pandemic’s economic consequences on mental
health could be substantial. We know that

COVID-19 will undoubtedly cause extensive and
persistent recessions around the world (even in
those countries without major outbreaks of the
virus). It is hard to speculate precisely on the
magnitude of the mental health consequences
since the economic shocks have been of a nature
and size that we have not seen in modern times.
Focusing on the different stressors caused by the
pandemic and the various mechanisms by which
these stressors have their mental health effects,
as well as the continual measurement and
monitoring of all population subgroups, will help
researchers derive long-run estimates effects in
as timely a manner possible. Such research should
be treated as a priority. This will be particularly
crucial for younger generations, who will be
most heavily affected by the long-run economic
consequences and who are already a group
with poor mental health and high mental
health inequalities.
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1

28 Banks and Xu (2020).

see Kivimäki et al. (2017).

29 Pierce et al. (2020).

2	Mechanisms are the processes – the ways in which risk
factors turn into outcomes.
3

Stressors are objects - the risk factors themselves.

4

see Goldberg et al. (1997).

5

Spitzer et al. (2006).

6

Radloff et al. (1977).

7

Kroenke et al. (2001).

8

Kroenke et al, (2009).

9

ONS (2020a).

30	We depart from the specific Banks and Xu (2020)
methodology in a few other ways here. First, the sample
in Banks and Xu was restricted to those observed in the
2017-18 wave of the survey, whereas we now include all
individuals observed in 2019. Second, the addition of
further waves of the survey means that we are able to
identify individual fixed effects for more individuals. Third,
given the larger sample, we estimate our prediction model
using only individuals in the Covid waves. Fourth, we define
age groups based on their 2019 values, as opposed to their
April 2020 values. Fifth, age groups are defined in a more
disaggregated way, to allow comparisons to September
2020 figures in Figure 5.2 (for which the sample size is
much smaller). Finally, we use revised cross-sectional
weights issued by UKHLS.

10 ONS (2020b).
11

McGinty et al. (2020); Swaziek and Wozniak (2020).

12 Kilgore et al. (2020).

31	The revised estimate of the impact on young men is smaller
than in Banks and Xu (2020), however. This is because the
new data reveal a sharper deterioration in mental health
among young men from 2017-18 to 2019 than would have
been predicted by the trend up to 2017-2018). The
continuation of this trend implies a worse level of mental
health in 2020 in the absence of the pandemic, and hence
a smaller causal effect of the pandemic. In contrast, the
impact on women in all age groups is slightly larger than in
Banks and Xu (2020), owing to better pre-pandemic
mental health trends than the previous data suggested. Full
updated results are available from the authors on request.

13 Pierce et al. 2020, Shanahan et al. (2020).
14 Banks and Xu (2020).
15 Banks and Xu (2020).
16 Brodeur et al. (2020).
17 Knipe et al. (2020).
18 Tubadji et al. (2020).
19 Foa et al. (2020).
20 Armbruster and Klotzbuecher (2020).
21 Brülhart and Lalive (2020).
22	For example, studies using Google trends cannot disaggregate
searches by the characteristics of those searching. Even if
this were possible, researchers could not distinguish
between the pandemic having a larger effect on the mental
health of certain groups, or certain groups being more
inclined to search for well-being-related keywords in
response to a given fall in mental health.
23 Adams-Prassl et al. (2020).
24 Banks and Xu (2020).
25	Measured using 0-12-point GHQ Caseness scale, where
each of the 12 items of the questionnaire is assigned a score
of 1 if the respondent experiences the negative (positive)
event less (more) or much less (much more) than usual.
26 Pierce et al. (2020).
27	The modelling in Pierce et al. (2020) does not control for
seasonal trends and also differs from Banks and Xu (2020)
in a number of other ways: it uses a quadratic (rather than
linear) time trend, does not allow trends to differ across
demographic groups, and does not control for changes in
mental health over the lifecycle or changes in individual
circumstances such as marital status and (pre-pandemic)
employment outcomes. Most importantly, it includes the
April 2020 data in estimating individual fixed effects, which
is likely to lead to downward bias in estimated effects.

32	Hawryluck et al. (2004); Reynolds et al. (2008); Mihashi
et al. (2009); Liu et al. (2012).
33 Yougov (2020); Layard et al. (2020); Daly et al. (2020).
34 Banks and Xu. (2020).
35	We have also run multinomial logit specifications to model
all four transitions simultaneously but do not discuss or
present the results for ease of exposition. Qualitative
conclusions on the determinants of the persistently badly
affected group are unaffected, and some of the transitions
reveal other interesting effects, such as the presence of
school or pre-school age children being associated with
movements in and out of the badly affected group, in
keeping with the timing of school closures. Results are
available from authors.
36	This final result is consistent with the findings on the initial
effects reported in Etheridge and Spantig (2020), who
argue that those with large social circles suffered more
from restrictions on socialising, and also with Folk et al
(2020) in a smaller scale but more specifically focused US
UK study. It is also worth noting that, other things equal,
this effect would reduce mental health inequalities.
37 Fancourt, Steptoe, and Bu (2020).
38 taken from Fancourt, Steptoe, and Bu (2020).
39 Varga et al. (2020).
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40	The figure presents weighted means and 95% CIs of levels
of worries in individuals from the Epinion general population
cohort (Ntotal=2,123) and the Lifelines cohort (Ntotal=44,076),
and unweighted means and 95% CIs of levels of worries in
individuals from the DNBC cohort (Ntotal=23,029) and the
TEMPO cohort (Ntotal=729). On the same graph, weighted
proportions are presented of individuals reporting high
levels of anxiety in the UCL COVID-19 Social Study
(Ntotal=70,538).
41 USC Dornslife (2021) https://uasdata.usc.edu/.
42 see Brooks et al (2020).
43 Fancourt, Steptoe and Bu (2020).
44 see Wright et al. (2020a for the U.K.).
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48 Banks and Xu (2020); Etheridge and Spantig (2020).
49 Etheridge and Spantig (2020).
50	Banks and Xu (2020); Daly et al. (2020); Pierce et al.
(2020).
51	Figure A1 also presents trajectories for Anxiety and
Depression from the UCL Covid-19 Social Study and reveals
the same patterns for these more specific dimensions of
mental health.
52 Kirby 2020, Platt and Warwick (2020); Sze et al. (2020).
53	Banks and Xu (2020); Daly et al. (2020); Pierce et al.
(2020); Fancourt, Steptoe and Bu (2020).
54 Proto and Quintana-Domeque (2020).
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56 Wright et al. (2020a).
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60 Alonso et al. (2020).
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62 Bu, Steptoe and Fancourt (2020a, 2020b).
63 Guan et al. (2020).
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The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted life
worldwide. Globally, governments have attempted
to slow the spread of the disease by promoting
“social distancing” guidelines, including staying at
least 6 feet (2 meters) away from anyone outside
one’s household.1 Early in the implementation of
social distancing, the World Health Organization
(WHO) announced that the term “physical
distancing” better captured the essence of the
guidelines, such that people should remain
physically but not socially distant from others.2
The same recommendation was independently
decided by the (World Happiness Report Editors)
on the same day, at the March 20 virtual launch of
World Happiness Report (WHR) 2020. Although
the term “social distancing” continues to be
widely used (including within peer-reviewed
journals), because the topic of this chapter is
about maintaining connections while distancing,
we adopt the WHO and WHR recommendation
to use “physical distancing.”
Physical separation curtails the spread of the
virus, yet the practice of physical distancing
inherently limits people’s in-person social
interactions, which may narrow their sense of
social connection.3 The reduction in the physical
availability of social connections is concerning, as
over a century of research has proven how crucial
social connection is for well-being.4 Aware of the
potential negative consequences to well-being
posed by COVID-19 and its sequelae, researchers
in the social, behavioral, and clinical sciences have
published urgent calls for action to mitigate the
disease’s potential harms.5 One noteworthy and
particularly relevant potential harm discussed by
these researchers is the possible increase in social
isolation and strife in intimate relationships, which
can be exacerbated by the many sources of stress
(social, financial, health, etc.) associated with
the pandemic. However, it is important to note
that physical distancing—which permits social
interaction with housemates, digital interactions
with the outside world, and is imposed on entire
regions, not solitary individuals—is not the same
as social isolation.6
As such, COVID-19 has imposed a myriad of
consequences for health and well-being globally.
Understanding how and why well-being has

shifted due to the pandemic is especially important
given its unknown trajectory. Indeed, although
vaccines are being distributed globally, it is
unclear when daily life will revert to pre-pandemic
times, given the persistence of spikes in cases
worldwide. Furthermore, published literature
reviews about past pandemics have revealed that
quarantining or separating those who may be
infected to minimize the spread of a disease leads
to long-lasting negative psychological effects—a
finding that is important to keep in mind as the
pandemic continues.7 Accordingly, the goal of this
chapter is to advance understanding of how the
COVID-19 pandemic has impacted overall wellbeing and social connection across the globe by
reviewing relevant research published in 2020.

Psychological well-being
during COVID-19
The negative psychological impact of COVID-19
has been observed across the world. In a
U.S. study examining people’s experiences
from January 2020 (N = 1,010) to June 2020
(N = 3,020), reports of happiness and life
satisfaction saw one of the largest declines during
the pandemic, along with mental and physical
health, together with more modest declines in
meaning in life and overall flourishing.8 In a study
that followed about 2,000 respondents in the U.K.
from June 2019 to June 2020, researchers found
that positive emotions (i.e., happy, energetic,
inspired, optimistic, and content) became less
prevalent and some negative emotions (i.e., sad,
stressed, scared, frustrated) worsened during the
initial outbreak in March, but most eventually
recovered to pre-pandemic levels during the
lockdown in May.9 Interestingly, other negative
emotional states actually declined (i.e., loneliness,
apathy) or remained stable (i.e., boredom) during
the month of the outbreak but began rising as
the lockdown progressed.
Although the negative psychological impact of
the COVID-19 pandemic is readily apparent, some
people are doing surprisingly well. In France,
researchers surveyed participants three times
between April 1 and May 6, 2020, and found that
these respondents, especially those who had low
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Protective factors for positive well-being

exposure to the disease, reported increases in
health and well-being during the quarantine,
regardless of income level.10 Other research found
no change in life satisfaction from before to
during the pandemic. In a sample of adults mostly
from the U.S. and U.K. (N = 336), respondents
reported no changes to their life satisfaction from
mid-February to late May 2020.11

Psychological Characteristics. First, a number of
psychological characteristics, such as extraversion,
grit, gratitude, and resilience, have been shown
to be protective factors for well-being during
COVID-19.
Personality. Some researchers have investigated
the role that personality may play in protecting
people’s well-being during the pandemic. A
snowball sampling study that included 516 U.S.
adults who responded to a survey between April
and June 2020 demonstrated that extraversion
was negatively associated with distancing, while
conscientiousness, agreeableness, and neuroticism
were positively related to distancing.12 However,
as distancing behavior increased, extraversion
was related to more positive affect, less negative
affect, and greater life satisfaction. This pattern

Protective factors and risk factors
for positive and negative well-being
In light of the growing research on the pandemic,
particular patterns have emerged about who is
faring better or worse. Here we outline several
protective factors and risk factors for positive
and negative well-being during COVID-19 (see
Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1: Psychological well-being during COVID-19
PROTECTIVE FACTORS

RISK FACTORS

Positive psychological characteristics:
Gratitude, resilience, grit, flow

Intolerance for uncertainty

Personality: Extraversion

Pre-existing mental health conditions:
Clinical diagnosis of depression,
anxiety, & others

Quality of relationships

Engaging in distancing

Connectedness, positivity resonance

Quality of relationships:
Loneliness, poor social support, abuse

Psychological

Social

Quantity of relationships:
Larger social networks

Types of relationships:
Parent, child

Prosocial behavior
Social media use

Social media use

Daily activities:
Physical activity, time outdoors

Online news sources:
Consulting more sources,
more time spent consulting sources

Demographic factors:
Older age

Demographic factors:
Disease risk factors, occupation type

Time Use

Vulnerable groups:
Financial insecurity, food insecurity,
lower SES

Circumstantial
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of results may be accounted for by extraverts
engaging in relatively more online social activities,
such as virtual chatting. Thus, having an extraverted
personality appears to serve as a unique protective
factor for individuals’ well-being during COVID-19.
Positive Psychological Characteristics. Research
also suggests that several positive psychological
characteristics may protect well-being, broadly
defined, during the pandemic. For example, in a
cross-sectional study of 878 community-dwelling
older adults (60 to 80 years old) in Spain surveyed
three weeks after lockdown instructions, the three
variables that showed significant associations
with personal growth and purpose in life were
gratitude, resilience, and good family functioning.13
Accordingly, although older adults are at a higher
risk for contracting COVID-19, those with psychological resources appear to be buffered from
declines in personal growth or purpose in life,
regardless of whether they are “young-old”
(60 to 70) or “old-old” (71 to 80).
Similarly, a study following 86 undergraduates
from before their university’s campus closure
(January 27 to March 10, 2020) to the end of the
semester (April 30 to May 20, 2020) found that
gratitude and grit were associated with greater
well-being, while grit was also associated with
greater resilience.14 Finally, a study of 5,115
participants in China conducted in mid-February
2020 found that, although longer time spent in
quarantine was linked with worse well-being
outcomes, experiencing flow was protective of
well-being.15 The researchers point to the value of
distraction conferred by the experience of flow;
that is, during a time filled with uncertainty, being
absorbed in something neutral or positive during
the pandemic may benefit well-being.
Social Factors. Along with psychological factors,
social factors and social behaviors—including
the quality and quantity of people’s social
relationships—have also been shown to protect
well-being during the pandemic.
Quality of Social Relationships. Researchers
have examined the quality of people’s social
relationships and social interactions during
COVID-19. For example, among a survey of adults
primarily from the U.S. and U.K, increases in the
sense of connectedness from before to during the
pandemic were associated with increases in life

satisfaction, while increases in loneliness were
associated with decreases in life satisfaction.16
Furthermore, a survey of 1,059 participants in
the U.S. (in April and May 2020 for communitydwelling adults and in March and April 2020 for
undergraduates) found that positivity resonance,
or shared feelings of positivity and caring for
another, explained the relationship between trait
resilience and better mental health during the
pandemic.17 Similarly, researchers have found that
higher levels of relatedness (i.e., connectedness)
during COVID-19 were associated with greater
well-being.18 The same research team conducted a
single-timepoint intervention study of 215 MTurk
workers, aimed at increasing psychological needs.
In this study, the sense of relatedness mediated
the relationship between the psychological needs
intervention (i.e., asking participants to provide
instances when they felt a sense of autonomy,
competence, and relatedness during the pandemic)
and mental well-being.
Quantity of Social Relationships. In addition
to the quality of one’s social relationships, the
number of relationships people have access to
during COVID-19 has also been related to wellbeing. In a study of 902 Austrians surveyed once
in late April 2020, researchers found that those
who had larger social networks (i.e., a greater
number of social connections) reported less
stress and worry during the lockdown.19 These
findings suggest that having a team of people
to rely on for support, rather than a specific
close other, may be protective of well-being
during the pandemic.
Prosocial Behavior. Prosocial (or helping)
behavior is a type of social behavior that has
been shown to improve well-being in many
studies before the pandemic.20 Furthermore, prior
research has demonstrated that some people
engage in prosocial behavior when under stress or
during an emergency, such as following Hurricane
Katrina.21 Accordingly, some researchers have
explored helping behavior during the pandemic.
A study of over 50,000 U.K. adults found that
they reported greater life satisfaction on days
in which individuals engaged in volunteering.22
Similarly, 389 Prolific, participants between
April 16 to 17, 2020 and 1,234 Prolific participants
between April 24 to 30, 2020 reported greater
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well-being (i.e., positive affect) after prosocial
spending.23 As such, engaging in prosocial
behavior during the pandemic appears to confer
benefits to well-being.
Researchers have not only explored the effects
of performing prosocial behaviors but of receiving
them. For example, in a survey of 437 U.S. adolescents completed in mid-April 2020, engaging in
prosocial behavior during COVID-19 was associated
with greater anxiety, burdensomeness, and social
responsibility; however, receiving prosocial acts
was associated with fewer depressive symptoms
and greater belongingness.24 This research provides
preliminary evidence that people reach out and
help others during the pandemic when they are
struggling or perceive others as struggling—for
example, when they are perceiving more threat,
experiencing greater anxiety, or feeling the need
to help. By contrast, those who receive support
during the pandemic are higher in well-being and
belongingness.
Other research has explored why people might
choose to engage in prosocial behavior during
the pandemic. In a study that followed 600 U.S.
adults across four weeks (n = 150 at each timepoint) from March 24 to April 14, 2020, individuals
who reported acute anxiety and high physiological
arousal, indicative of higher perceived threat
imminence, reported more prosocial behaviors.25
Furthermore, greater perceived COVID-19 threat
was linked to greater everyday acts of kindness.
Thus, having high perceptions of threat may be
one trigger for engaging in more prosocial behavior
during the pandemic. However, the data in this
study were correlational, and the objects of
people’s reported threat perceptions (i.e., threat
to self vs. threat to others) were unclear. One
possibility is that people help other individuals
when they perceive these others to be at risk for
disease or related adverse outcomes. In sum,
although many are looking for ways to improve
their well-being during the COVID-19 pandemic,
more experimental research needs to be conducted
to identify the optimal prosocial or social
interventions tailored to people’s needs and
challenges during these unprecedented times.
Time Use. Given massive shifts in observed daily
behaviors during COVID-19, studies have begun
to examine specific behaviors in an attempt to

identify which are most strongly related to
well-being.
Social Media Use. Although some research
suggests that engaging with social media may
have adverse effects on well-being, other research
points to the possibility of social media producing
positive outcomes. In a sample of 1,412 participants
from Italy who were recruited online in mid-March
2020, using social media as a way to express
emotions to overcome hardships was related to
post-traumatic growth, which in turn was related
to greater prosocial behavior.26 Furthermore,
perceptions of stronger online social support were
associated with greater well-being, which in turn
was related to greater prosocial behavior as well.
Moreover, research has examined how specific
social networking sites are associated with
well-being; for example, active usage of Instagram
was linked to both greater satisfaction with life
and higher negative affect.27 Thus, more research
on specific social networking sites and their
individual features may better explain their links
to well-being. Relatedly, recent evidence suggests
that interactions that include voice (e.g., phone,
video chat, or voice chat) lead to stronger social
connection compared to those without voice.28
Thus, although more post-pandemic research
is needed, the ways in which one engages with
social media and whether voice is involved
appears to impact whether positive or adverse
outcomes follow.
Daily Activities. Engagement in daily physical
activity has been a recurring theme in recent
research, with more frequent exercise related
to increased well-being during the pandemic.
Interestingly, researchers examining changes in
people’s activities in France, Germany, the U.S.,
and the U.K. (N = 23,210) from before to during
the pandemic via Apple navigation requests,
Google location data, and previously published
survey data found that physical activity was the
only activity that increased consistently in each
country during the pandemic.29 Many other
studies corroborate this finding, showing that
exercising during the pandemic predicts higher
well-being. In a sample of about 600 adults in
Ireland surveyed a day after stay-at-home orders,
those who spent more time outdoors and engaged
in activities such as exercising or going for a walk
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Perceptions of stronger online
social support were associated
with greater well-being, which
in turn was related to greater
prosocial behavior.

reported more positive affect and less negative
affect.30 In a sample of 13,696 participants from
99 countries who were surveyed between March
29 and May 7, 2020, those who exercised nearly
every day during the pandemic reported more
positive moods.31 Similarly, increases in exercising,
as well as gardening, were negatively associated
with depression and anxiety and positively
associated with life satisfaction.32 Thus, it appears
that people may be increasing their exercise
routine during COVID-19, and those who do so
report being happier.
Circumstantial Factors. Along with psychological
and social factors, research has found that
circumstantial factors (i.e., older age) may be
protective of well-being during the pandemic.
Demographic Factors. While a number of
demographic factors have been revealed as risk
factors for worse well-being during the pandemic
(see below), mixed evidence has emerged about
whether age is a risk or protective factor. For
example, in a sample of 945 Americans between
the ages of 18 and 76 assessed in April 2020,
older adults reported relatively greater emotional
well-being, even in a global pandemic.33 More
research is needed to identify whether age is a
risk or protective factor of well-being, as well as
to establish whether other demographic factors
might protect well-being during the pandemic.

Risk factors for negative well-being
Psychological Characteristics. Research has
revealed that two types of psychological
characteristics—namely, intolerance for uncertainty
and pre-existing mental health conditions—appear
to be risk factors for worse well-being during
COVID-19.
Intolerance for Uncertainty. Having an
intolerance for uncertainty or feeling a lack of
control has been shown to produce negative
outcomes during the pandemic. For example, in a
single timepoint study of 1,772 Turkish individuals,
intolerance for uncertainty demonstrated a direct
effect on well-being, with rumination and fear of
COVID-19 serially mediating this relationship.34
As such, because many aspects of the pandemic
have been uncertain (e.g., transmission risk,
availability of a vaccine, duration of antibodies),

those with an intolerance for uncertainty are
reporting particularly poor well-being, especially
if they also tend to ruminate or have fears about
the disease.
Pre-Existing Mental Health Conditions. Those
who have pre-existing mental health conditions
may be especially at risk for worse well-being
during the pandemic. In the study of more than
50,000 U.K. adults surveyed seven times, having
pre-existing mental or physical health conditions
was associated with severe depressive symptoms
(which were prevalent in 11% of the study
population) during the pandemic.35 Similarly, in
the study of 3,077 U.K. adults who were surveyed
three times during the pandemic beginning March
31 to April 9, 2020, those with pre-existing mental
health conditions were more likely to report
worse well-being compared to those without
pre-existing mental health conditions.36 Further
research is needed to replicate these results, as
well as to better understand the unique impacts
of particular types of pre-existing conditions (e.g.,
depression, anxiety, chronic health problems, etc.).
Social Factors. Social factors and social behaviors—
including the extent to which people engage in
distancing behavior and whether they have
high-quality social relationships—have also been
shown to be risk factors for worse well-being
during the pandemic.
Engaging in Distancing. Physical distancing
policies instituted worldwide to mitigate COVID-19
may have adverse impacts on people’s well-being.
For example, in a study with 435 U.S. adults in
March 2020, those who distanced reported
increases in depressive symptoms, generalized
anxiety disorder, intrusive thoughts, and acute
stress.37 Moreover, this effect remained when
accounting for people’s social resources, such
as social support and the size of their social
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late March and late April 2020, among those
experiencing physical abuse, 27% reported severe
depressive symptoms, 22% reported severe
anxiety symptoms, 24% had thoughts of self-harm
or suicide, and 41% reported self-harm behaviors.40
Those experiencing psychological abuse exhibited
similar patterns, albeit to a lesser extent. Similarly,
in the study of more than 50,000 U.K. adults,
experiencing physical or psychological abuse was
associated with severe depressive symptoms.41
Types of Social Relationships. Different types
of social relationships have also been found to
differentially impact people’s well-being during
the pandemic. For example, some parents and
children appear to have experienced diminished
well-being. In a June 2020 study of parents with
children under the age of 18, 27% of parents
personally reported worse well-being, and 14%
reported worse behavioral problems in their
children since March 2020.42 Changes in daily
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networks. Future research could seek to
understand the impact of distancing itself on
well-being, as well as what context, type, duration,
and frequency of distancing is optimal.
Quality of Social Relationships. The quality of
people’s social relationships and social interactions
during the pandemic were also found to be risk
factors for worse well-being and mental health
during COVID-19. For example, increases in
loneliness from before to during the pandemic
were associated with decreases in life satisfaction
among U.S. and U.K. adults.38 Furthermore, in the
study of more than 50,000 U.K. adults, having
poor social support was associated with severe
depressive symptoms (which were prevalent in
11% of the study population).39 Research during
the pandemic has demonstrated that those who
experience relational issues such as abuse (both
physical and psychological) report worse outcomes.
In a study of 44,775 U.K. adults surveyed between
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life prompted by the shift to online learning and
remote work may be especially challenging for
both children and their parents.
Time Use. Studies have begun to identify specific
daily behaviors during COVID-19 that may be risk
factors for worse well-being and mental health
during COVID-19.
Social Media Use. For example, research has
touched on the ramifications of interacting with
social media during COVID-19. In a study of 558
participants living in Wuhan from early February,
those who used social media more often reported
greater depression and secondary trauma.43 In a
different study from China conducted at the
beginning of the pandemic, interacting with social
media more frequently was associated with a
higher likelihood of anxiety and the combination
of both depression and anxiety.44 Parallel data
comes from a study of 6,329 U.S. adults surveyed
in March 2020: those who used social media were
more likely to report relatively greater mental
distress.45 Similarly, a study of 604 adults in
Ireland reported greater negative affect when
using social media.46 Although social connection is
vital in times of stress, such as a global pandemic,
and many may use social media to connect with
others while at a physical distance, research
seems to point to social media having detrimental
psychological outcomes.47
One possibility for why social media has been
associated with worse emotional outcomes during
the pandemic was raised by a study of 17,865 users
of Weibo (a Chinese social media site) in China.
Compared to the language used on Weibo before
the declaration of the pandemic (mid-January,
2020), people used more negative emotion
words, fewer positive emotion words, and fewer
life satisfaction words after the declaration of the
pandemic in China (late-January, 2020).28 Thus,
although reaching out to friends and family over
social media may strengthen connections, the
negative sentiment on social media may make
people who are scrolling through or contributing
to posts feel objectively worse.
Online News Sources. In addition to using
social media, digital news outlets have been a
common way for people to seek out COVID-19related information. Given the myriad of fears
about the pandemic, people may be searching for

ways to gain more control and knowledge of how
to best stay protected.49 However, in a large study
of U.S. adults, those who consulted a larger
number of media sources for COVID-related
information reported greater mental distress.50
Similar evidence comes from the U.K. study of
55,204 adults: Those who spent more time
following COVID-19 news reported greater
depression, more anxiety, and worse life
satisfaction.51 Therefore, research indicates that
consulting news media sources—particularly a
large number of sources and for a longer period
of time—may lead to worse psychological
outcomes. Alternatively, individuals who are
already distressed may be more likely to seek
out information about COVID-19.
Another possibility raised by these studies is
the potential “overdose” of information that may
occur when consulting news on COVID-19. As
previously noted, reducing uncertainty has been
related to well-being benefits during COVID.
However, if one’s behaviors go beyond reducing
uncertainty, such that one consults news outlets
too often, those behaviors may fuel, rather than
alleviate, distress. The process of seeking out
information about COVID may be especially
detrimental given the copious amounts of
conflicting and intimidating information circulating
in mainstream news. Furthermore, COVID-19
misinformation (or “fake news”) appears to be
pervasive in both news outlets and on social
media.52 Thus, researchers have sought to explain
how or why people fall prey to misinformation, as
well as suggesting strategies to combat the
spread of misinformation.53
Circumstantial Factors. Circumstantial or demographic factors have also been found to be risk
factors for worse well-being during COVID-19.
Demographic Factors. Researchers have
identified a number of demographic variables
as risk factors for worse well-being during the
pandemic. For example, a French study of
participants who were surveyed three times
during the pandemic found multiple demographic
risk factors. Those who spent more hours working
from home lived in Paris and were blue-collar
workers (whose COVID-19 rate was 11% compared
to the population average of 6%) reported worse
well-being.54 The researchers noted that the
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health and well-being inequalities found in France
were concentrated among blue-collar workers,
rather than just low-income earners in general,
highlighting occupation-specific inequalities.
Moreover, the low levels of well-being reported
among those living in Paris could have been due
to small living spaces, the lack of green spaces,
and being surrounded by local attractions
(e.g., museums, theatres, cafes) but being unable
to enjoy them.
Vulnerable Groups. A number of populations
are disproportionately experiencing worse
well-being (or greater distress) due to COVID-19.
For example, not surprisingly, those facing
adversities (e.g., financial insecurity, food insecurity,
inability to access proper medication) during the
pandemic may be at greater risk for worse
well-being. In a large sample of 35,784 U.K. adults
surveyed weekly from April 1 to April 28, 2020,
having a larger number of worries about adversities
each week and the actual number of adversities
faced each week were associated with greater
anxiety and depression.55 Parallel findings come
from the study of more than 50,000 U.K. adults,
whereby those with low socioeconomic status
encountered more severe depressive symptoms.56
Furthermore, in another study, people with high
COVID-19 stressor scores coupled with lower
social and economic resources had relatively
greater odds of reporting depressive symptoms.57
It is unclear, however, whether the pandemic is
contributing to and exacerbating the low well-being
of individuals who were experiencing adversities,
abuse, or other forms of suffering before it started,
or whether these experiences are consequences
of the pandemic. Future research is vital to
disentangle the directionality of these effects.58

during the pandemic and what factors might
predict positive and negative changes. For example,
among 654 Prolific participants in a relationship
who were surveyed before (December 2019) and
during the pandemic (March and April 2020),
relationship satisfaction remained unchanged.59
In a study of 500 U.S. adults surveyed between
March 27 and April 5, 2020, people who resided
in areas with stay-at-home restrictions reported
relatively more loneliness; however, describing
COVID as having a great impact on their lives was
associated with less loneliness and greater perceptions of social support.60 A study of over 1,500
participants in the U.S. assessed before and
during the pandemic (i.e., from early February
to mid-March and mid-April, 2020) partially
replicated this finding, such that participants did
not report any changes in loneliness but did
report increases in perceived social support.61
Feelings of connectedness declined slightly in the
sample of undergraduates in Canada surveyed
before and during the pandemic. Still, they felt
connectedness did not change—and loneliness
actually decreased—during the same time period
in a sample of community adults, mostly in the
U.S. and U.K.62

Social connection and loneliness
during COVID-19

Protective factors for social connection
and less loneliness

Given that much of the world has been physically
distancing for the better part of 2020, feelings of
social connection and loneliness during COVID-19
have been a popular topic of study. As such,
similar to work on which factors have predicted
well-being during the pandemic (see above),
parallel research has explored how social
connection and loneliness may have shifted

Protective factors and risk factors for social
connection and loneliness
Similar to the literature on well-being, investigators
have explored the protective and risk factors for
social connection during COVID-19 (see Figure
6.2). In light of research on the importance of
social connection for health and well-being both
before and during the pandemic, understanding
the ways in which social connection may be
promoted or thwarted is essential.63

Psychological Characteristics. Several psychological
characteristics, such as pre-existing mental health
conditions, have been shown to be protective of
social connection and loneliness during COVID-19.
Pre-Existing Mental Health Conditions. Contrary
to expectations, some research has identified
pre-existing mental health conditions as protective
of social connection and loneliness during the
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Figure 6.2: Social connection and loneliness during COVID-19
PROTECTIVE FACTORS
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Pre-existing mental health conditions
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anxiety, & others

Psychological

Social

Engaging in distancing

Engaging in distancing

Features of household:
Living with a partner
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Living alone

Types of relationships:
Family, friends, pets
Prosocial behavior
Using digital media to connect:
If used to cope with loneliness

Time Use

Using digital media to connect:
No access to internet/digital inequality

Daily activities:
Spending more time with family & friends

Demographic factors:
Older age

Demographic factors:
Occupation type, older age
Vulnerable groups: Chronically ill,
children, disadvantaged groups

Circumstantial

pandemic. An investigation of 3,077 U.K. adults
surveyed three times during the pandemic
demonstrated that those with pre-existing mental
health conditions actually decreased in loneliness
over the three waves of data collection.64 This
finding may be accounted for by ceiling effects
for loneliness or by these distressed participants
receiving relatively more attention and social
support. However, more research is needed on
whether and how other mental health conditions,
such as anxiety and substance use disorders,
may put people at risk for loneliness or poor
relationship quality.
Social Factors. Because social connection and
loneliness are inherently social constructs, they
have been found, not surprisingly, to be protected
by a number of social factors during the pandemic.
Engaging in Distancing. One potential source
of changes in social connection is distancing

guidelines, which have confined people to their
homes, limited their in-person social interactions,
and led to the use of electronic meetings as a
substitute. Indeed, most people are abiding
by these guidelines. In a sample of 683 U.S.
adolescents surveyed in March 2020, 98% reported
engaging in at least a little distancing.65 Among
467 Canadian undergraduates and 336 adults
mostly from the U.S. and U.K. surveyed in April
2020, 99% and 93% reported practicing distancing,
respectively.66 However, surprisingly, the correlations
between engaging in distancing and measures of
social connection (i.e., connectedness, loneliness)
were null.67 In light of evidence that social
connection and loneliness have largely remained
unchanged and in some instances have improved—
and that more distancing is not associated
with less felt social connection or with more
loneliness—the worry that physical distancing is
141
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impeding connection for the majority of people
may be unfounded.68 Recent studies suggest that
it may be possible, through the internet and other
means, to maintain social closeness while being
physically separated.
Features of the Household. Social distancing
has forced people to remain in their homes,
sheltering with their household members. In a
sample of 38,217 U.K. participants surveyed
between March 31 and May 10, 2020, those who
lived with others had 75% lower odds of being
lonely compared to those living alone.69 However,
in a pair of studies, household size (including
living alone) was not related to changes in
perceptions of social connection from before to
during the pandemic.70 Similarly, in a study of 888
elderly adults from Lower Austria surveyed once in
Spring 2019 and again in Spring 2020, people living
alone also did not report increases in loneliness.71
Notably, these results may be explained by
self-selection effects, such that individuals who
choose to live alone may have unique personality
characteristics or social resources that help them
weather stay-at-home policies.
However, one feature of household composition
does seem to matter, and that is whether one has
a partner. In the two studies conducted with
undergraduates and community-dwelling adults,
respectively, those living with a partner reported
feeling relatively more socially connected during
the early phases of the pandemic.72 Mirroring
these findings, the study of 1,964 participants
from Prolific found that those who were married
or cohabiting had lower odds of being lonely.73
Cooper and colleagues (2020) assessed social
distancing, personality, and relationships with
household members in a single study. They found
an overall effect, such that the longer people were
social distancing, the higher their relationship
quality with their household members. However,
this effect was pronounced for those higher in
agreeableness; as social distancing increased,
more agreeable people reported better relationship
quality with people in their household, particularly
their children and partners.
Types of Relationships. In addition to the
association between the composition of one’s
household and feelings of connection, researchers
have also examined time spent with specific

people (or pets) and feelings of connection
during COVID-19. For example, in a study of
1,054 Canadian adolescents surveyed between
April 4 to 16, 2020, spending more time with
family and friends was predictive of lower levels
of loneliness.74 Moreover, those who had a larger
group of close friends were 42% less likely to be
in the loneliest group.75
Furthermore, owning a pet during the pandemic
has been shown to be protective for mental
health and a buffer against loneliness. In a study
of 5,926 U.K. adults from April 16 to May 31, 2020,
those who owned a pet indicated smaller increases
in loneliness during the pandemic compared to
those who did not own a pet, regardless of pet
type.76 Similar results were found in a sample of
384 Australian adults between May 5 to 13, 2020,
whereby owning dogs, but not cats, was protective
of loneliness during the pandemic.77 However,
qualitative analyses showed that both dog and
cat owners reported their pets as helping with
their feelings of connection and loneliness during
the pandemic.
Prosocial Behavior. A common way that
people connect with others is by helping or
supporting them.78 In fact, recent research on
prosocial behavior during the pandemic has
revealed improvements in social connection for
those who engage in acts of kindness. For example,
389 Prolific participants recruited on April 16 to 17,
2020, and 1,234 Prolific participants recruited on
April 24 to 30, 2020, reported greater well-being
(i.e., positive affect) after spending money on
others during the pandemic.79 Similarly, a study
from the U.S. and Canada of 1,028 participants
ages 18 to 19 reported that those who engaged in
more prosocial activities (i.e., formal volunteering,
support provision, support receipt) reported
greater social satisfaction on the days in which
these activities occurred.80
Time Use. Given that people around the world
have been encouraged to physically distance,
there are many ways in which people can spend
their time during stay-at-home or lockdown
orders that protect their feelings of social
connection and loneliness.
Using Digital Media to Connect. Because
people are physically distancing, some may be
turning towards digital means to connect with
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lower levels of loneliness.84 A study by Wray-Lake
and colleagues (2020) used latent profile analysis
of how 555 U.S. adolescents spent their time
during a typical day, and they found that support
from family and friends likely influenced how
adolescents spent their time. For example, “media
users” had relatively lower family support but
more friend support, those labeled “educationfocused” had higher family support and lower
friend support, and those labeled “work-focused”
spent relatively more time with friends in person.
Thus, the types of relationships or social support
that people have may influence the kinds of daily
activities they engage in during the pandemic.

others. In a study of 1,374 U.S. adults aged 18 to
82 from April 4 to 8, 2020 (average age = 46),
participants reported increases in digital
communication: 43% increase in texting, 36%
increase in voice calls, 35% increase in social
media, and 30% increase in video calls.81 Those in
the youngest quartile of the sample were more
likely to increase their digital communication use
compared to other age groups. In addition, data
from a Gallup/Knight Foundation survey from
April 14-20, 2020, demonstrated that 74% of users
found social media to be “very” or “moderately”
important for remaining connected with people
they are unable to see during the pandemic. In
the same dataset, women (81%) were more likely
to find social media to be important for connection
in comparison to men (66%).82 Furthermore, in a
study of 2,165 Belgian adolescents surveyed
between April 16-30, 2020, lonely adolescents
were more likely to use social media to cope with
their loneliness.83 Thus, adults and adolescents
appear to be increasing their use of digital media,
including texting and social media, as a means to
connect during the pandemic.
Daily Activities. Researchers have examined
how individuals have been spending their time
during the pandemic and how such time use may
boost social connection and alleviate loneliness.
For example, in a study of 1,054 Canadian
adolescents surveyed between April 4-16, 2020,
spending more time with family, friends and
engaging in physical activity were all predictive of

Circumstantial Factors. Demographic factors—
such as one’s age—may be protective of social
connection and feelings of loneliness.
Demographic Factors. Similar to the research
on age and well-being, mixed evidence has
emerged regarding whether age is a risk or
protective factor for social connection and
loneliness. For example, elderly adults in Lower
Austria revealed a slight increase in loneliness
during the pandemic.85 However, other research
demonstrated that loneliness during COVID-19
has decreased with age, with young adults being
4 to 5 times more likely to be lonely compared
to those who are over 65 years old.86 Thus,
additional research is needed to identify whether
age is a protective or risk factor for social
connection and loneliness.
Risk factors for worse social connection
and loneliness
Psychological Characteristics. Several psychological
characteristics have been shown to be potential
risk factors for worse social connection and
increased loneliness during COVID-19.
Personality. Researchers have investigated
which personality traits—especially extraversion—
may adversely factor in people’s experiences
during the pandemic. In the study that sampled
undergraduates and adults from before to during
the pandemic (i.e., January/February to April
2020), although extraverts fared relatively worse
in terms of felt social connection as the pandemic
got underway, the pattern of results suggested
that they declined more in connection only
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because they started far higher than did introverts
before the pandemic.87 Thus, future work is
needed to determine whether extraversion is truly
a risk factor.
Pre-Existing Mental Health Conditions.
Research during the pandemic has also revealed
that those living with pre-existing mental health
conditions may be at a higher risk for loneliness.
For example, those with clinical levels of major
depressive disorder were nearly twice as likely to
report being lonely during the pandemic, signaling
that such individuals may be disproportionately
affected.88 Similarly, those with mental health
conditions (e.g., clinical depression, anxiety) were
more than five times as likely to fall in the loneliest
group in the sample.89 Thus, pre-existing mental
health conditions present a risk vis-à-vis people’s
sense of social connection and loneliness during
the pandemic.
Social Factors. A number of social factors during
the pandemic have also been revealed as risk
factors for worse social connection and greater
loneliness during COVID-19.
Engaging in Distancing. In most countries,
people have been engaging in distancing behavior.
The reasons reported for engaging in distancing
may shed light on some of the negative experiences observed during the pandemic. The study
of 683 adolescents in the U.S. assessed in late
March 2020 revealed the following reasons for
following distancing guidelines to be most
common: not wanting to become ill, preferring
to stay home regardless of the pandemic, not
wanting to be judged by peers, and pressure from
parents.90 Interestingly, when parents compelled
distancing, the adolescents reported greater
belongingness. However, when the adolescents

Some households may not have
access to Wi-Fi, or older adults
may have trouble navigating
technology, which may put such
individuals at risk both socially
and physically.

were told to distance by peers or when they were
worried about being judged for not distancing,
they reported greater depressive and anxiety
symptoms, respectively. Although these findings
are correlational, they suggest that who instructs
adolescents to keep their distance may impact
their psychological outcomes; thus, this work may
inform how best to communicate important
health practices to maximize adherence, social
connection, and psychological well-being.
Features of the Household. Because lockdown
and distancing measures forced people to shelter
in their homes, whether, with family members,
roommates, in a senior living facility, or alone,
household size has been of interest to researchers
as a factor potentially influencing feelings of
connection or loneliness. Some studies have also
examined how felt social connection has changed
over the course of COVID-19 as a function of the
size of one’s household. Mixed findings have
emerged when examining the relationship between
household size or living alone and reports of
social connection. For example, in a sample of
1964 Prolific participants, living alone was related
to more than double the risk for loneliness, yet in
a sample of 336 Prolific participants, living alone
was unrelated to loneliness.91
Time Use. How people choose to spend their time
in response to distancing recommendations can
serve as risk factors for feelings of reduced social
connection and greater loneliness.
Using Digital Media to Connect. Although
many individuals are using digital media to
connect during COVID-19, it is important to note
that not everyone has access to the internet.
Nguyen and colleagues (2020) addressed digital
inequality, which highlights that some people
did not have the same access to and skills using
the internet before the pandemic, and how
this inequality may be exacerbated during the
pandemic.92 For example, some households may
not have access to Wi-Fi, or older adults may
have trouble navigating technology, which may
put such individuals at risk both socially and
physically. More work should be done to assess
digital inequality during the pandemic and how
it may impact social connection and loneliness
during the pandemic.
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Circumstantial Factors. A number of circumstantial
factors—such as one’s age, occupation, or
membership in a vulnerable group—may increase
the likelihood of worse social connection and
increased feelings of loneliness.
Demographic Factors. Some demographic
variables may put certain people at risk for lower
social connection or greater loneliness. For
example, healthcare workers may be at increased
risk for isolation and stigma because friends and
family may choose to avoid them due to the
increased risk of COVID-19 exposure that their
profession involves.93 In addition, the elderly are
at high risk for contracting the disease and thus,
should practice physical distancing to preserve
their health. However, despite their vulnerability,
some research has shown that they are no more
likely to isolate than any other age group.94 A
study of elderly adults in Lower Austria revealed a
slight increase in loneliness during the pandemic.95
However, research in the U.K. found that adults
between the ages of 18 and 59 were more likely to
be lonely compared to adults 60 and older.96
Future work is needed to reconcile these conflicting
findings with regard to age—for example, by
uncovering critical moderators (e.g., culture,
occupation type, and living situation).x
Vulnerable Groups. Theory and research
suggest that vulnerable populations are especially
at risk for poor connection, social isolation, and
loneliness. Because some individuals were at risk
for social isolation even before the pandemic,
researchers have highlighted specific populations
that must be studied further, such as those living
with a chronic illness. Those with chronic conditions,
such as HIV, tend to have smaller social networks
(even prior to the pandemic) due to social stigma,
leading to isolation; hence, these individuals may
be especially at risk for isolation during the
pandemic.97 Furthermore, a review of the
literature on disease containment strategies from
1946 to 2020 revealed that children are particularly
vulnerable to loneliness and social isolation, which
in turn increases their risk for depression and
anxiety between 3 months to 9 years later.98
Another review of articles published on isolation
during a variety of public health crises (e.g.,
COVID-19, Ebola, SARS) found empirical research
on the impact of social isolation on disadvantaged

and vulnerable groups largely lacking.99 Thus, it is
critical for future researchers to investigate what
factors impact connection in disadvantaged or
vulnerable groups, such as people of color, those
with pre-existing conditions, and marginalized
and low-income individuals.

Future directions
Although a wealth of data is rapidly distributed
and published on people’s psychological experiences during the pandemic, much of the research
has focused on relatively Western, Educated,
Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD)
populations, which limits the generalizability of
these findings.100 As such, future investigators
should strive to replicate the current findings in
BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, and People of Color)
and non-WEIRD populations. Furthermore, by
necessity, most of the research on people’s
responses to COVID-19 is correlational, which
means that several plausible alternative explanations could be advanced for each of the findings
reported here. Researchers may also wish to
explore the many nuances that remain untested,
including how and when such factors interact with
one another as the pandemic progresses, as well
as how they might be moderated by individual
differences or contextual variables.
Moreover, researchers are only beginning to
understand how to improve well-being and
connection during these challenging times.
For example, few interventions have been
conducted during the pandemic with the aim
of making people happier and more socially
connected. Given the need to remain at home,
digitally delivered mental health support
(e.g., via telehealth or with locally trained mental
health providers) and self-administered well-being
interventions (for example, prompting people to
practice mindfulness, gratitude, or kindness may
serve as powerful tools to improve well-being
during the pandemic).101 However, such
interventions need to be validated and tailored
to the realities and challenges specific to
COVID-19. Furthermore, research on the most
vulnerable and disadvantaged populations—
including both cross-sectional research and
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intervention research—is largely lacking, and a
great deal more needs to be done to help those
most at risk.

Conclusion
As the pandemic persists and surges in COVID-19
cases recur, it is critical to continue to closely and
regularly examine the causes, antecedents, and
consequences of shifts in well-being and social
connection in 2021 and beyond. Accumulating
research has shown that the pandemic has led to
increases in negative psychological outcomes,
such as depression and anxiety, for a large portion
of the population. However, many people are
arguably faring better than expected, with some
reporting increases in life satisfaction and felt
social connection. Researchers have identified

multiple factors that may account for individual
differences in well-being and social connection
across the globe, such as seeking out COVID-19
-related information, experiencing flow during the
pandemic, using social media, being from a
vulnerable population, living with a partner, and
having positive psychological characteristics like
gratitude or resilience. However, before effective
interventions to improve well-being and social
connection globally can be recommended, much
more research is needed. With the wealth of
information already published and more on the
horizon, researchers, policymakers, and health
officials must continue to rely on empirical data
to inform interventions and policies that aim to
balance physical health with a focus on maintaining
or boosting the well-being and social connection
of people around the globe.
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The consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic
on economic activity, employment, and our way
of working have been far-reaching. In turn, all of
these shocks have the potential to substantially
impact subjective well-being. Our goal in this
chapter is to outline the various ways in which
the pandemic has affected the global labour
market and the world of work, and investigate
the downstream impacts on workers’ well-being
around the world.
We structure the chapter around five broad
issues. In the first section, we begin by surveying
global changes in employment and working
hours, and highlighting some key inequalities of
impact by country, income, gender, age, and type
of work. The remainder of the chapter focuses on
the well-being implications of these changes. In
the second section, we consider the well-being
impacts of unemployment and labour market
inactivity throughout the pandemic. In the third
section, we turn to the well-being of employees
who have retained their jobs, using a novel dataset of more than four million individuals collected
on an ongoing basis since November 2019. In
the fourth section, we build on this analysis by
investigating the key drivers of worker resilience
during the crisis. In the final section, we speculate
on how the changes to the global labour market
brought on by COVID-19 may influence the future
of work. In doing so, we offer a tentative account
of how workers’ expectations may begin to
change in the aftermath of the pandemic and
how these changes could influence the drivers
of workplace well-being in the years to come.

European countries.2 By December, almost
15 million airline flights had been cancelled, an
average of 50,000 per day.3 While the global
economy began to rebound in the summer, many
countries were gripped by a second wave in the
autumn and winter. A full return to pre-pandemic
levels of stability still appears to be a long way off.
Such dramatic economic downturns have had
profound effects on the global labour market.
As of January 2021, more than 90 percent of
the world’s workforce lived in countries where
business closures were still in place for at least
some sectors.4 Unemployment has also increased
in many countries affected by the COVID-19
crisis, though unemployment figures alone do
not capture the full extent of the labour market
impact for two primary reasons.
First, many workers who have suffered job losses
during the COVID-19 pandemic are not actively
looking to find new jobs, and are therefore classified
as “inactive” or “out of the labour force” in official
statistics.5 Increases in inactivity have, in fact,
outpaced increases in unemployment in a majority
of countries (Figure 7.1).6 For workers who have
recently lost their jobs, finding a new one amid a
recession can be exceedingly difficult. Data from
the international jobs site Indeed.com shows that,
in many countries, the trend in job postings

COVID-19 and the global
labour market
Global growth is estimated to have contracted
by more than 4 percent in 2020, representing
the largest economic crisis in a generation.1 At
the beginning of the year, at the onset of the
pandemic, consumer spending began to decline
dramatically, most notably in retail and recreation.
By April, visits to restaurants, cafes, shopping
centres, theme parks, museums, libraries, and
movie theatres had declined globally by almost
60 percent, and by more than 80 percent in many
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Figure 7.1: Change in employment from 2019 to 2020 (%)
Figure 1: Change in employment from 2019 to 2020 (%)
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rise in inactivity. ** Denotes countries where inactivity decreased, but was overcompensated by the rise in unemployment.
Source: International Labour Organization (ILOSTAT)

plummeted by more than 50 percent in April and
remained well below 2019 trends by the end of
the year (Figure 7.2).
Second, even while still in paid work, many workers
have had to reduce their working hours as a result
of the pandemic. Therefore, looking at declines in
total hours worked offers a complete picture of
the labour market impact of the crisis. According
to the International Labour Organization (ILO),
global working hours declined by 17.3 percent in
the second quarter of 2020.7 This is equivalent to
495 million full-time jobs lost.8 By the end of the

year, total working hour losses were roughly four
times greater than during the Great Recession
in 2009.9 These dramatic reductions in working
hours have been accompanied by equally
dramatic reductions in income. Global labour
income declined by 8.3 percent in 2020, amounting
to a loss of USD 3.7 trillion, or 4.4 percent of
global GDP.10
These changes are likely to have significant
effects on well-being. Most studies generally find
that those who are unemployed are 5 to 15 percent
less satisfied with their lives than those who are
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Figure 7.2: Change in job postings from 2019 to 2020 (%)

Figure 2: Change in job postings from 2019 to 2020 (%)
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Source: Indeed Hiring Lab

employed.11 In the 2017 edition of this report, we
found that unemployed workers are on average
0.6 points less satisfied than counterparts working
full-time on a scale from 0-10.12 In high-income
countries, this difference becomes even larger. In
Western Europe and North America, full-time
workers have been found to be 1.11 and 1.31 points
more satisfied with their lives than those who are
unemployed, respectively.13 Relative to other life
circumstances, becoming unemployed is also less
subject to well-being adaptation over time.14 Yet,
importantly, the relationship between work and

well-being extends beyond simply unemployment.
Past research has documented strong negative
impacts of underemployment, as well as labour
market inactivity. In some analyses, the negative
impact of working hour reductions and inactivity
on life satisfaction is even larger than the negative
impact of becoming unemployed.15
While the labour market impacts of the pandemic
have been almost universally widespread, they
have also been highly unequal. In the sections
that follow, we highlight some key differences of
impact across five dimensions: country, income,
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gender, age, and type of work. In turn, all of these
dimensions feed into the uneven ways the pandemic
has affected well-being across society.
Differences in impact between countries
The global economic impacts of the crisis have
been so far highly unequal, with disproportionate
effects in developing countries. Since March 2020,
workers in lower-middle-income countries have
experienced a 43 percent larger reduction in
working hours and labour income than in highincome countries.16 Informal sector workers, who
make up a considerable portion of the labour force
in developing countries, have been particularly
at risk. Estimates from the ILO suggest that
1.6 billion informal sector workers have seen their
hours decrease since the onset of the pandemic.
In low-income countries, the resulting drop in
earnings is estimated to be 86 percent.17 Workers
in developing countries are generally much less
likely to work remotely, and therefore at higher
risk of losing their jobs and contracting the
disease in their normal work environments.18 Many
governments in low-income countries have also
been financially incapable of providing workers
with sufficient economic relief. As of October
2020, announced fiscal stimulus packages in
low-income countries amount to only 13 percent
of what would be required to offset the total loss
in working hours.19 These trends contribute to
increased labour market instability in many of
the world’s most vulnerable regions.
Even within high-income countries, there are large
differences in the magnitude of the economic
downturn. By the end of June 2020, GDP growth
had decreased by 22 percent in Spain and the
United Kingdom relative to the year before. In
South Korea, Finland, and Norway, this figure was
less than 5 percent.20 In Europe, the economic
consequences of the crisis have been outsized in
countries with already precarious labour market
conditions. Even workers employed in the same
sector face considerably different economic
outlooks. Among those working in food and
accommodation, the risk of losing working hours
at the beginning of the crisis was four times larger
in Spain and Italy than in Denmark or Finland.21
Young and low-skill workers have also been more

likely to lose their jobs or reduce their working
hours in Spain and Ireland than in Denmark or
France (Figure 7.3b-c). Individual-level survey
data collected at the height of the first wave
documents similar cross-country differences in
the United Kingdom, United States, and Germany,
with employment losses being much more
pronounced in the U.K. and U.S.22
While many of these effects have been shaped
by public health policies in each country, labour
market policies have also played an important role.
Many countries have introduced fiscal stimulus
packages to buffer the economic shock. By
October 2020, governments around the world
had promised upwards of USD 9 trillion to mitigate
the negative economic consequences of the
pandemic.23 Where these policies pertain to the
labour market, they are generally aimed at job
retention and/or income replacement. Job retention
schemes strive to keep contracts between
employees and employers intact by alleviating
firms’ labour costs and subsidizing workers for
lost hours. As of May 2020, job retention policies
were supporting more than 50 million jobs in
OECD countries.24 On the other hand, income
replacement schemes aim to provide financial
relief directly to affected workers without explicitly
seeking to maintain employment contracts. This
approach was characteristic of the early response
to the pandemic in the United States.
Generally speaking, countries that have introduced
larger and more comprehensive fiscal stimulus
packages have seen less severe reductions in
working hours.25 However, key differences of
impact across countries have also emerged,
depending on the policy approach adopted.
We will explore these dynamics in greater detail
in the second part of this chapter.
Low-income and low-skill workers
One of the starkest consequences of the crisis has
been the exacerbation of existing socio-economic
inequalities. In almost every European country,
low-income and low-skill workers were more likely
to have reduced their working hours (Figure 7.3a)
or lost their jobs (Figure 7.3b) in the early phases
of the pandemic.26 In Ireland, twice as many
low-income workers reduced their working hours
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relative to high-income workers. In Sweden,
low-skill workers experienced working hour
declines that were almost three times as large as
the national average. Similar trends have been
observed in Japan, the United States, and the
United Kingdom.27 In the U.K., almost one-third
of low-income households had lost more than
20 percent of their earnings by the end of the first
wave, while only one-fifth of high-income households reported the same.28 College-educated
workers in the U.K. were also 6 percent less likely
to have lost their jobs in April relative to lowereducated workers.29 In the United States,
employment rates for low-income workers sunk
by 24 percent as of December 2020. For highincome workers, the recession had practically
ended by the same time, with an observable
increase in employment of 1 percent compared
to the beginning of the year.30
Vulnerable workers were also at greater risk of
experiencing low subjective well-being before the
pandemic took root. Low-income and low-skill
workers are typically less satisfied with their jobs
while also more dependent on them.31 Like many
other dynamics detailed in this chapter, the labour
market impacts of the pandemic have seemed to
fall disproportionally on those already in more
vulnerable positions, to begin with.
Disproportionate effects of the
pandemic on young people
Young people are facing multiple social and
economic shocks resulting from the COVID-19
crisis. Data from the International Labour

Coupled with delays to
education and training programs,
obstacles to finding work,
and increases in loneliness and
social isolation, the COVID-19
pandemic has taken a particularly
dramatic toll on young people’s
well-being.

Organization (ILO) indicates that roughly
178 million young people – 1 in 4 of the global
working population between the ages of 15 and
24 – worked in the hardest-hit sectors when the
pandemic began. Young women, in particular,
make up more than half of youth employment in
food and accommodation. More than 75 percent
of young workers are also informally employed. In
low-income countries, this percentage climbs to
above 90 percent.32
The resulting increases in youth unemployment
and inactivity have been severe. Between February
and July 2020, employment among adults
declined by 5.1 percent, while employment among
young adults fell by 17.4 percent, more than three
times as much.33 In the United States, roughly 1 in
4 young adults were unemployed during the same
period, an increase of 290 percent from the year
before.34 By the end of September, young people
also faced greater than average risks of losing
their jobs in almost every European country
(Figure 7.3c). Rates of inactivity among young
workers have also outpaced corresponding rates
of inactivity among adults in Australia, Canada,
South Korea, and the United States.35 Coupled
with delays to education and training programs,
obstacles to finding work, and increases in
loneliness and social isolation, the COVID-19
pandemic has taken a particularly dramatic toll
on young people’s well-being.36
Gendered impacts of COVID-19
Women have also been particularly vulnerable
to the labour market consequences of the
pandemic. Globally, four in ten employed women
work in sectors that were hard-hit COVID-19,
including travel, retail, food, accommodation, and
services. In low-and middle-income countries,
women are also much more likely to be employed
in domestic work, a sector in which three out of
four workers were at risk of losing their job in
June 2020. At the same time, women are also
overrepresented in certain essential sectors,
including health and social work, exposing
them to greater physical and mental health
risks. In many high-income countries, more than
80 percent of the health workforce is made up
of women.37 Perhaps, as a result, early estimates

160

World Happiness Report 2021

Figure 7.3a: Risk of reduced working
hours by income level (Q2 2020)

Figure 7.3b: Decline in
working hours by skill level
(Q3 2019 – Q3 2020)

Figure 3a: Risk of reduced working hours by
income level (Q2 2020)

Figure 3b: Decline in working hours by skill level
(Q3 2019 to Q3 2020)
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Source: Eurostat (2020)
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Figure 7.3c: Change in
employment rate by age
(Q3 2019 – Q3 2020)

Figure 7.3d: Change in
employment rate by gender
(Q3 2019 – Q3 2020)
Figure 3d: Change in employment rate by gender
(Q3 2019 to Q3 2020)

Figure 3c: Change in employment rate by age
(Q3 2019 to Q3 2020)
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Figure 7.4: Hours spent on active childcare and home schooling on a “typical”
workday in early April 2020
Figure 4: Hours spent on active childcare and home schooling on a
"typical" workday in early April 2020
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Note: The figure shows the average number of hours that men and women reported spending on childcare and
home-schooling across countries for individuals with children who report working from home. 95% confidence
intervals displayed.
Source: Adams-Prassl et al. (2020a)

regarding gender gaps in the ability to work from
home and employment changes have provided
mixed results.38 For example, in Europe, women
were more likely to lose their jobs in Finland,
France, and Belgium, but not in Sweden, Portugal,
or Denmark (Figure 7.3d).
Childcare responsibilities arising as a result of
school closures can also play a role in the reduction
of working mothers’ labour supply.39 Single
parents are particularly at risk, of whom almost
four out of five around the world are women.40
Single mothers were also much more likely to be

socioeconomically disadvantaged before the
pandemic began.41 In the United Kingdom, single
mothers are more likely to work in hard-hit
sectors, less likely to own a house, and less likely
to have access to a car. They have also been much
more likely to reduce their hours or leave the
labour force entirely as a result of the crisis.42 In
the United States – a country in which one in four
children live in single-parent households, the
highest rate globally – single mothers have
been less satisfied with their working hours and
more likely to report low productivity since the
pandemic began.43
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Yet, even among coupled adults, women have
seemed to bear the brunt of the burden. Using panel
data collected in the United States from February
to April 2020, one study found that mothers had
reduced their working hours by two hours per week,
roughly four to five times more than fathers.44
This trend was even more pronounced among
parents with young children and did not seem to
depend on the extent to which either partner
worked from home. In the early phases of the
pandemic, mothers in the U.K., U.S., and Germany
were also spending considerably more time on
childcare than fathers and slightly more time on
home-schooling activities.45 Even among working
parents, large gender gaps in time spent on childcare remain (Figure 7.4).46 However, there is also
evidence to suggest that these gender gaps may
be getting smaller. In many countries, fathers have
also increased time spent on childcare since the
beginning of the pandemic, leading to slight shifts
towards more egalitarian distributions of labour.47

Accommodation, food service, and
temporary workers have been hit hardest
Differences in the extent to which workers can
shift to a home office have become extremely
salient during the pandemic. The ability to work
from home has been an important predictor of job
loss.48 These impacts have also varied considerably
by sector. Accommodation and food service
employees have been particularly hard hit
(Figure 7.5). Workers employed under less secure
work arrangements have also been more likely to
lose their job or suffer earnings losses during the
crisis. One study found that roughly 30 percent
of survey respondents employed under temporary
contracts in the United States and the United
Kingdom had lost their job by early April,
compared to roughly 15 percent of permanent
employees.49 In Europe, workers on temporary
contracts were more likely to lose their jobs in the
second quarter of 2020 than both low-income
and low-skill workers.50

Figure 7.5: Change in employment by sector in the European Union
(Q3 2019 – Q3 2020)
Figure 5: Change in employment by sector in the European Union
(Q3 2019 to Q3 2020)
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Note: Includes data from the EU-27 minus Germany. Sectors broken down by NACE categories.
Source: Eurostat (2021)
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(Un)employment and well-being
during COVID-19
Given the vital role that work plays in our lives,
it is crucial to understand how rising levels of
unemployment and inactivity have impacted
well-being. To address this issue, we use data
from the COVID-19 Behaviour Tracker, a joint
project between Imperial College London and
YouGov, which integrates weekly data on behaviour
and life satisfaction as a response to COVID-19.51
We restrict our analysis to 32 weeks of data,
beginning at the onset of the pandemic, that track
life satisfaction and negative affect on a weekly
basis for a representative sample of respondents
from 29 large economies (n=363,768). Between
April 2020 and January 2021, the average
respondent in these countries ranked their life
satisfaction as 6.3 on a 0 to 10-point scale, with
a standard deviation of 2.0.52

countries, unemployed respondents score
substantially lower on the Cantril Ladder.
On average, the life satisfaction of employed
respondents is 6.4 on a scale from 0 to 10, while
the life satisfaction of unemployed respondents
is markedly lower at 5.2. This is a sizable
difference of 1.2 points, equivalent to 60 percent
of a standard deviation in life satisfaction.55

Figure 7.6: Life satisfaction by
employment status around the
world (2020)
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One of the most robust and well-documented
findings in the economics of subjective well-being
is that the unemployed are significantly less
happy than the employed. Yet, the relationship
between employment and well-being also tends
to be moderated by background labour market
conditions. In times of recession, the negative
impact of unemployment on subjective well-being
is generally less severe – an effect that is usually
attributed to the reduced social stigma associated
with job loss.53 In the present context, the large
increases in unemployment and inactivity due to
the coronavirus may therefore attenuate the
negative impact of being laid off or reducing
working hours. At the same time, workers who
experience hardships associated with COVID-19
and become more unhappy may also become
more likely to resign from work or lose their
jobs.54 This dynamic could lead to even greater
declines in well-being associated with job loss for
vulnerable workers during the pandemic.
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Note: The figure shows average life satisfaction
differences for unemployed and employed adults
(full-time and part-time) across 22 large economies.
Life satisfaction is measured using the Cantril
Ladder on a scale from 0 to 10. The sample includes
respondents aged 18 to 65. 95% confidence
intervals displayed.
Source: YouGov, Imperial College

Figure 7.6 shows the average life satisfaction for
the unemployed compared to those in part-time
or full-time employment, averaged across all
months between April 2020 and January 2021.
In line with previous findings, we find that in all

6.5

Cantril Ladder (0-10)
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status and additional control variables to isolate
the impact of not being able to work during the
pandemic. The reference category in terms of
employment status, in this case, are respondents
working full-time.59 The coefficients in column (1)
show that unemployed respondents’ life satisfaction
is significantly lower than that of people working
full-time throughout this period. Labour market
inactivity – characterised by not having a job and
no longer looking for one – also has a statistically
significant negative effect on life satisfaction.

Figure 7.7 shows how life satisfaction by
employment status varies across gender. When
employed, men and women have very similar
levels of life satisfaction. However, unemployment
appears to decrease men’s happiness more than
women, though the gap varies significantly across
countries. This finding, that men tend to be more
severely affected by unemployment than women,
is largely consistent with prior evidence and
appears not to have been dramatically altered by
the onset of COVID-19.56 In the appendix, we also
plot patterns of life satisfaction and employment
for different age groups.57 Across countries,
middle-aged adults are generally less satisfied
with their lives when unemployed than other
age cohorts, although there are some notable
exceptions, including Brazil, India, and Mexico.58
In Table 7.1, we estimate a linear regression model
in which life satisfaction is regressed on employment

In column (2), we add into the equation a set of
individual characteristics, including age, gender,
household size, and parenthood status. In column
(3), we add two variables indicating trust in the
national healthcare system and trust in the national
government.60 Finally, in column (4), we add a
series of health-related control variables, including
the presence of any pre-existing conditions,

Figure 7.7: Life satisfaction by employment status and gender (2020)
Figure 7: Life satisfaction by employment status and gender (2020)
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Table 7.1: Determinants of life satisfaction during the COVID-19 pandemic
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Cantril Ladder (0-10)
Full-time (reference)
Unemployed
Inactive

-1.376***

-1.349***

-1.321***

(0.069)

(0.066)

(0.066)

(0.063)

-0.703***

-0.788***

-0.769***

-0.732***

(0.111)

(0.108)

(0.107)

(0.097)

-0.175*

-0.159*

-0.204**

(0.084)

(0.086)

(0.086)

-0.000

0.007

-0.027

(0.039)

(0.039)

(0.039)

18-24
25-34

-1.300***

35-44 (reference)
45-54
55-64

0.011

-0.003

0.023

(0.045)

(0.045)

(0.045)

0.194**

0.160*

0.219**

(0.080)

(0.080)

(0.081)

0.606***

0.576***

0.647***

(0.169)

(0.165)

(0.166)

Male

-0.129***

-0.124***

-0.122***

(0.025)

(0.027)

(0.026)

Live alone

-0.449***

-0.441***

-0.438***

(0.039)

(0.040)

(0.035)

Parent

0.249***

0.240***

0.248***

65+

(0.044)

(0.041)

Trust in health system

(0.045)

0.397***

0.352***

(0.024)

(0.023)

Trust in government

0.296***

0.265***

(0.047)

(0.044)

Health controls

No

No

No

Yes

Country fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Week fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6.490***

6.586***

6.131***

6.616***

(0.022)

(0.059)

(0.076)

(0.091)

Constant

Mean dependent var

6.183

6.183

6.183

6.183

Observations

97613

97613

97613

97613

R-squared

0.102

0.116

0.134

0.151

Note: Regressions are estimated using OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis,
adjusted for clustering at the country level. Health controls include presence of pre-existing conditions, individual and
household COVID-19 status, ability to isolate, and willingness to isolate. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
Source: YouGov, Imperial College
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whether or not the respondent or anyone else in
the household has tested positive for COVID-19,
ability to isolate, and willingness to isolate. Overall,
we find highly consistent associations between
unemployment, inactivity, and subjective wellbeing. Once the full suite of control variables is
added, we find that, relative to full-time workers,
unemployment predicts a 1.3-point decline in life
satisfaction, while inactivity predicts a 0.7-point
decline on a scale from 0 to 10. These effects
render employment status one of the most
important predictors of subjective well-being
during the COVID-19 crisis across countries.
Negative affect and employment status
In this section, we consider the association
between employment status and negative affect.
Our dataset records responses along four
dimensions: depression, anxiety, worry, and lack
of interest in daily activities. Responses to each
negative affect question are recorded on a scale
from 0 to 3, where higher values correspond to
higher levels of negative affect.61 Responses to
these four questions are then aggregated to
provide an overall assessment of negative affect
on a scale from 0 to 12, with a mean value of 3.7.
Disaggregated regressions for each dimension
are also provided in the appendix.62
Table 7.2 shows how variation in negative affect
is explained by employment status, personal
characteristics, trust in institutions, health status,
and country and week fixed effects. Those who
report being unemployed or inactive during the
pandemic report significantly higher levels of
negative affect than those who are employed on
a full-time basis. The standard deviation of the
negative affect index variable is about 3.3 on a 0
to 12-point scale, indicating that the coefficients
on unemployment and inactivity are both
statistically and meaningfully significant. Even
after including an extensive set of controls,
unemployed respondents score 1.2 points
(0.4 standard deviations) higher in negative
affect than full-time workers, while those who
are out of the labour force report negative
affect scores that are 0.67 points (0.2 standard
deviations) higher.

Age, gender, and employment
status during COVID-19
Given the unequal impacts of the crisis, it is worth
commenting on differential well-being impacts of
unemployment by age and gender. First, we find
that every age group reported higher levels of
life satisfaction than young people (18-24) during
the pandemic, a difference that also seems to
increase with age (Table 7.1). Related research
conducted during COVID-19 has documented
similar decreases in life satisfaction among young
people.63 These trends are notably different from
past studies before the crisis, which tend to track
a U-shape curve in life satisfaction over the life
course.64 At the same time, we also find that
young people have seemed to experience higher
levels of negative affect than older adults
(Table 7.2). Taken together, this evidence
suggests that young people’s subjective wellbeing has been dramatically impacted by the
onset of the pandemic, more so than almost
any other age group.
However, in the appendix, we provide evidence
that the effect of unemployment on life satisfaction
and on negative affect has been comparatively
smaller for young people than for older adults
throughout the crisis.65 Instead, we observe
particularly pronounced effects of unemployment
on well-being for those middle-aged and older.
This could indicate that young people may expect
the difficulties in finding work to pass once the
pandemic has subsided, while older adults who
have lost their job in the midst of COVID-19 may
be less optimistic.66 While we observe slight
increases in the impact of inactivity on negative
affect for middle-aged adults relative to young
people, these differences prove to be only
marginally significant.
In line with previous studies, we also find that
the effects of unemployment on life satisfaction
for men have been more severe than for women
throughout the pandemic.67 Labour market
inactivity has also seemed to reduce life
satisfaction more for men than for women, to
an even greater extent than the gendered impact
of unemployment.68
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Table 7.2: Determinants of negative affect during the COVID-19 pandemic
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Negative affect (0-12)
Full-time (reference)
Unemployed
Inactive

1.354***

1.257***

1.213***

(0.113)

(0.107)

(0.107)

(0.092)

0.736***

0.753***

0.724***

0.663***

(0.185)

1.204***

(0.194)

(0.193)

(0.159)

18-24

0.831***

0.812***

0.776***

(0.071)

(0.071)

(0.068)

25-34

0.448***

0.437***

0.424***

(0.057)

(0.058)

(0.056)

-0.325***

-0.304***

-0.355***

(0.077)

(0.077)

(0.077)

-0.731***

-0.680***

-0.846***

(0.107)

(0.104)

(0.106)

65+

-1.127***

-1.082***

-1.302***

(0.151)

(0.147)

(0.156)

Male

-0.370***

-0.375***

-0.441***

35-44 (reference)
45-54
55-64

Live alone
Parent

(0.071)

(0.064)

(0.058)

0.371***

0.362***

0.337***

(0.072)

(0.075)

(0.064)

0.122**

0.134**

0.009

(0.053)

(0.049)

(0.036)

-0.660***

-0.565***

Trust in health system
Trust in government

(0.062)

(0.051)

-0.375***

-0.327***

(0.084)

(0.079)

Health controls

No

No

No

Yes

Country fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Week fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

3.603***

4.163***

4.853***

3.790***

(0.039)

(0.100)

(0.065)

(0.102)

Mean dependent var

3.903

3.903

3.903

3.903

Observations

91981

91981

91981

91981

R-squared

0.041

0.067

0.081

0.127

Constant

Note: Regressions are estimated using OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis,
adjusted for clustering at the country level. Health controls include presence of pre-existing conditions, individual and
household COVID-19 status, ability to isolate, and willingness to isolate. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
Source: YouGov, Imperial College
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Parenthood and unemployment
In Table 7A.4 in the appendix, we also consider
the impacts of unemployment and inactivity on
life satisfaction for adults with and without
children. First, it is worth noting that both men
and women with children have generally reported
higher levels of life satisfaction than non-parents
throughout the crisis.69 However, the interactions of
parenthood and unemployment on life satisfaction
prove to be insignificant. In other words, we do
not find strong evidence that having children
exacerbated the impact of unemployment on life
satisfaction during the pandemic.
However, we do observe that having children in
the household can mitigate the negative impact
of inactivity on life satisfaction. While the overall
impact of inactivity is still negative, men and
women with children seemed to have experienced
less severe reductions in life satisfaction as a
result of being out of the labour force than those
without children. This dynamic may suggest that
adults with children who have left the labour
market due to the pandemic have been able to
spend more time with their children at home,
thereby attenuating the negative effects of the
crisis on life satisfaction.
We also find that, while having children predicts
higher levels of negative affect for both men and
women, having children does diminish the affective
impact of unemployment for men and inactivity
for women. Overall, we find that men without
children experience a sharper uptick in negative
affect as a result of unemployment and inactivity
than any other group under consideration.70
Labour market policy responses
to COVID-19 and well-being
While most governments have adopted measures
to protect workers from labour market shocks
related to COVID-19, there has been a large
degree of variation in the responses and policy
packages implemented by different countries.
Following our discussion in earlier sections, we
distinguish between policies focused on job
retention, which aim to keep workers employed in
their jobs, and interventions focused on income
replacement, aiming to top up lost wages without
necessarily maintaining employment contracts.

Alongside their economic effects, these strategies
are also expected to have differential effects on
subjective well-being. Most importantly, income
replacement schemes are not designed to address
the non-pecuniary aspects of work. While
maintaining a sustainable source of income is
undeniably important to well-being, employed
workers also benefit from a broad range of
non-monetary rewards. Jobs can provide a
source of meaning, community, and social status.
Therefore, job retention policies are likely
preferable to income replacement policies from
a well-being perspective, as the former are better
poised to keep these non-financial advantages
of employment intact.
In this section, we look at three large economies
that have adopted different labour market policies:
Germany, which focused on job retention using
short-time work schemes; the United Kingdom,
which focused on job retention using wage
subsidy schemes; and the United States, which
focused largely on income replacement.
In Germany, workers have benefited from
Kurzarbeit, a long-running program that allows
employers to reduce their employees’ working
hours up to 100 percent, with the state covering
all or most of the difference in lost wages. In
March 2020, the German government expanded
access to the program and loosened the eligibility
criteria so that more businesses would be able to
apply for benefits. Governments in the United
Kingdom and the United States also introduced
relief packages to assist workers, though they
have generally been more restrictive.71 In the U.K.,
the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme allowed
firms to furlough workers for up to three months
while replacing 80 percent of employees’ lost
wages, for up to £2,500 per month. However,
unlike the German Kurzarbeit, furloughed workers
were not allowed to undertake any work for their
employers in the initial phase of the program.72
From July 2020 onwards, this policy was adjusted
to allow employees to work part-time. In the
United States, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security (CARES) Act included provisions
to subsidize firms’ labour costs, although few
firms took up the program. The program’s rollout
was limited by administrative bottlenecks, lack of
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awareness, weak financial incentives, and caps on
reductions in working hours.73 In practice, the
United States relief effort functioned much more
effectively as an income replacement scheme.
Initially, unemployment benefits were increased to
$600 per week for four months, and households
earning under $75,000 per year were sent onetime direct payments of $1,200, plus an extra
$500 per child. Likely as a result of these divergent
approaches, rates of unemployment and inactivity
increased much more in the United States than in
the United Kingdom or Germany.74
To consider the well-being implications of these
approaches, we plot national averages of life
satisfaction (Figure 7.8a) and negative affect
(Figure 7.8b) for all three countries starting in
April 2020.75 Data for the United States extends
until mid-September, while data for the United
Kingdom and Germany extends through December.
For both Germany and the U.K., we see slight
increases in life satisfaction from April onwards
followed by slight decreases as both countries
entered second waves of infections in autumn.
However, while Germany never drops below initial

record levels, the trend in the U.K. becomes
increasingly negative towards the end of the
summer. Both trends are also dramatically different
than the United States, which sees a steep linear
decline in life satisfaction throughout the spring
and summer. In September, respondents in the
U.S. rated their life satisfaction to be 0.2 points
lower than Germany, even though the former
reported higher levels of life satisfaction at the
start of the pandemic in April.
In terms of negative affect, we see a sharp
divergence between Germany and the United
States, and the United Kingdom. Respondents in
the latter two countries not only reported higher
levels of negative affect, to begin with, but also
seemed to experience steeper increases as time
went on. By September, negative affect had
increased by 10 percent in the United States and
6 percent in the United Kingdom. In Germany,
negative affect had decreased by 2 percent by
the same time. However, Germany then began to
experience increases in negative affect towards
the end of the year, while negative affect in the
United Kingdom began to steadily decline.

Figure 7.8a: Life satisfaction
over time (0–10)

Figure 7.8b: Negative affect over
time (0–12)

Figure 8a: Life satisfaction over time (0-10)

Figure 8b: Negative affect over time (0-12)

6.5

3.9

6.4

3.7

6.3

3.5

6.2
6.1

3.3

6.0
3.1

5.9
5.8

2.9

5.7

2.7

5.6

United Kingdom

20
27
-J
ul
-2
27
0
-A
ug
-2
0
27
-S
ep
-2
27
0
-O
ct
-2
27
0
-N
ov
-2
27
0
-D
ec
-2
0

un
-

27
-J

0
-2
pr

27
-M

27
-A

United States

ay
-2

20
27
-J
ul
-2
27
0
-A
ug
-2
0
27
-S
ep
-2
27
0
-O
ct
-2
27
0
-N
ov
-2
27
0
-D
ec
-2
0

0

un
-

27
-J

0
-2

ay
-2

pr

27
-M

27
-A

Germany

0

2.5

5.5

Germany

United Kingdom

Note: Lowess lines of best fit plotted from national averages and displayed using a bandwidth of 0.8.
Source: YouGov, Imperial College

172

United States

World Happiness Report 2021

While this analysis does not allow for causal
interpretations, it does suggest that Germany and
the United Kingdom, both of which adopted
policies aimed at job retention, have been better
able to withstand the negative well-being impacts
of the pandemic than the United States.

Employee well-being during the
COVID-19 pandemic
Thus far, we have mostly considered the wellbeing impacts of unemployment and inactivity. In
this section, we turn our focus to those who have
remained employed. The landscape of work has
changed dramatically as a result of COVID-19.
Many workers have begun working from home,
while others have had to reduce their working
hours. At the same time, employees in key
professions may have seen their workload increase
dramatically, while being exposed to additional
workplace stressors and health risks. Changes to
workplace conditions and cultures brought on by
the crisis are likely to have long-lasting impacts.
Many of the world’s largest companies, including
Google, Facebook, Twitter, Amazon, and Viacom,
have announced plans to allow employees to
continue working remotely after the pandemic has
subsided.76 Therefore, it is crucial to understand
how employees have fared in this new world of
work, and what these effects may tell us about
the future of work.
For those remaining at work, how was their
well-being affected?
In this section, we consider the evolution of
worker well-being throughout the pandemic thus
far. To do so, we make use of a novel proprietary
dataset set collected in the United States.
Beginning in November 2019, the jobs website
Indeed.com has been collecting data on employee
happiness in an effort to assist jobseekers in their
job search and decision-making process by
providing them with company reviews from
current and former employees. Since then, the
company has amassed a very large and growing
depository of data on workplace happiness in the
United States, with over 5 million individual
responses so far.

The great benefit of this unique dataset is its
sheer size. Even over a relatively short period,
such a large number of observations allows for a
granular look at workplace happiness across
companies, locations, and time. However, because
users decide for themselves whether or not to use
the site and whether or not to review the company
they currently work for, the sample is, of course,
not a random or nationally representative one.
Average estimates of workplace happiness may
be biased if, for example, very happy or very
disgruntled employees are more motivated to fill
in the survey. However, to the extent that these
potential sources of bias are evenly distributed
across companies and over time, it may nevertheless be instructive to observe trends in the evolution
of workplace happiness during the pandemic.
Since users can review companies they currently
and formerly work for, we limit the sample for
our purposes here to include only a subset of
respondents who we are most confident currently
work for the company they are reviewing. In this
case, we are primarily concerned with the extent
to which respondents agree with the following
statement: “I feel happy at work most of the time.”
Responses are recorded from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 5 (strongly agree).77 This number is then
rescaled by Indeed to provide an overall indication
of workplace happiness from 0 to 100.78
In order to study the evolution of workplace
happiness over time, we first plot average daily
happiness using the raw data in Figure 7.9,
overlayed with a local regression (or “lowess”)
line of best fit. We find that workplace happiness
declined throughout January and February, as the
beginnings of the crisis unfolded. This downward
trend reaches its bottom and levels out around
the time that the federal government declared a
national state of emergency, and various state and
local governments began to impose stay-at-home
orders. Perhaps counterintuitively, workplace
happiness then proceeded to increase, reaching
the year’s high around the time $1,200 stimulus
checks were mailed out to recipients in mid-April
as a result of the CARES Act.
Given our dataset’s limitations, it is impossible for
us to say exactly why workplace happiness
increased following the state of emergency
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Figure 7.9: Happiness at work in the United States during the COVID-19 pandemic
Figure 9: Happiness at work in the United States during the COVID-19 pandemic
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declaration and remains open to future research.
One conjecture is that the uncertainty of a rapidly
unfolding crisis was eased once local governments
began to respond to the severity of the crisis with
policy measures, and many people were ordered
to stay home. During this period, the federal
government also began negotiating a stimulus
package, which may have helped to soothe
some workers’ fears of job loss and provided the
reassurance of an eventual cash stimulus payment.
In the final sections of this chapter, we present
related evidence that happiness levels reached
their lowest point in the United Kingdom just
before lockdowns were implemented, after which
they began to recover. Taken together, this may

suggest that uncertainty and anticipation effects
could have had stronger negative effects on
well-being than government policy throughout
the crisis.
Another possibility is more mechanical. As we
have seen elsewhere in this chapter, this phase
of increasing workplace happiness in March and
April coincided with an unprecedented and
precipitous rise in unemployment.79 It is worth
re-iterating that ours is not a measure of average
workforce happiness, but only of average
happiness for those currently employed. As a
result, we are only observing those who remain in
work – the “survivors” in this period. This changing
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composition of the sample may account for at
least some of the observed changes in happiness.
For example, (a) happier workers may have been
more likely to retain their jobs in any given
occupation or industry, (b) higher wage (and
generally happier) industries were less acutely
affected, (c) workers’ reference groups may have
changed, and/or (d) workers remaining employed
may have been more able to work from home in
the first place, and therefore less negatively
affected by workplace closures.80 Given the
limitations of our data, we cannot easily distinguish
between these potential explanations.
Workplace happiness then began to decline after
the initial boost in March and April. Interestingly,
the lowest point of the year was not when a
national emergency was declared, but later in the
year, once workers’ resilience ostensibly began to
wear off and the long-haul nature of the pandemic
became a reality. Happiness levels continued to
erode in autumn and still had not recovered by
the end of the year. This is notable since, by
autumn, employment levels among high-wage
workers had fully returned to pre-pandemic levels

in the United States, while employment levels for
middle-wage workers and especially low-wage
workers remained well below the baseline.81
Inasmuch as this changing composition of the
national workforce is reflected in our sample, the
fact that happiness levels did not increase even as
high-wage workers were increasingly re-hired is
worth highlighting. The lack of a summer recovery
in happiness levels is also somewhat at odds with
trends observed in other countries, including the
United Kingdom and Germany.82 However, while
many European countries experienced declines in
COVID-19 cases after the first wave in the spring,
the United States experienced an even more
dramatic second wave throughout the summer
months. Nevertheless, it is again important to
stress that these explanations should be interpreted
with caution because the sample is not randomly
collected or nationally representative. It remains
possible that at least some of the observed
changes in happiness may be attributable to
changes in data collection procedures.83 Future
research using more traditional academic and
government data sources may begin to shed
more light on these dynamics.
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Drivers of employee well-being in times of crisis
Alongside the happiness question, survey
respondents on Indeed.com were also asked
about eleven “drivers” of workplace well-being as
part of the company reviewing process.84 In this
section, we use this data to consider how job and
workplace characteristics shaped employee
well-being throughout the course of the pandemic.
We look at the extent to which workers (1) feel
they achieve their goals at work, (2) have a clear
sense of purpose, (3) feel appreciated, (4) feel a
sense of belonging, (5) have the time and location
flexibility they need, (6) work in an inclusive and
respectful environment, (7) learn at work, (8) have
a manager who helps them succeed, (9) are paid
fairly, (10) feel supported, and (11) trust their
colleagues.85 Our intention in this section is not
only to assess the degree to which of these
drivers are correlated with workplace happiness,
but also to consider if and to what extent their
importance has shifted throughout the course of
the pandemic.
To this end, we again restrict the sample to
include only respondents who we are confident
are currently employed at the company they are
reviewing. In Table 7.3, we regress workplace
happiness (measured on a scale from 0 to 100) on
this set of eleven drivers (each one of which we
z-score to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation
of 1). We use data recorded prior to March 1, 2020,
and after April 1, 2020.86 We create an indicator
variable for the period after the onset of COVID-19
– i.e., after April 1 – and interact it with each
driver.87 Finally, we include a battery of fixed
effects, including the date of survey completion,
company, occupation, where the respondent
clicked through to the survey, and state.88 To help
visualize these dynamics, coefficients associated
with each driver are plotted on a month-to-month
basis in Figure 7.10.89
While all of the eleven drivers are significantly
related to happiness, we can also observe a number
of changes in the strength of these correlations
as the year progressed.90 We note two broad
developments here. First, more eudaimonic
drivers of workplace happiness – achievement,
purpose, and learning at work – appear to have
declined in importance.91 Amid rising unemployment
176

Table 7.3: Drivers of happiness at
work before and after the onset of
the COVID-19 in the United States
Happiness at work (0-100)

Coef.

Std. Err.

Achieve

1.679***

(0.027)

Purpose

2.883***

(0.033)

Learn

1.717***

(0.032)

Flexibility

5.014***

(0.026)

Paid fairly

2.311***

(0.025)

Manager

0.857***

(0.036)

Support

2.287***

(0.043)

Appreciate

1.599***

(0.042)

Trust

2.154***

(0.044)

Belonging

6.063***

(0.045)

Inclusive

3.530***

(0.038)

COVID x Achieve

-0.124***

(0.048)

COVID x Purpose

-0.184***

(0.059)

COVID x Learn

-0.159***

(0.056)

COVID x Flexibility

0.158***

(0.047)

COVID x Paid fairly

-0.019

(0.044)

COVID x Manager

0.246***

(0.064)

COVID x Support

0.089

(0.077)

COVID x Appreciate

0.017

(0.075)

COVID x Trust

0.013

(0.079)

COVID x Belonging

0.082

(0.081)

COVID x Inclusive

0.093

(0.069)

Constant

69.428*** (0.013)

Mean dependent var

70.30

Observations

968,363

R-squared

0.836

Note: Dependent variable is workplace happiness
on a 0-100 scale. All explanatory variables are
z-scored to have a mean of 0 and standard
deviation of 1. Standard errors reported in
parentheses. Data is drawn from Indeed.com
company surveys and restricted to include
currently employed respondents. “COVID”
represents a dummy variable for April, May,
and June 2020; the omitted category is
December 2019, January, and February 2020.
The regression includes fixed effects for company,
occupation, date, U.S. state, and review page
source.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
Source: Indeed.com
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and shifts to remote working environments, this
may suggest that employees have come to value
their work for more fundamental reasons during
the pandemic and may simply be happy to have a
reliable source of income. These developments
may also have long-term consequences. For

example, there is an intriguing possibility that
young people who come of age during this crisis
may be more likely to prioritize financial security
than job meaning or purpose as they enter the
workforce. We will return to this issue in the final
section of this chapter.

Figure 7.10: Drivers of happiness at work before and after the onset of COVID-19
in the U.S. (monthly)
Figure 10: Drivers of hapiness at work before and afer the onset of COVID -19 in the U.S. (monthly)
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The drivers of workplace
well-being have generally
remained constant since
the onset of COVID-19.
Even in turbulent times,
the well-being of workers is
highly dependent on consistent
and fundamental drivers.
The second notable development is that, as the
pandemic worsened, flexible work schedules and
supportive management have become even
more important. With ever-changing workplace
restrictions, it may be unsurprising that workers
have come to value time and location flexibility
more than ever before. Yet, the role of managers
has also increased in importance to an even greater
degree. Past research suggests that the more
employees work from home, the more likely they
are to depend on their supervisors’ frequent
contact.92 Since the onset of the crisis, many
workers have reported feeling unprepared to fulfil
their responsibilities, again underscoring the need
for good communication between managers and
employees.93 Our analysis in this section reflects
these trends.
However, despite these modest changes, it is
worth noting that the drivers of workplace
well-being have generally remained constant
since the onset of COVID-19. Even in turbulent
times, the well-being of workers is highly
dependent on consistent and fundamental
drivers. As a result, organizations that cultivate
workplace environments to foster and sustain
these drivers in good times may also be better
prepared to withstand labour market shocks
and support employee well-being in times of
economic uncertainty.

Resilience
As documented in earlier sections, the consequences of the pandemic on the global labour
market have been unequally shared. Yet even for
workers faced with similar prospects and labour
market outcomes, some have been better able to
maintain high levels of well-being than others. To
better understand the determinants of worker
resilience throughout the crisis, in this section,
we will focus on the United Kingdom using
two longitudinal datasets. The first is a weekly
quasi-panel study surveying representative
samples of the British public from January to
December 2020, provided by YouGov.94 The
second is a weekly panel study surveying
respondents over time from April to December
2020, provided by University College London.95
White- and blue-collar workers
In this section, using data provided by the YouGov
Weekly Tracker, we consider the happiness
trajectories of white- and blue-collar workers
who remained employed throughout the crisis.
White-collar workers include managers, senior
administrators, higher technical workers, professionals, and clerical workers. Blue-collar workers
include those performing skilled or unskilled
manual labour. In Figure 7.11, we plot the percent
of each group reporting feeling happy in the
previous week.96 Dotted vertical lines indicate
national lockdowns implemented in the United
Kingdom on March 23 and November 5.97
First, it is worth noting the consistent gap in
happiness levels between white- and blue-collar
workers. From January to March of 2020, roughly
12 percent more white-collar workers reported
feeling happy than blue workers, a gap that
widened to 14 percent from April to December,
on average. However, the size of this gap also
varied throughout the year, with the smallest
differences recorded at the time of the first and
second lockdowns.
In line with previous results reported in this
chapter, both groups’ happiness levels also began
to decline dramatically in February and March,
before the first national lockdown was implemented.
Both declines are roughly comparable, reaching
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lows of 35 percent for white-collar workers and
31 percent for blue-collar workers. Beginning in
April, happiness levels began to steadily rebound
for both groups, although white-collar workers
recovered faster than blue-collar workers after the
first wave. Whereas 40 percent of white-collar
workers reported feeling happy by mid-April, it
took another six weeks for blue-collar workers to
reach the same milestone. This upward trend
continued throughout the summer until both
groups had almost fully recovered to baseline
levels in August. However, fewer workers in both
groups then began to report feeling happy in the
period leading up to the second lockdown. These
drops were again roughly proportional, though in
this case, a higher percentage of white-collar
workers seem to have been affected than
blue-collar workers.
While we can’t rule out the possibility that
survivorship bias may again drive some of the

happiness recoveries after the first wave, this
dynamic may be expected to affect both groups
of workers equally. Overall, this analysis would
suggest that, at least among these two groups,
the government response to coronavirus was not
responsible for the most severe drops in employee
well-being. Rather, anxieties relating to the spread
of the virus itself, anticipated future lockdowns,
or uncertain employment prospects seem more
likely to be driving declines in happiness
throughout the pandemic.98
Social support protects against the negative
impact of being unable to work
Earlier in this chapter, we found that having
children seemed to protect against some of the
negative well-being impacts of not having a job
during the pandemic, especially for men. However,
while rates of unemployment and inactivity have
certainly increased in many countries worldwide,

Figure 7.11: Changes in happiness for workers during COVID-19
in the United Kingdom
Figure 11: Changes in happiness for workers during COVID-19 in the United Kingdom
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the crisis has also resulted in many more subtle
labour market effects. Even for workers who have
not lost their jobs, many have been unable to
work for short periods of time due to virus
infections or exposure, to take care of loved ones,
or because workplace closures or restrictions
temporarily prevented them from doing so. How
these workers have fared throughout the crisis is
crucial to understanding the full well-being
impact of COVID-19. In this section, we will again
focus on the United Kingdom using data provided
by the UCL Social Study, a longitudinal panel
documenting changes in social behaviour and
mental health in the U.K. since April 2020.

Scale.99 We limit the sample to those employed
at the beginning of the survey period and split
respondents into two groups, one containing
respondents who report rarely feeling lonely and
the other containing respondents who report
often feeling lonely.100 Throughout the pandemic,
respondents in the U.K. who were not lonely
reported average life satisfaction scores of 7.0 on
a scale from 0 to 10, while those who were lonely
reported average scores of 4.9 points. In other
words, non-lonely respondents were roughly 43
percent more satisfied with their lives than lonely
respondents, representing a substantial difference
in quality of life.

As has been documented in numerous editions
of this report, social connection has consistently
proven to be one of the essential drivers of
subjective well-being. Here we consider social
connection in terms of subjective loneliness
assessed using the three-item UCLA Loneliness

Feeling isolated may also make it more difficult
to deal with negative life events. In Figure 7.12, we
document changes in life satisfaction for lonely
and non-lonely respondents in the eight weeks
before and after the first time in the survey period
where they reported being unable to work.101

Figure 7.12: Life satisfaction changes before and after work stoppage in the U.K.
Figure 12: Life satisfaction changes before and after work stoppage in the U.K.
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Table 7.4: Effect of work stoppage on life satisfaction by loneliness
Full sample

Full sample

Not lonely

Lonely

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.330***

-0.278***

-0.275***

-0.379***

(0.020)

(0.026)

(0.026)

(0.030)

Life satisfaction (0-10)
Stop work
Stop work x Lonely

-0.101***
(0.039)

Constant

Mean dependent var
Observations
R-squared

5.653***

5.652***

6.254***

4.808***

(0.029)

(0.029)

(0.034)

(0.051)

6.173

6.173

6.173

6.173

407187

407187

240682

166505

0.039

0.039

0.045

0.038

Note: Fixed effects regression controlling for individual and week fixed effects. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level are reported in parenthesis. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
Source: UCL COVID-19 Social Study

roughly one third to 0.38 points for lonely
respondents. Taken together, this evidence
suggests that social support networks can help to
buffer against the negative impacts of hard times.

In the weeks leading up to the work stoppage,
we notice a potential anticipation effect for both
groups, as life satisfaction levels begin to decline
steadily. However, for lonely respondents, this
drop becomes substantially larger than for
non-lonely respondents. By the time they stopped
working, lonely respondents’ life satisfaction had
dropped by 15 percent of its baseline level, while
the life satisfaction of non-lonely respondents had
declined by 9 percent. Feeling lonely also seems
to predict a slower pace of recovery. While we
do not observe full adaptation for either group,
non-lonely respondents had recovered to
95 percent of their baseline life satisfaction five
weeks later. Lonely respondents had still not
reached this milestone eight weeks on.

Impact of furloughing on subjective well-being
In response to the economic consequences of the
pandemic, many governments introduced labour
market legislation to protect workers against
reductions in working hours and losses in income. As
discussed earlier, the United Kingdom government
enabled firms to furlough workers for up to three
months while replacing 80 percent of employees’
lost wages for up to £2,500 per month. However,
until July 2020, to receive these benefits, workers
could not undertake any paid work for their
employers. In this section, we consider the potential
well-being impacts of this scheme. In this case, we
limit our sample to include workers who were
employed part-time or full-time at the beginning
of the survey period, but then stopped working
entirely and were either (a) furloughed without
any income loss, (b) furloughed with income loss,
or (c) stopped work without being furloughed
at all.102

To further investigate these dynamics, in Table 7.4,
we consider the effect of stopping work on life
satisfaction using fixed effects regressions controlling for individual and time fixed effects. We
find significant and meaningful differences between
the impact of work stoppages for lonely and
non-lonely respondents. While not being able to
work reduces life satisfaction by 0.28 points for
those who are not lonely, this figure rises by
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In Figure 7.13, we plot average changes in life
satisfaction levels for all three groups of workers
four weeks before and after stopping work for
the first time in the survey period. Regardless
of furlough status or income loss, all groups
of workers appear to suffer a decline in life
satisfaction when unable to work. However, for
workers who are furloughed without any income
losses, this decline never exceeds 6 percent. On
the other hand, the life satisfaction of furloughed
and non-furloughed workers with income losses
drops by 10 and 21 percent, respectively.
Moreover, only furloughed workers without any
income loss achieve full adaptation four weeks
later. This may suggest that furlough schemes in
which wages are replaced in full protect the
well-being of affected workers better than those
with only partial income replacement.

Table 7.5 expands this analysis by estimating
the effect of stopping work on life satisfaction
depending on furlough status and income losses
using a fixed effects regression controlling for
individual and week fixed effects.103 Once again,
we find that stopping work has a negative impact
on life satisfaction, regardless of furlough status
or income losses.104 Even for workers who suffered
no income losses due to being furloughed, their
life satisfaction declined by 0.39 points relative to
those who were able to continue working. These
dynamics again indicate that the relationship
between work and well-being extends beyond
pecuniary benefits alone. This would also seem to
run counter to classic tenets of economic theory,
which understand the relationship between
employment and welfare exclusively in terms of
financial compensation. From this perspective,
workers who stopped working without any lost
income should not only have experienced no

Figure 7.13: Life satisfaction changes before and after work stoppage in the U.K.
depending on furlough status
Figure 13: Life satisfaction changes before and after work stoppage in the
United Kingdom depending on furlough status
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provide some indication. Using longitudinal data
on more than 20,000 workers in the United States
from 1973 to 2014, one analysis found that young
people who come of age in worse macroeconomic
conditions are more likely to value financial
security than job meaning throughout their
careers.105 Early evidence from the initial phase of
the current crisis also suggests that young people
who experienced health and financial losses
resulting from the pandemic were more likely to
report career uncertainty and financial worry.106
While it is still too early to tell, the pandemic’s
impact on this generation of young people may
result in a shifting landscape of work values and
expectations in the years to come.

Table 7.5: Impacts of stopping
work depending on furloughing
Life satisfaction (0-10)

Coef.

Std. Err.

Stopped work, furloughed,
no income loss

-0.393**

(0.154)

Stopped work, furloughed,
income loss

-0.538***

(0.154)

Stopped work,
not furloughed, income loss

-0.546***

(0.119)

5.681***

(0.217)

Did not stop work (reference)

Constant
Mean dependent var
Observations
R-squared

6.221
154,978
0.029

Note: Fixed effects regression controlling for
individual and week fixed effects. Heteroskedastic
robust standard errors clustered at the individual
level are reported in parenthesis.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
Source: UCL COVID-19 Social Study

decline in welfare but actually experienced a
welfare gain. We do not observe this to be the
case. However, we do find suggestive evidence
that workers who suffered no income losses as a
result of being furloughed were better off than
workers who did. Yet, these differences are mostly
within the margin of error.

Lessons for the “future of work”
Throughout this chapter, we have documented
stark labour market impacts brought on by the
coronavirus crisis and their impact on workers’
well-being. While the crisis itself might end soon,
its impact on the global world of work may well
endure. In the wake of the crisis, it is possible that
some workers may begin to look for jobs that are
more meaningful and that have strong social
support networks, while others may begin to
prioritize earnings and job security. The dynamics
of these effects are difficult to predict, though
documented changes in labour market expectations
in the aftermath of previous recessions may

In the short term, perhaps the most salient
change brought on by the pandemic has been the
need to work from home for those who can. As is
the case in most other countries, the fraction of
the workforce homeworking in the United Kingdom
stood at one fourth in October 2020, down from
about half during the first lockdown, but far
above the pre-pandemic level of just 5 percent.107
While workers have reported slight productivity
declines during the crisis, they have also
experienced immediate benefits such as greater
autonomy and avoiding the commute (and the
expenses associated with it).108
Sensing a workplace revolution, some companies
have already decided to get rid of their offices
entirely.109 However, this risks overlooking important
potential negative impacts of homeworking
full-time. This shift could undermine social and
intellectual capital, which may harm companies
and their employees in the long-term. In this
context, social and intellectual capital can be
visualised as stocks that are slowly being depleted
when working mostly from home. These stocks
are normally replenished by new in-flows of
people, places, and ideas. For workers, social and
intellectual capital is built by shared experiences
with co-workers and unplanned social interactions
that broaden one’s thinking. While past research
has found some clear benefits in productivity for
home workers, they also found that they are more
likely to be overlooked for promotion—a clear
indication of the need to build social capital with
colleagues.110
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Moving forward, it will be
important to maintain the
benefits of working from home
while still enabling employees
and companies to build
and sustain their social and
intellectual capital.
Building meaningful relationships with co-workers, especially management, is critical to job and
life satisfaction. Working from home all the time
does not allow for that to the same extent as the
office.111 Work itself represents more than a pay
check – it is a large part of many people’s identity.
Prior research suggests that when somebody
loses their job, half of the negative impact on
well-being stems not from the loss of income but
from the loss of social ties, identity, and routine
that come with a job.112 In this chapter, we found
that during the pandemic, workers who were
furloughed with full income replacement still

suffered significant well-being losses relative to
those who were able to remain at work. While the
pandemic’s labour market shock will eventually
subside, the drive for social connection and social
support at work is unlikely to.
Moving forward, it will be important to maintain
the benefits of working from home while still
enabling employees and companies to build and
sustain their social and intellectual capital.
Throughout the pandemic, flexibility has become
an even more important driver of workplace
well-being than it already was. Even working at
the office one or two days a week can provide
people with the network, routine, and identity
needed to support well-being. A flexible homeworking model that still affords employees
opportunities to network, collaborate, and
socialise in person could provide the necessary
in-flows of social and intellectual capital and lead
to large productivity dividends.113 These and other
insights derived from applied well-being science
can help societies build back better in the
post-pandemic world.
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others? Answers to all three questions are aggregated to
give an overall indication of loneliness on a 6-point scale
from 3 to 9. For more information, see: Hughes et al. (2004).

84	Further questions on job satisfaction, stress, and purpose
were added toward the end of the year, and will likely
provide key insights on further dimensions of subjective
well-being in the workplace in the future.

100	In this case, the sample includes respondents who are
employed full-time, part-time, or self-employed. We
consider respondents to be “not lonely” if they have an
index score of 3 throughout the course of the study period,
and lonely if they report a score of 7 or higher at least once.
In the appendix, we provide an additional robustness check
with respondents grouped by baseline loneliness levels
instead of maximum loneliness levels, and find highly
consistent results. For more information, see Figure 7A.8
and Table 7A.5 in the appendix.

85	Each driver is again measured on a 5-point Likert scale
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95	University College London (2020). The COVID-19
Social Study is funded by the Nuffield Foundation
[WEL/FR-000022583], but the views expressed are those
of the authors and not necessarily the Foundation. The
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Mental Health Network, funded by the Cross-Disciplinary
Mental Health Network Plus initiative supported by the U.K.
Research and Innovation [ES/S002588/1], and by the
Wellcome Trust [221400/Z/20/Z].
96	Happiness is measured using the following question:
“Broadly speaking, which of the following best describe
your mood and/or how you have felt in the past week.
Please select all that apply.” In the appendix, we also plot
normalized response relative to a baseline average in
January 2020 to illustrate relative changes in happiness
levels throughout the course of the pandemic (Figure 7A.5).
In subsequent graphs, we overlay rises in unemployment
(Figure 7A.6), and provide the absolute difference in
happiness between white- and blue-collar workers
(Figure 7A.7).

102	For those who are not furloughed with income loss, it
seems likely that they have lost their jobs entirely. However,
given the nature of the question this variable is based on,
we cannot rule out the possibility that these workers may
still have maintained an employment contract with their
original employer, but have not enrolled in any furlough
scheme and are now not working without pay.
103	Because demographic controls including marital status,
educational attainment, and age were only recorded once
in the baseline survey, they do not vary over time and are
therefore do not need to be added as separate controls
since they are captured by the individual fixed effect.
104	While we cannot rule out the possibility that workers who
have stopped work and been furloughed may also have
received financial support from other means, in the
appendix we provide an additional robustness check that
produces largely similar results even after excluding
respondents from the sample who report receiving
additional financial help (Table 7A.6).
105 Cotofan et al. (2020).
106 Giurge et al. (forthcoming).
107 Cameron (2020); Gibbs (2020); Watson (2020).
108 Morikawa (2020); Lee & Tipoe (2020).
109 Lebowitz (2020).
110 Bloom et al. (2015).
111 Krekel et al. (2020).
112 Bloom et al. (2015).
113 Davis et al. (2021).

97 See Figure 7A.5 in the appendix.
98	This finding – that lockdowns have generally not been
responsible for the largest declines in well-being throughout
the crisis – is also supported by related research using
YouGov and Google Trends data for a variety of countries
(Foa et al., 2020).
99	The UCLA Loneliness Scale is measured using the following
three questions, scored on a three-point scale from “hardly
ever,” “some of the time,” and “often”: (1) How often do you
feel that you lack companionship? (2) How often do you
feel left out? (3) How often do you feel isolated from
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Most accounts of well-being focus on the
experience of the living. But, if we are to
judge the overall welfare of a country, we
must also consider how long people live.
This is vital

Some key assumptions

In following this approach, we are
making four key assumptions. The first
is that well-being is measured like
weight — the difference between 3 and
4 is the same as the difference between
7 and 8. There is good evidence that
when people answer questions, they do
it in this way.3 The second is that people
who are dead score 0. To validate this,
researchers are beginning to ask people
what point on the scale is as bad as
being dead. So far, there is no strong
evidence against assuming the answer
is 0.4 Third, in evaluating the changes
produced by a policy, we shall ignore
the changes in the objective, which
results from changes in the number of
births. Thus, we are focusing essentially
on WELLBYs per person born. Finally,
we are simply adding up well-being
experience, as Bentham recommended,
without giving extra weight to the
prevalence of misery. We do this because
choosing such weights is an ethical
issue on which people differ, though
individual policymakers may wish to
use them.

• whenever we want to evaluate a policy
change, and
• when we want to compare how different
countries are doing.
In this chapter, we tackle four major questions:
•H
 ow can we combine the length of life and
its quality into a single metric?
• How can we use this metric for policy?
• What does this metric show about the
performance of different countries?
•W
 hat does this metric imply for the monetary
equivalent of a life lost?

The WELLBY approach
The well-being approach to these issues is simple.
People want to live well, and they want to live
long. Therefore, we should judge a society by the
extent to which it enables people to experience
lives that are long and full of well-being. For any
individual, the measure of this is simply the
well-being she experiences each year summed
up over all the years that she lives.

(1)

A natural name for the well-being experienced
over one year is a Well-Being-Year (or WELLBY).1
What we want to maximise, across people in all
present and future generations, is their number of
future WELLBYs - with one qualification. Things
that happen in the future are increasingly uncertain
the further we look, and we, therefore, apply a
“pure time discount rate,” δ.2 Thus

(1)

(2)

(3)

𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 =

∑∑
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊!" (1 − 𝛿𝛿)"
𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡

This concept of the role of the state goes back
to the 18th Century Enlightenment.5 As Thomas
Jefferson put it, “The care of human life and
happiness… is the sole legitimate object of good
government.” We shall revert to the policy in more
detail later on. But before that, we shall look at
how different countries are doing when we take the
length of life into account (as well as well-being).

where i is the individual and t is the number of
= 𝑌𝑌" a scale of
years ahead.
Well-being
is measured
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
" = 𝑊𝑊"on
0-10. In proceeding in this way, we are making a
number of key assumptions, which are summarised
in the box.
∆ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
∆ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 ∆ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
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=
+
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
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The performance of nations

(1)

To do this, we focus on the present rather than
the future, and this requires a slightly different
metric. For clearly, it is not easy to measure
the length of life at one moment in time. But
demographers have a clever way of doing it. They
do not calculate the prospects of each cohort
born. Instead, they construct a snapshot of
mortality rates at each age in the current year.
Thus the “expectation of life” today is how long
someone born now could expect to live if her
chance of dying at each age was the same as that
experienced this year by people of that age. This
roots the calculations of life expectancy in data
from the current year. We can do the same with
our measure of well-being.
Hence the measure of national social welfare
∑∑
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊
− 𝛿𝛿)"the
today
is average
current=well-being
(W̄!")(1
times
𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡
6
expectation of years (Y) of life:

(2)
(2)

=" 𝑌𝑌"
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 " = 𝑊𝑊

but life expectancy increased by nearly four years
up to 2017-19 (we shall come to 2020 later). The
rate of progress differed a lot across regions.
The biggest improvements in life expectancy
were in the former Soviet Union, in Asia, and (the
greatest) in Sub-Saharan Africa. And these were
the regions that had the biggest increases in
WELLBYs. In Asia, the exception is South Asia,
where India has experienced a remarkable fall
in Well-being which more than outweighs its
improved life expectancy. Life expectancy grew
slowest in North America, which also had a
substantial fall in well-being — hence an overall
fall in WELLBYs. The other area where well-being
fell was the Middle East/North Africa, and that
area also experienced a fall in WELLBYs.
One thing is clear. Since 2006-08 there has been
a huge reduction in the inequality of social
welfare between countries. This is not because
well-being has become more equal — it has not,
due to the huge fall in well-being in India. But life
expectancy has become much more equal, and
the seven years increase in sub-Saharan Africa is
truly remarkable.

So how does taking a length of life into account in
Coming to 2020, life expectancy fell substantially.
this way change our ranking of countries? And
In the first year of COVID-19, two million people
(3)
countries∆have
been
doing the∆best
in terms
∆ which
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
died of the disease — an increase of some 3.4%
= they have achieved +
of the𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
changes,
welfare?
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 in social
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
in deaths worldwide. But most of the deaths
have been among older people, so the fall in life
In Table 8.1, we present the ranking of countries
expectancy is much less than 3.4%. In the USA,
according to their level of WELLBYs per person in
2017-19. Remarkably, the top 11 countries in terms of which had a high death rate, one estimate is that
WELLBYs are the same as the top 11 in Well-being. life expectancy fell by one year in 2020.7 Similar
(4)
This is because life expectancy is so similar across estimates have been made for Britain, which has
also had a high death rate.8 But, even if the fall in
the top0.3
19 ∆or
so countries. At the
very top is ∆ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
∆ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
log(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺/𝑁𝑁)
1.2 ∆ 𝑢𝑢
= both in Well-being
− and in WELLBYs.
+
life expectancy in 2020 worldwide were as much
Finland,
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 Again,
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
as one year, this would not altogether undo the
at the bottom, the lowest 11 countries in terms of
gain of 3.7 years over the preceding decade.
WELLBYs include most of those, which are also
lowest in well-being. Overall, the correlation
So, sticking with 2020, what can be said about
across countries between well-being and WELLBYs
the change in overall social welfare? It will have
is 0.97 (while that between life expectancy and
fallen if the proportional fall in life expectancy
WELLBYs is 0.87). So adding in the length of life
exceeded the proportional rise in average
makes little difference to the ranking of countries
well-being.9 As Chapter 2 showed, estimated
by well-being, with which we are already familiar.
well-being fell in half the countries of the world
and rose in the other half. But life expectancy
However, adding in the length of life transforms
probably fell in most countries. Not a good year.
our understanding of human progress over time.
Since 2006-08, world well-being has been static,
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Table 8.1: WELLBYs per person, average well-being and life expectancy, 2006–08
to 2017–19: by region and country
WELLBY

Wellbeing

Life Expectancy

2006–08

2017–19

∆

2006–08

2017–19

∆

2006–08

2017–19

∆

World

368.7

373.6

4.9

5.4

5.2

-0.2

68.7

72.4

3.7

North America, Australia & New
Zealand

576.3

555.7

-20.6

7.3

7

-0.3

78.6

79.5

1

Latin America and Caribbean

455.2

463.2

8

6.2

6.1

-0.1

73.4

75.3

2

Western Europe

550.3

561.3

11

6.9

6.8

0

80.3

82.2

1.9

Central and Eastern Europe

402

468.2

66.3

5.4

6.1

0.7

74.6

77.4

2.8

352.4

393.2

40.8

5.2

5.4

0.2

67.5

72.2

4.7

Southeast Asia

354.3

390.8

36.5

5.1

5.4

0.3

69.4

72.5

3.1

East Asia

368.8

407.6

38.8

4.9

5.2

0.3

74.8

77.8

3.1

Commonwealth of Independent
States

South Asia

334

278

-56

5.1

4

-1.1

65.7

69.5

3.8

Middle East and North Africa

380

363.9

-16

5.3

4.9

-0.4

71.9

74.6

2.7

240.2

271.3

31.1

4.5

4.5

0

53.6

60.7

7.1

Finland

609.4

638.3

28.8

7.7

7.8

0.1

79.4

81.7

2.3

Switzerland

610.2

632.1

22.0

7.5

7.6

0.1

81.6

83.6

2.0

Sub-Saharan Africa
By country

Iceland

560.6

621.8

61.2

6.9

7.5

0.6

81.4

82.9

1.5

Denmark

620.3

617.6

-2.7

7.9

7.6

-0.3

78.5

80.8

2.3
1.8

Norway

605.5

616.1

10.6

7.5

7.5

0.0

80.5

82.3

Netherlands

603.3

611.9

8.6

7.5

7.4

-0.1

80.0

82.1

2.1

Sweden

597.4

607.8

10.3

7.4

7.4

0.0

81.0

82.7

1.7
1.9

Australia

591.6

601.5

9.9

7.3

7.2

0.0

81.4

83.3

New Zealand

596.0

599.7

3.7

7.4

7.3

-0.1

80.2

82.1

1.9

Canada

603.7

595.4

-8.3

7.5

7.2

-0.3

80.7

82.3

1.6

Austria

572.3

594.1

21.8

7.2

7.3

0.1

80.0

81.4

1.4

Israel

573.0

590.4

17.5

7.1

7.1

0.0

80.8

82.8

2.0

Ireland

584.5

582.2

-2.3

7.4

7.1

-0.3

79.5

82.1

2.6

United Kingdom

548.7

582.1

33.4

6.9

7.2

0.3

79.6

81.2

1.7

Germany

515.1

574.4

59.3

6.5

7.1

0.6

79.6

81.2

1.6

Costa Rica

558.1

570.4

12.3

7.1

7.1

0.0

78.4

80.1

1.7

Belgium

569.4

559.2

-10.2

7.2

6.9

-0.3

79.4

81.5

2.0

France

549.2

550.0

0.9

6.8

6.7

-0.1

80.8

82.5

1.7

Czech Republic

499.4

547.5

48.1

6.5

6.9

0.4

76.8

79.2

2.4
0.8

United States

572.1

547.2

-24.8

7.3

6.9

-0.4

78.1

78.9

Spain

579.4

534.0

-45.4

7.1

6.4

-0.7

81.1

83.4

2.3

Italy

543.5

532.3

-11.1

6.7

6.4

-0.3

81.4

83.3

2.0

Singapore

538.4

532.2

-6.2

6.6

6.4

-0.3

81.0

83.5

2.4

United Arab Emirates

510.2

527.9

17.7

6.7

6.8

0.1

75.8

77.8

2.0

Taiwan Province of China

458.3

518.2

59.9

5.9

6.5

0.6

78.1

80.3

2.2

Slovenia

455.3

516.3

61.0

5.8

6.4

0.5

78.4

81.2

2.8

Uruguay

435.7

500.5

64.8

5.7

6.4

0.7

76.2

77.8

1.5

Chile

456.9

498.9

42.0

5.9

6.2

0.4

78.1

80.0

1.9

Cyprus

492.3

497.8

5.5

6.2

6.2

-0.1

78.9

80.8

1.9

Japan

501.6

495.9

-5.7

6.1

5.9

-0.2

82.6

84.5

1.9

Panama

507.0

494.4

-12.7

6.7

6.3

-0.3

76.2

78.3

2.1

South Korea

435.5

486.4

50.9

5.5

5.9

0.4

79.2

82.8

3.6

Slovakia

393.3

486.1

92.8

5.3

6.3

1.0

74.7

77.4

2.7

Poland

444.6

485.7

41.2

5.9

6.2

0.3

75.5

78.5

3.0

Mexico

502.4

484.8

-17.7

6.7

6.5

-0.2

75.2

75.0

-0.3

Portugal

439.9

483.7

43.8

5.6

5.9

0.3

79.1

81.9

2.7

Saudi Arabia

517.2

480.3

-36.9

7.0

6.4

-0.6

73.5

75.0

1.5

Brazil

472.4

478.6

6.2

6.5

6.3

-0.2

72.6

75.7

3.1
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Table 8.1: WELLBYs per person, average well-being and life expectancy, 2006–08
to 2017–19: by region and country continued
WELLBY

Colombia

Wellbeing

Life Expectancy

2006–08

2017–19

∆

2006–08

2017–19

∆

2006–08

2017–19

∆

456.7

475.3

18.6

6.1

6.2

0.1

74.7

77.1

2.4

Guatemala

437.6

474.3

36.7

6.2

6.4

0.2

70.4

74.1

3.6

Estonia

396.4

473.0

76.6

5.4

6.0

0.6

73.6

78.6

4.9
3.8

Lithuania

415.3

470.7

55.3

5.8

6.2

0.4

72.0

75.7

Hong Kong S.A.R. of China

438.4

466.7

28.3

5.3

5.5

0.2

82.3

84.7

2.3

Romania

393.5

464.9

71.4

5.4

6.1

0.7

73.0

75.9

3.0

El Salvador

380.7

463.8

83.1

5.4

6.3

0.9

70.5

73.1

2.6

Thailand

420.6

460.8

40.2

5.8

6.0

0.2

72.9

76.9

4.0

Hungary

364.9

460.2

95.3

5.0

6.0

1.0

73.7

76.7

3.0

Kuwait

448.5

459.9

11.5

6.1

6.1

0.0

73.8

75.4

1.6

Argentina

457.4

457.0

-0.4

6.1

6.0

-0.1

74.8

76.5

1.7

Nicaragua

346.6

455.8

109.1

4.8

6.1

1.3

71.7

74.3

2.6

Ecuador

380.4

455.1

74.6

5.1

5.9

0.8

74.5

76.8

2.3

Trinidad and Tobago

446.1

454.3

8.3

6.3

6.2

-0.1

71.2

73.4

2.2

Greece

531.3

451.7

-79.7

6.6

5.5

-1.1

79.9

82.1

2.1

Uzbekistan

363.4

448.0

84.6

5.3

6.3

1.0

68.9

71.6

2.6
3.5

Latvia

346.7

447.2

100.5

4.8

5.9

1.1

71.6

75.2

Honduras

384.8

447.0

62.1

5.3

6.0

0.6

72.5

75.1

2.5

Peru

371.4

443.5

72.1

5.1

5.8

0.7

73.5

76.5

3.0

Kazakhstan

375.4

443.1

67.7

5.7

6.1

0.4

65.9

73.2

7.3

Jamaica

460.2

438.0

-22.1

6.2

5.9

-0.3

74.1

74.4

0.2

Bosnia and Herzegovina

369.9

437.6

67.7

4.9

5.7

0.8

75.5

77.3

1.8

Serbia

348.2

437.4

89.2

4.8

5.8

1.0

73.3

75.8

2.5

Croatia

442.2

431.0

-11.1

5.8

5.5

-0.3

76.0

78.3

2.4

Montenegro

385.2

426.1

40.9

5.2

5.6

0.4

74.1

76.8

2.6

Paraguay

374.0

421.3

47.2

5.2

5.7

0.5

72.1

74.1

2.1

Philippines

331.4

420.2

88.8

4.8

5.9

1.1

69.4

71.1

1.7

Dominican Republic

356.8

419.7

63.0

5.0

5.7

0.7

71.3

73.9

2.6

Belarus

385.7

412.8

27.1

5.6

5.5

0.0

69.1

74.6

5.4
4.8

Bolivia

360.8

409.4

48.6

5.4

5.7

0.3

66.4

71.2

Malaysia

445.0

409.1

-35.9

6.0

5.4

-0.6

73.9

76.0

2.1

Turkey

393.4

404.3

11.0

5.4

5.2

-0.1

73.2

77.4

4.2

Moldova

350.3

402.4

52.1

5.1

5.6

0.5

68.3

71.8

3.5

Russia

352.1

401.4

49.3

5.3

5.5

0.3

66.8

72.4

5.5
0.9

Vietnam

402.0

400.2

-1.9

5.4

5.3

-0.1

74.5

75.3

Tajikistan

316.8

396.7

79.9

4.7

5.6

0.9

67.4

70.9

3.5

Kyrgyzstan

316.9

394.9

78.0

4.7

5.5

0.8

67.5

71.3

3.8

China

349.9

393.1

43.2

4.8

5.1

0.4

73.6

76.7

3.1

Macedonia

333.4

390.8

57.4

4.5

5.2

0.7

74.2

75.7

1.5
2.8

Albania

350.6

382.8

32.2

4.6

4.9

0.2

75.7

78.5

Bulgaria

280.9

382.2

101.3

3.8

5.1

1.3

73.1

74.9

1.9

Mongolia

300.3

380.1

79.7

4.6

5.5

0.9

66.0

69.7

3.7

Pakistan

324.9

379.3

54.4

5.0

5.7

0.6

64.4

67.1

2.7

Lebanon

358.8

377.2

18.4

4.6

4.8

0.2

77.6

78.9

1.3

Azerbaijan

328.1

376.3

48.2

4.7

5.2

0.5

69.7

72.9

3.1

Indonesia

337.4

376.2

38.8

5.0

5.3

0.3

68.1

71.5

3.4

Venezuela

466.6

364.5

-102.1

6.4

5.1

-1.3

73.0

72.1

-0.9

Iran

380.1

356.9

-23.2

5.2

4.7

-0.6

72.6

76.5

3.8

Nepal

303.8

354.6

50.8

4.6

5.0

0.4

66.3

70.5

4.2

Armenia

335.6

350.4

14.8

4.6

4.7

0.1

72.8

74.9

2.1

Jordan

383.9

344.7

-39.2

5.3

4.6

-0.6

72.9

74.4

1.5
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Table 8.1: WELLBYs per person, average well-being and life expectancy, 2006–08
to 2017–19: by region and country continued
WELLBY

Georgia

Wellbeing

Life Expectancy

2006–08

2017–19

∆

2006–08

2017–19

∆

2006–08

2017–19

∆

272.2

343.5

71.2

3.8

4.7

0.8

70.8

73.6

2.8

Cambodia

262.7

341.0

78.3

4.1

4.9

0.8

64.7

69.6

4.9

Senegal

285.4

337.0

51.6

4.6

5.0

0.4

62.1

67.7

5.5

Iraq

312.8

336.8

24.0

4.6

4.8

0.2

68.2

70.5

2.3

Palestinian Territories

319.7

336.6

16.9

4.4

4.6

0.1

72.4

73.9

1.5

Bangladesh

319.8

335.6

15.8

4.7

4.6

0.0

68.6

72.3

3.7

Sri Lanka

329.9

332.3

2.4

4.4

4.3

-0.1

75.0

76.8

1.8

Ghana

293.1

328.5

35.4

4.9

5.2

0.2

59.7

63.8

4.0

Ukraine

344.9

328.0

-16.9

5.1

4.6

-0.5

67.9

72.0

4.0

Benin

203.8

320.7

116.9

3.5

5.2

1.7

58.2

61.5

3.2

South Africa

284.2

307.1

22.9

5.2

4.8

-0.4

54.5

63.8

9.3

Niger

224.5

305.6

81.1

4.1

4.9

0.8

55.0

62.0

7.0

Kenya

245.3

304.0

58.6

4.3

4.6

0.3

57.4

66.3

8.9

Cameroon

223.6

299.7

76.1

4.2

5.1

0.9

53.7

58.9

5.2

Egypt

355.0

293.6

-61.4

5.1

4.1

-1.0

69.8

71.8

2.0

Burkina Faso

213.2

291.9

78.7

3.9

4.8

0.9

54.8

61.2

6.3

Liberia

227.1

290.5

63.4

4.0

4.6

0.6

57.3

63.7

6.4

Namibia

257.3

289.6

32.3

4.9

4.6

-0.3

52.7

63.4

10.7

Mauritania

259.4

283.5

24.1

4.2

4.4

0.2

61.8

64.7

2.9

Uganda

229.2

278.5

49.3

4.3

4.4

0.2

53.9

63.0

9.1

Mozambique

239.2

277.8

38.6

4.7

4.6

-0.1

51.0

60.1

9.2

Mali

217.6

277.6

60.1

4.1

4.7

0.7

53.5

58.9

5.4

Madagascar

267.6

277.6

10.0

4.3

4.2

-0.1

62.1

66.7

4.6
5.0

Nigeria

239.2

270.4

31.1

4.8

5.0

0.1

49.4

54.3

India

338.1

257.1

-81.0

5.2

3.7

-1.5

65.4

69.4

4.1

Togo

167.1

254.5

87.4

3.0

4.2

1.2

55.6

60.8

5.2

Botswana

280.4

240.8

-39.6

5.1

3.5

-1.6

55.0

69.2

14.2

Chad

200.8

239.2

38.4

4.1

4.4

0.4

49.4

54.0

4.6

231.1

238.7

7.6

4.5

3.8

-0.8

51.2

63.5

12.3

Haiti

225.8

236.7

11.0

3.8

3.7

-0.1

59.4

63.7

4.2

Yemen

288.6

231.5

-57.0

4.5

3.5

-1.0

64.5

66.1

1.6

Burundi

195.8

231.2

35.4

3.6

3.8

0.2

54.9

61.2

6.3

Zambia

Rwanda

252.5

227.5

-25.0

4.3

3.3

-1.0

58.9

68.7

9.8

Tanzania

235.4

226.0

-9.4

4.2

3.5

-0.7

55.9

65.0

9.0
13.1

Malawi

220.8

225.8

5.0

4.4

3.5

-0.8

50.6

63.8

Sierra Leone

158.3

214.4

56.0

3.4

3.9

0.5

46.5

54.3

7.8

Zimbabwe

154.6

202.8

48.3

3.4

3.3

-0.1

45.1

61.2

16.1

Central African Republic

189.9

183.4

-6.5

4.2

3.5

-0.7

45.7

52.8

7.1

Afghanistan

221.1

166.2

-54.9

3.7

2.6

-1.1

59.4

64.5

5.1

Sources: Gallup World Poll and UN World Population Prospects 2019.
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Public policy
Until recently, it was not possible to apply the
WELLBY approach to public policy for lack of
direct quantitative information about well-being.
So effects on well-being had to be inferred from
people’s choices, and cost-benefit analysis done
this way could only be applied to a limited range
of policy choices. Now, however, the science of
happiness provides direct evidence on measured
well-being and what affects it. This makes it
possible to analyse policy in a quantitative way
over a much wider range of policy areas. The
numbers may not be perfect, but it is far better to
use empirically-based numbers than pure hunch.10
So we now have for the first time a way of dealing
with the fundamental problem of all public policy
— how to compare the claims of different policies
whose aims are not obviously commensurable.
Using WELLBYs, we have at last a common
currency with which to compare the outcomes
of all policies.

The new objective is, in fact, not that different
from the objective of many existing health services,
but more ambitious. They talk about QualityAdjusted Life Years (or QALYs), and by quality of
life, they mean the “health-related” quality of life
of the individual patient. But we are concerned
with people’s well-being, whatever its source, and
we are concerned with everybody who is affected
by any decision.
Policymakers have many levers: they can spend
money, raise money, and make regulations. All
these decisions should be based on their impact
on WELLBYs. When it comes to spending money,
the most realistic approach is to assume that the
total amount of public expenditure is a political
decision. But, once the total is determined, it is
vital that it should be spent effectively - to produce
the greatest possible WELLBYs. This means that
spending policies should be ranked according to
the total WELLBYs they produce per dollar of
expenditure and authorised in that order until the
available budget is exhausted. A number of
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countries already analyse the impact of new
spending policies upon the well-being of the
population.11 New Zealand has an annual well-being
budget, and the EU Council of Ministers and the
OECD have requested their members to “put
people and their well-being at the centre of policy
design.”12 This should include policies on regulation
and tax as well as spending. All policies should be
based on the total WELLBYs that result.
As regards COVID-19 policy, as the earlier chapters
in this report show, the right strategy in 2020 was
to suppress the virus. Countries that did this had
fewer deaths and a better economy. There was no
need to balance one against the other. However,
in 2021 we shall increasingly have the vaccine. So,
for countries that have failed to suppress the virus
so far, the best course now may involve accepting
some cases of illness (while the vaccine is being
distributed) in order to protect the economy,
children’s education, and the mental health of the
population. For such a balancing act, the WELLBY
approach is helpful and is illustrated in Layard et
al. (2020).13

The monetary value of a life year
In this balancing act, we have to take into account
everything which affects WELLBYs. Besides much
else, this includes the impact on WELLBYs of
life-years lost and of changes in incomes. There is,
thus, in any policy evaluation, an implicit measure
of the amount of money that is of equivalent value
to a year of life lost. For decades governments
have been using estimates of this number to
evaluate health interventions and safety improvements in road, rail, air transport, and workplaces.
These have been obtained using quite different
methods from the WELLBY approach. Interestingly,
the numbers they provide would not justify any
of the lockdowns we have seen in Europe or the
USA.14 And yet, the public approve the lockdown.15
So it is interesting to ask if the WELLBY approach
offers similar or higher numbers compared with
traditional approaches.

(i)	the number of WELLBYs lost when a
year of life is lost, and
(ii)	the loss of money, which (when spread
over a large number of people) would
produce the same loss of WELLBYs.
(i)	On the WELLBY value of a life year, we
assume that if someone dies one year earlier
than otherwise, the loss of WELLBYs equals
average well-being in the population. The
reasoning is that we all want a life that is both
long and enjoyable — in other words, we wish
for the maximum of WELLBYs in our life. If a
year of life is lost, that is a loss of WELLBYs. In
advanced societies, the average WELLBYs per
year lived is 7.5 (out of a maximum of 10), and
that is. Therefore, the cost (in WELLBYs) of a
year of life lost.
(ii)	On the value of money (measured again in
WELLBYs), we know a huge amount from
equations where life-satisfaction (0-10) has
been regressed on log income.16 So suppose
Wellbeing =  Log Income. Then the impact of an
extra dollar of annual income on annual
well-being is /Annual Income.17
So what is the value of  ? Within four advanced
countries, the coefficient on log income is between
0.15 and 0.30 in cross-sectional regressions (and
very much lower in panel analysis). Similar studies
using the Gallup World Poll for nearly every
country in the world give an average coefficient
(with a few controls) of 0.16 in advanced countries
and 0.28 in middle and low-income countries
— again, a similar range.18 However, there are two
factors that could make this an underestimate,
while two others go in the opposite direction.
1.	If income affects some of the variables
controlled for, then income has a bigger
true effect than has been allowed for.
Removing all controls raises the coefficient
by a multiple of between 1.5 and 2.
2.	If income is measured with error, we
should also raise the coefficient.
3.	On the other hand, in any equation, there
must be unobservable differences between
people, which are positively correlated
with both income and well-being and thus

We shall revert shortly to the traditional estimates,
which involve extended chains of inference. But
by contrast with them, the WELLBY approach is
very direct. We simply find out:
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(iii) Thus, in rich countries, the loss of $1 reduces
WELLBYs by around 1/100,000. At the same time,
an extra year of life delivers an average of 7.5
WELLBYs. So we should be willing to pay up to
around $750,000 (widely spread) to save one
Life-Year in the WELLBY approach that is the
monetary value of a Life-Year. It is a large number
and (as we shall see) higher than traditional
values. Two comments are in order.

tend to exaggerate the effect of income.
This is one reason why panel estimates of
the effects of income are typically twothirds lower than those so far quoted.
(Other reasons are additional effects of
measurement error and problems of
timing). One interesting way to reduce
the effect of unobserved variables is to
study the effect of purely exogenous
shocks on income. One type of income
that is completely exogenous is the size
of lottery wins (among those who play
the lottery). In one careful study, the
effect of money gained in this way is to
raise well-being in a way equivalent to a
coefficient of 0.38 on log income.19

First, traditional values would not justify most
lockdowns, but the people support the lockdowns.
Second, if public expenditure is constrained, it
would not be right to fund all savings of a life-year
that cost less than $750,000. But in this constrained
situation, life-years should still be valued at that
level relative to monetary outcomes.

4.	A final complication is that there is
overwhelming evidence that much of the
effect of income measured in these
studies is an effect of relative income.20
But the point of estimating the value of a
life-year is to answer the question, “What
fall in absolute income, shared across the
population, would be as bad as the loss of
a life-year.” There is good evidence that
an absolute change in national income
per head has a smaller effect than the
effects of changes in individual income
quoted so far. These latter are measured
holding other incomes constant and
therefore include the effect of gains in
relative income. One type of evidence on
the effects of absolute income comes
from looking at country time-series. In
European countries since 1970, one
estimate is that an increase in trend log
income raised well-being by 0.2, with very
wide confidence intervals.21

The well-being approach to this issue is relatively
new.22 But over the last forty years, other methods
have been used to produce a range of numbers
used by governments in many countries. These
methods fall into two main types, based on either
“revealed preference” or “stated preferences.”

Revealed preference
The revealed preference method relies mainly on
the wages paid in jobs that differ in the frequency
of fatal accidents. The basic idea is that, for
people of a given ability, a higher risk of death
has to be compensated by a higher wage. More
precisely, there is (for people of given ability) a
market relationship, w = f(p), where a higher
probability of death (p) is associated with a
higher wage (w).23 Along this market line, each

Based on all this evidence, we propose to use the
figure as 0.3 as a generous measure of the impact
on well-being (0-10) of a unit change in absolute
log income. From this, it follows that the loss of
WELLBYs from one dollar fall in annual income is
no higher than 0.3 / Average annual income. If
the average annual disposable income per head is
$30,000, the loss of $1 when widely spread is
equivalent to the loss of 1/100,000 WELLBYs.

From 2006-08 to 2017-19 social
welfare in the world rose from
369 to 374 WELLBYs per person;
in 2020 life expectancy fell in
most countries, though not
enough to wipe out at world level
the gains since 2006-08.
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Figure 8.1: Wage /risk trade-off
w

w = f(p)

on the assumption of accurate information on the
part of workers. It is also based on people’s ex
ante valuations of the risk of death, whereas the
well-being estimate is essentially ex-post — it
relies on an empirical estimate of how much
well-being is actually lost (plus the marginal value
of money).

Stated preferences

Probability of death (p)

individual chooses a point where the extra wage
equals her subjective valuation of the extra risk,
while at the same time, each firm chooses a point
where the extra wage is matched by the reduced
cost of safety measures. Only when all individuals
and all firms are in equilibrium is the market
relationship stable. (see Figure 8.1)
If all firms and individuals share the same, correct
information about risk, we can claim that the
slope of the line w=f(p) measures the monetary
equivalent of a prevented fatality.24

The second approach that has been widely used
depends on people’s answers to hypothetical
questions about how much they would be willing
to pay for a reduced probability of death. This is
the preferred method in the UK. It results in lower
numbers, and the UK government currently uses a
figure of £1.6 million for a prevented fatality and
£60k for a life-year.26
The argument for the stated preference approach
is that it addresses the question of valuation
directly. The main problem with it is that people
have great difficulty thinking clearly about very
small probabilities. For example, in one study, 40%
of respondents reported the same willingness to
pay for a reduced probability of 4 in 100,000 and
a reduced probability of 12 in 100,000.27
There is another problem. The question of valuation
can, of course, be put in two ways.
1.	How much would you pay to achieve
some given reduction in the probability
of death?

Many such evaluations have been used by
different agencies. In 2011 and 2012, a variety of
US government agencies valued a prevented
death at between $6 million and $10 million.25
Such estimates are, of course, generated by the
choices of workers of a wide variety of ages. So,
to move from the value of a prevented fatality to
the value of one life-year saved, we have to allow
for the remaining life expectancy of those who
die. Suppose this is 40 years, and applying no
discount rate, we would get the value of a life-year
of $150k to 250k. But those figures should be
increased somewhat to allow for discounting. The
resulting calculation would, however, be lower
than the typical result of the WELLBY calculation
that we have documented.
In comparing the two, we should remember that
the labour market valuation depends very much

2.	How much would you need to be paid
to give up the same reduction in the
probability of death?
For small changes, these numbers should, in
theory, be very close to each other. But people, in
fact, give answers to the second question that are
almost five times higher — because they see it as
a loss.28 This is a big problem.
And there is a further problem with both stated
preference and revealed preference methods:
they estimate what an individual would be
willing to pay for a reduced risk of death on the
assumption that other people’s incomes are
unchanged. But in fact, if taxes were raised to
finance increased safety, other people’s incomes
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would also fall. This fall in comparator income
would partly offset the loss of well-being
experienced by each individual from the loss of
her own income. So people would each be willing
to pay more if others were doing the same. For
this reasoning, a country should be willing to pay
more in order to save a life. The WELLBY approach
provides a more reasonable alternative.

The impact of COVID-19

(1)

(2)

(3)

Column (3) does the same for deaths from
COVID-19. Despite the approximate and provisional
nature of the data, we have ranked countries
according to how much they have suffered from
these three factors combined, starting with those
that suffered most.
Those who have suffered most include South Africa,
the USA, and many Latin American countries.
Most European countries come in the next group
down. And in the least affected group come
all the main parts of East and Southeast Asia
(mainland China, Taiwan, Cambodia, Thailand,
Vietnam, Singapore, and Japan).

Finally, we can apply the WELLBY approach to
estimating the combined impact of COVID on
social welfare, taking into account only its effect
It is extremely interesting to look at the correlation
on income per head, unemployment, and life
of death rates and losses to GDP. Across 79
∑∑
expectancy. So unlike the rest of
the chapter, we "
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 =
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊!" (1 − 𝛿𝛿) countries, the correlation is positive and quite
𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡 total change
are(1)not looking at estimates of the
substantial (r = 0.38). In other words, countries that
in well-being but only at estimated effects on
controlled the virus also avoided the economic
∑∑
"
well-being coming 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
through
GDP
per head
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
= and𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊!"losses
(1 − 𝛿𝛿)which
affected other countries.31
𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡 so
unemployment. We
start
from
equation
(2)
=
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 " = 𝑊𝑊" 𝑌𝑌"
that, if we look at proportional changes, we have
the(2)following.
=" 𝑌𝑌"
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 " = 𝑊𝑊

(3) ∆ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 = ∆ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 + ∆ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

(3)

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

∆ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
∆ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 ∆ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
=
+
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

But for the present purpose, we are only interested
in changes in well-being coming from GDP per
(4)
head and unemployment. Thus, the equation we
use
to calculate
8.2 is29
∆ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
0.3 ∆Table
log(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺/𝑁𝑁)
1.2 ∆ 𝑢𝑢
∆ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
(4)
(4)

=

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤

−

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤

+

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

∆ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
0.3 ∆ log(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺/𝑁𝑁)
1.2 ∆ 𝑢𝑢
∆ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
=
−
+
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

Where N is population, and u is the proportional
rate of unemployment. For the last term, we
assume that it bears the same ratio to Deaths
per million as it does in the US.30 The results are
therefore very approximate and provisional. They
are shown in Table 8.2.
Column (1) shows the percentage change in
welfare due to changes in GDP, Column (2) does
the same for changes in unemployment, and
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Table 8.2: Percentage changes in social welfare due to changes in GDP per head
and unemployment and deaths from COVID-19
Change in GDP
per capita

All countries

Change in
Unemployment
rate

Deaths
from COVID

Total

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.4

-0.3

-0.4

-1.0
-3.4

Peru

-0.8

-1.2

-1.4

South Africa

-0.6

-2.1

-0.6

-3.3

Colombia

-0.5

-1.3

-1.0

-2.8

Dominican Republic

-0.4

-2.1

-0.3

-2.7

Belgium

-0.4

-0.1

-2.0

-2.5

Slovenia

-0.3

-0.6

-1.5

-2.5

Bosnia and Herzegovina

-0.3

-0.7

-1.5

-2.5

Ecuador

-0.7

-0.9

-0.9

-2.5

Macedonia

-0.3

-0.7

-1.4

-2.4

Spain

-0.6

-0.5

-1.3

-2.4

Costa Rica

-0.3

-1.6

-0.5

-2.4

United States

-0.2

-0.9

-1.2

-2.4

Panama

-0.5

-0.7

-1.1

-2.4

Armenia

-0.3

-0.9

-1.1

-2.3

Bolivia

-0.5

-0.8

-0.9

-2.3

Chile

-0.4

-0.8

-1.0

-2.2

Italy

-0.5

-0.2

-1.5

-2.2

Argentina

-0.7

-0.2

-1.1

-2.1

Hungary

-0.3

-0.5

-1.2

-2.0

United Kingdom

-0.5

-0.3

-1.3

-2.0

Romania

-0.2

-0.8

-1.0

-2.0

Mexico

-0.5

-0.3

-1.2

-2.0

Croatia

-0.5

-0.3

-1.1

-1.9

Bulgaria

-0.2

-0.3

-1.3

-1.8

Czech Republic

-0.3

-0.2

-1.3

-1.8

France

-0.5

-0.1

-1.2

-1.7

Philippines

-0.5

-1.1

-0.1

-1.7

Brazil

-0.3

-0.3

-1.1

-1.7

Portugal

-0.5

-0.3

-0.8

-1.7

Ukraine

-0.5

-0.7

-0.5

-1.7

Moldova

-0.2

-0.6

-0.9

-1.6

Greece

-0.5

-0.6

-0.6

-1.6

Sweden

-0.3

-0.3

-1.0

-1.6

Iran

-0.4

-0.4

-0.8

-1.6

Canada

-0.4

-0.7

-0.5

-1.5

Switzerland

-0.3

-0.1

-1.1

-1.5

Netherlands

-0.2

-0.3

-0.8

-1.4

Sri Lanka

-0.4

-1.0

0.0

-1.4

Austria

-0.3

-0.2

-0.8

-1.3

Latvia

-0.3

-0.5

-0.4

-1.2

Lithuania

-0.1

-0.4

-0.8

-1.2

El Salvador

-0.5

-0.5

-0.2

-1.2
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Table 8.2: Percentage changes in social welfare due to changes in GDP per head
and unemployment and deaths from COVID-19 continued
Change in GDP
per capita

Change in
Unemployment
rate

Deaths
from COVID

Total

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Slovakia

-0.4

-0.4

-0.5

-1.2

Serbia

-0.1

-0.5

-0.6

-1.2

Poland

-0.2

-0.1

-0.9

-1.2

Israel

-0.3

-0.4

-0.5

-1.2

Nicaragua

-0.3

-0.9

0.0

-1.2

Estonia

-0.3

-0.7

-0.2

-1.1

Honduras

-0.4

-0.3

-0.4

-1.1

Iceland

-0.4

-0.6

-0.1

-1.1

Kyrgyzstan

-0.8

0.0

-0.2

-1.0

Albania

-0.5

-0.1

-0.5

-1.0

Azerbaijan

-0.3

-0.4

-0.3

-1.0

Kazakhstan

-0.2

-0.6

-0.2

-1.0

Germany

-0.3

-0.2

-0.5

-0.9
-0.9

Russia

-0.2

-0.2

-0.5

Turkey

-0.4

-0.2

-0.3

-0.9

Indonesia

-0.1

-0.6

-0.1

-0.9

Paraguay

-0.3

-0.2

-0.4

-0.9

Ireland

-0.2

-0.1

-0.5

-0.8

Malaysia

-0.4

-0.4

0.0

-0.8

Cyprus

-0.4

-0.2

-0.2

-0.7

New Zealand

-0.3

-0.3

0.0

-0.6

Mongolia

-0.2

-0.4

0.0

-0.6

Denmark

-0.2

-0.2

-0.3

-0.6

Belarus

-0.1

-0.2

-0.2

-0.5

Australia

-0.2

-0.3

0.0

-0.5

Finland

-0.2

-0.2

-0.1

-0.5

Singapore

-0.3

-0.1

0.0

-0.5

Japan

-0.3

-0.2

0.0

-0.5

Uruguay

-0.2

-0.1

-0.1

-0.4

Thailand

-0.4

0.0

0.0

-0.4

Norway

-0.1

-0.1

-0.1

-0.4
-0.3

Pakistan

-0.1

-0.1

-0.1

Vietnam

0.0

-0.2

0.0

-0.2

South Korea

-0.1

-0.1

0.0

-0.2

Taiwan Province of China

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

China

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

Egypt

0.1

0.1

-0.1

0.1

Sources: GDP: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020. Unemployment:
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020 (country level), The World Bank.
World Development Indicators (World estimates). Covid deaths: Johns Hopkins University database. Dong E, Du H,
Gardner L. An interactive web-based dashboard to track COVID-19 in real-time. Lancet Infect Dis; published online
Feb 19. All figures have been calculated to five decimal places before rounding.
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Conclusions
The WELLBY approach offers the most plausible
way of combining well-being with the length of
life. It assumes that the value of life comes from
the well-being it provides. We do not rely on how
individuals respond to the ex-ante risk of losing
their lives but on the ex-post satisfaction that life
actually delivers. And we do this because of our
view that a good society delivers lives that are
both long and satisfying.
This approach serves two purposes. First, it
provides us with a more comprehensive way of
assessing human progress and the performance
of different countries. The story is basically
positive. From 2006-08 to 2017-19 social welfare
in the world rose from 369 to 374 WELLBYs per
person. This was because, while well-being fell
somewhat, life expectancy rose by 3.7 years. And
WELLBYs became more evenly distributed across
the world because life expectancy rose most in
low-WELLBY regions.

However, in 2020 life expectancy fell in most
countries, though not enough to wipe out at
world level the gains since 2006-08. At the same
time, the economy shrank, and unemployment
increased. But typically, those countries which
controlled the virus best also experienced the
least hit to the economy — there was no trade-off
between these two outcomes.
The second use of WELLBYs is to evaluate policy
options. Well-being science now provides enough
evidence for this to become more and more
feasible. It should be used wherever possible to
evaluate future strategies against COVID-19.
And within 20 years, it will surely become the
standard method of policy evaluation in more and
more countries.
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Endnotes
1

For a fuller treatment see De Neve et al (2020).

2

This is often assumed at 1.5% per annum.

3	If they do, we would expect the test-rest differences to be
similar at different parts of the scale. They are (Krueger and
Schadke (2008)).
4

But see Peasgood et al (2018).

5

Bentham (1789). Mill (1861).

6	The product of two averages is not the same as the average
of the product but in this case it is a good approximation
since well-being is similar across ages.
7

Andrasfay, T., & Goldman, N. (2021).

8

Aburto, J. M et al (2021).

29	For the coefficient of 1.2 see Chapter 2. A similar coefficient
comes from Di Tella et al. (2003) for substantially higher
coefficients, see Clark et al. (2018) Table 4.4.

10	For a useful survey of quantitative estimates of the effects
on wellbeing of a whole range of factors see Frijters et al
(2020), Table 1.

30	In the USA in 2020, COVID-19 deaths were 1.049 per 1000.
And life expectancy fell by 1 year i.e. by 1.2%.

For example, France, Sweden. See OECD (2016).

12	See European Council (2019). https://data.consilium.europa.
eu/doc/document/ST-13171-2019-INIT/en/pdf.
13 Layard et al (2020).
14	On the UK see Dolan and Jenkins (2020). A similar point
has been made by Paul Frijters and others.

27	Dubourg et al (1996). For a devastating analysis of the
stated preference approach in general see Kahneman et al
(1999). Focusing illusion is a particular problem.
28 Tuncel and Hammitt (2014).

9	Social welfare = W̄Y, so social welfare rises if Δ log W̄ + Δ log Y > 0

11

26	Chilton et al (2020). Note that in the wellbeing approach
the quality of life is measured directly. In the QALY
approach used by the British NHS the quality of life of a
given medical condition is measured by comparison with
a fully healthy life by a time-trade-off exercise. (People
are asked “If you could have either ten years with your
condition or x years without your medical condition, what
value of x would make you indifferent?”). For a critique of
this approach see Dolan and Kahneman (2008) who
advocate a wellbeing approach to measuring the quality
of life in the presence of a disease.

31	The correlations between the columns are r12 0.32, r13 0.38,
r14 0.63, r23 0.14, r24 0.68, r34 0.79. For 49 countries covered
in Chapter 2 and Table 8.2, the correlations between the
measured changes in well-being and columns (1)-(4) in this
table are: (1) 0.12; (2) 0.34; (3) 0.33; (4) 0.31.

15 See for example Duffy and Allington (2020)
16	This is the functional form with the best power to explain
life-satisfaction (Layard et al 2008).
17 If W = 0.3logY, dW/dY = 0.3/Y
18	Clark et al (2018), table 2.2. Britain, Germany, Australia and
US. For the whole world Chapter 2 of this report finds a
coefficient of 0.25.
19 Lundqvist et al (2020).
20 Clark et al (2008). Layard et al (2010).
21	Layard et al (2010). Using a wider range of countries.
Wolfers et al (2013) got a higher figure, with again wide
confidence intervals. By contrast Easterlin et al (2020) find
no effect.
22 It was first proposed by Dolan (2011).
23 Viscusi and Aldi (2003), reflecting Rosen (1986).
24 For example, suppose
	w = a + bp, where w is the annual wage and p the annual 		

probabilty of death.
If N workers ecperience a given Δp, then the total change in wages
is bΔp. N.
If Δp. N equalled one, there would be one life lost per year and the
total wage compensation per year would be $b.

25 Viscusi (2014).
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